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Abstract 
 
In crucial places in his path of thought, Martin Heidegger appeals to the notion of an 
insoluble enigma as a way of elucidating that thought, to such an extent that the 
enigma goes to the very heart of that thinking. All the words that are central to that 
thinking, the words that Heidegger uses to point towards the possibility of 
appearance and disclosure, are marked by this figure of the insoluble enigma. 
Whether writing about the opening of a world that art is, or the happening that is 
figured as Ereignis, Heidegger resorts to the enigma to illuminate his thinking. But 
what does it mean to inscribe an enigmatic insolubility into one’s very thinking and 
what kind of explanatory power can such a figure have? To answer these questions, 
this thesis traces the thought of the enigma through a series of readings of 
Heidegger’s ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’, his 1942 lectures on Hölderlin’s ‘The 
Ister’ and Sophocles’s Antigone, and his writings on the poem of Parmenides. 
Beginning with a consideration of the enigma of art, it moves on to the enigmatic 
activity of the river in Hölderlin’s poem and how this gives rise to the enigma of the 
here and now, before moving on to the enigma of the uncanny in Antigone and the 
law of becoming homely in being unhomely; the place of the law itself becomes 
critical here. Finally, via Parmenides’s saying that thinking and being are the same, 
the enigma is identified with Heidegger’s rethinking of the ancient Greek thought of 
a0lh/qeia and traced, from there, to the givenness of being as es gibt and Ereignis. 
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Introduction 
 
On the enigma in thought 
 
The figure of the enigma, the Rätsel, is one that ramifies and reverberates through a 
number of texts by Martin Heidegger without becoming an explicit theme therein. 
Apart from two paragraphs largely concerned with the etymology of Rätsel in his 
lectures on Hölderlin’s poem ‘The Ister’, Heidegger neither gives us a definition of 
the enigma, nor does he elucidate it in a structured way. It is given to us in all its 
enigmatic character. Why does Heidegger resort to the enigma throughout his work? 
From ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’ to his essays on the Presocratics, the figure of 
the enigma is referred to in its essential insolubility. In the essay, ‘Hegel and the 
Greeks’, originally given as a lecture in 1958 and published in 1960, he writes of the 
enigma of a0lh/qeia, the Greek term usually translated as truth, and how it has 
prevailed or been at work [walten] both in the beginning of Greek philosophy and 
throughout the course of philosophy. Attending to the enigma, Heidegger says, is a 
form of pointing out that the philosophy of the Greeks exists in thinking in terms of a 
not yet [noch nicht] of what is still to be thought, what Heidegger calls the 
unthought, to which we have yet to measure up. To think the enigma attentively in 
Heidegger’s terms would seem to suggest that we can begin to measure up to the 
unthought. In a footnote to the word Rätsel, added in 1960, Heidegger writes of ‘the 
authority [Befugnis] of the enigma’.1 It seems that being attentive to the enigma of 
a0lh/qeia is to submit oneself to the authority of the enigma and to put oneself in the 
position of the not-yet of thinking. The enigma seems to name this not-yet but what 
is this authority, how does it arise and who or what authorises it? Does the enigma 
claim this authority from out of itself for itself? Whatever the answer to these 
questions, it seems reasonable to say that the enigma has a certain privilege within 
Heidegger’s thought, whether he characterises it as the enigma of a0lh/qeia, being or 
art. What it means to inscribe such a figure in philosophy and where it takes us are, 
perhaps, the guiding questions that lead this thesis as it follows the ravelling and 
unravelling of the enigma in Heidegger’s thought. But should it concern us at all? To 
                                                 
1
 Martin Heidegger, Pathmarks, edited by William McNeill, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
1998, p.336. Wegmarken, Frankfurt am Main, Vittorio Klostermann, 1976, p.444. 
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say that something is an enigma could mean that we need trouble ourselves no 
further with it; surely, we know what an enigma is without really having to think 
about it. Nothing could be more straightforward than the meaning of an enigma, 
especially if we consult the dictionary. An enigma is a puzzle, a riddle, something 
ambiguous or mysterious, whose meaning can be figured out, or whose ambiguity 
can be demarcated and domesticated. But if there is one thing that Heidegger teaches 
us, it is, perhaps, that a resort to the dictionary tells us nothing essential. If we rely 
solely on the dictionary, perhaps we miss what is essential about the enigma, or we 
mistakenly assume that we know what an enigma is and therefore leave it behind, 
untroubled and untroubling.  
 
That there is something troubling and troubled about an enigma, however, seems to 
be a recurrent theme in philosophy and this trouble is signalled in one of the 
beginnings of Western thought, in Greek tragedy, in Sophocles’s drama Oedipus 
Tyrannus.  Oedipus’s response to the enigmatic Sphinx, a hybrid creature from 
Theban legend, firstly in freeing Thebes from her malignity and secondly in his 
ignoring of her injunction not to seek out the murderer of Laius, brings about his and 
his family’s downfall. At the time of the murder, the Sphinx had counselled the 
people of Thebes not to bring his killer to justice, as Creon advises Oedipus during 
the play, after he has told him about the killing. This injunction is echoed by Tiresias 
in his confrontation with Oedipus who, having decided that the murderer must be 
found and punished, forces Tiresias to share his knowledge of the murder. Oedipus 
had been crowned king of Thebes, having solved the enigma of the Sphinx’s riddle, 
thereby saving the city from her tyranny. In marrying Jocasta, he fulfils the second 
part of the Oracle of Apollo, having already fulfilled the first by killing his father 
Laius in ignorance of who he was. What brings about his downfall is not the actual 
killing of Laius but Oedipus’s absolute insistence on knowing who the murderer is. It 
is this insistence on pursuing to the end what he does not know is self-knowledge 
that destroys him, leaving him abject. In ‘Notes on the Oedipus’, Hölderlin writes of 
a knowledge drunk on its own magnificent and harmonious form which ‘provokes 
itself to know more than it can bear or grasp’;2 Oedipus has one eye too many, as he 
                                                 
2
 Friedrich Hölderlin, Essays and Letters, edited and translated by Jeremy Adler and Charlie Louth, 
London, Penguin Books, 2009, p.320. Werke und Briefe, Band 2, herausgegeben von Friedrich 
Beißner und Jochen Schmidt, Frankfurt am Main, Insel Verlag, 1969, p.732. 
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writes ‘In lovely blueness’. This exposure of the truth about Oedipus takes the form 
of a series of interrogations which, says John Jones, ‘have a sublime impersonal 
malignity such as a series of forced moves at chess would impart if the game 
possessed tragic relevance to life’.3 These interrogations lead to a self-judgement in 
which there is a dual self-loss, writes Christoph Menke. Oedipus establishes his own 
condemned status, which he has ‘imposed on himself, without, however, intending it. 
In his self-condemnation Oedipus immediately twice loses himself; for this reason he 
is – in as well as after his self-condemnation - a self no longer capable of self-
determination, of action and living – he is one accursed’.4 What the fate of Oedipus 
seems to teach us is that how one responds to an enigma can bring with it an 
overwhelming responsibility and that what seems to be a plausible answer might well 
be nothing of the sort. The Chorus enjoins us at the end of the play to look upon the 
disaster that has befallen the ill-starred Oedipus, ‘who knew the answer to the 
famous riddle [a0ini/gmat0] and was a mighty man, on whose fortune every one 
among the citizens used to look with envy!’.5 The Greek Sphinx had a monstrous 
reputation even before her troubled meeting with Oedipus – all who failed to answer 
the riddle were killed; are these the corpses that populate the foreground of Gustave 
Doré’s painting L’Enigme? – so the outcome for Oedipus only added to this 
monstrosity, even though the Sphinx was seemingly defeated. 
 
The Sphinx belongs to both Greek and Egyptian mythology, although there are 
differences between them, not least their sex, and both play a part in the historical 
development of art. The Egyptian and Greek Sphinxes are paradigmatic of a certain 
symbolic sense for Hegel. In his Aesthetics, Hegel sees symbolism as a stage in art’s 
development, a stage that is inadequate to the spirit. This is ‘because the spirit here is 
itself not yet inwardly clear to itself, as it would be if it were the free spirit; 
nevertheless at least there are configurations which reveal in themselves at once that 
they are not merely chosen to display themselves alone, but that they are meant to 
                                                 
3
 John Jones, On Aristotle and Greek Tragedy, London, Chatto & Windus, 1962, p.201. 
4
 Christoph Menke, Tragic Play: Irony and Theater from Sophocles to Beckett, translated by James 
Phillips, New York, Columbia University Press, 2009, pp.51-52. 
5
 Sophocles, Oedipus Tyrannus in I Ajax, Electra, Oedipus Tyrannus, edited and translated by Hugh 
Lloyd-Jones, The Loeb Classical Library, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England, Harvard 
University Press, 1994, p.483. 
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hint [hindeuten] at meanings that lie deeper and are more comprehensive’.6 The 
symbolic work of art hints at things outside or beyond it, but these hints are not 
merely arbitrary. What it hints at must have an inwardly grounded affinity with the 
form in which the work of art is presented and have an essential relation with it, says 
Hegel. Symbolism is a form of hinting or pointing at something other, an indication. 
It is with the ancient Egyptians that the symbolic work of art reaches its apogee: 
‘Egypt is the country of symbols, the country which sets itself the spiritual task of the 
self-deciphering of the spirit, without actually attaining to the decipherment. The 
problems remain unsolved, and the solution which we can provide consists therefore 
only in interpreting the riddles [Rätsel] of Egyptian art and its symbolic works as a 
problem remaining undeciphered by the Egyptians themselves.’7 The enigmas of 
Egyptian art can only be presented as enigmas by those who come after them. We 
have to see the enigma as an enigma and to solve the enigma of Egyptian art is to 
present this insolubility. The Egyptians themselves could not find a solution to their 
enigmas and nor can we in coming to them centuries later. It is the Sphinx that best 
expresses the enigmatic character of Egyptian art for Hegel. The works of Egyptian 
art are enigmas and the Sphinx is symbolic of ‘the objective enigma par excellence 
[Rätsel selbst]…It is, as it were, the symbol of the symbolic itself’.8 But a symbol 
that is symbolic of symbolism is surely a symbol that escapes the logic of symbolism 
or that at least is prior to symbolism but can only be seen in the light of such a 
symbolism. If symbolism is part of a representational order then the symbol that is 
symbolic of such an order cannot belong in this order because it is a symbol of itself 
in which it is not itself because it is a symbol. A symbol points to something other 
than itself. If a symbol points to itself it is no longer a symbol. The symbol is 
destroyed at the very moment that it becomes a symbol. 
 
There is, therefore, a certain estrangement at work in the symbol of the symbolic and 
the Sphinx embodies this estrangement. The struggle which the Sphinx undertakes in 
its form, its Gestalt, between its human aspect and its various animal elements, is 
symbolic for Hegel of the struggle of spirit to come into itself, a struggle which is 
                                                 
6
 G.W.F. Hegel, Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art, translated by T.M. Knox, Volume I, Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 1975, p.352. Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik I Werke 13, Frankfurt am Main, 
Suhrkamp Verlag, 1970, p.454. Hegel’s emphasis. 
7
 Ibid. p.354/pp.456-7. Hegel’s emphasis. 
8
 Ibid. p.360/p.465. Translation modified. 
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unavailing in Egyptian art. What it does do, however, is speak to the strangeness at 
the heart of the Rätsel: ‘This pressure for self-conscious spirituality which does not 
apprehend itself from its own resources in the one reality adequate to itself but only 
contemplates itself in what is related to it and brings itself into consciousness in 
precisely what is strange to it, is the symbolic as such which at this peak becomes an 
enigma [Rätsel].’9 The Greek Sphinx appears in this sense, says Hegel, that is it 
appears only in its own estrangement, and it is in the perceived simplicity of 
Oedipus’s answer to the riddle, and in the Delphic oracle’s injunction to ‘know 
thyself’, that Hegel sees the clarity of the light of consciousness ‘which makes its 
concrete content shine clearly through the shape belonging and appropriate to 
itself’10 and, as such, it is that which reveals only itself. The aim of symbolic art was 
for the spirit to attain a clarity free of enigma [rätsellose] so that it could form itself 
out of its own self-sufficiency and separate itself from appearance, according to 
Hegel, so that meaning comes into consciousness through its own power. In not 
being able to cast off the enigma, Egyptian art remained stuck in riddles and obscure 
symbolism. Because of this inability, symbolism is precisely a deficient - defective 
or disfigured - form for Hegel. 
 
The enigma of art is a problem for Hegel that is overcome through art’s progression. 
The enigma remains insoluble but having presented its insolubility it can be passed 
over. However, if insolubility is seen as constitutive of the inherently enigmatic 
symbol, it is also true to say that Hegel reduces the Rätsel to the level of a puzzle, 
something easily soluble, when later in the Aesthetics he contrasts the symbol with 
the riddle. A symbol, he says, is essentially an unsolved problem, while the riddle is 
solved precisely because it has an inventor who shapes both its veiling and unveiling. 
A riddle is a construct; the enigma, it would seem, arises out of the work of art 
without conscious intent. The enigma is somehow given. One can see, therefore, two 
orders of the Rätsel in Hegel’s thinking on art. The first, as symbol, could more 
properly be called an enigma, something that is inherently unanswerable and whose 
solution is the presentation of this insolubility. The second is the riddle as a puzzle 
that is decipherable, precisely because it has a conscious intent behind it, and is more 
akin to a game than an enigma. It is, he says, the conscious wit of symbolism, a test 
                                                 
9
 Ibid. p.361/p.465. Translation modified. 
10
 Ibid. p.361/p.466. 
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of ingenuity and flexibility in the way that various different aspects are combined, 
which is also self-destructive in that the riddle has an answer. It seems to be nothing 
more than a low grade form of verbal dexterity, which in modern times, he says, has 
been debased to the level of witticisms and jokes. Does this mean that it is safe to 
pass over the enigma, that it can be left behind? If the enigma of art is merely a 
developmental stage, or a mere puzzle, then perhaps it is a question of what remains 
of art and of the enigma. But this passing over of the enigma, this believing that the 
enigma of art has been definitively dealt with, would seem to be premature, as Jean-
Luc Nancy acknowledges in his essay ‘The Vestige of Art’, when he conjectures that 
the entire history of art is constituted by the ‘tensions and torsions toward its own 
enigma’. Art, he says, ‘in our time imposes on itself a severe gesture, a painful move 
toward its own essence become enigma, a manifest enigma of its own vestige’.11 Art, 
then, is a kind of tearing, a system of forces in which one rift is answered by another, 
always prone to the possibility of being torn apart. That the question of art – of art as 
an enigma – is an urgent one for Nancy is clear when he says that these tensions and 
torsions seem to have reached their peak today – he was speaking in 1994 – which, 
he says, might be an appearance or it might be the culmination of an event that began 
at least two hundred years ago. Art vacillates in its meaning, says Nancy, and it is 
imperative that this movement is accompanied and known. Art as vestige is not an 
image, he continues, but is the mark of a passing, the remains of a pas, which is past 
as soon as it is made. The vestige is that which is left behind, a hint, a mere trace, of 
what has passed of this rifting movement: ‘It is impossible to say literally that the 
step takes place: yet a place in the strong sense of the word is always the vestige of a 
step.’12 
 
This excursus into classical dramaturgy and Hegelian aesthetics, while not supplying 
a definitive answer to the question of the enigma, does seem to mark the fact that we 
have moved away from the dictionary definition. Pace Hegel’s second order of the 
Rätsel, it is not just a simple puzzle, a riddle whose answer is worked out in advance. 
‘An enigma is more than a mere puzzle’,13 wrote Lawrence Durrell. But wherein lies 
this ‘more’? How is it constituted? It is not just a form of intellectual play in which 
                                                 
11
 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Muses, translated by Peggy Kamuf, Stanford, California, Stanford University 
Press, 1996, p.86. 
12
 Ibid. p.98. Nancy’s emphases. 
13
 Lawrence Durrell, Quinx or The Ripper’s Tale, Faber and Faber, London & Boston, 1985, p.166. 
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‘puzling Questions’, such as what song the sirens sang, or the name Achilles 
assumed when hiding among women, ‘are not beyond all conjecture’.14 Perhaps the 
‘more’ resides in the question of the answer to an enigma, whether an answer is ever 
possible or whether, in its structure and constitution, an enigma is unanswerable. But 
if the enigma is unanswerable then surely this is another reason to leave it behind. 
There has to be more than insolubility otherwise the necessity of engaging 
disappears. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, in his essay ‘Reading Montaigne’, hints at this 
something more when he describes the radical openness of an enigma in that it is 
both a demand and a refusal of such a demand but which, in its refusal, remains 
impossible to ignore: ‘Religion is valuable in that it saves a place for what is strange 
and knows our lot is enigmatic. All the solutions it gives to the enigma are 
incompatible with our monstrous condition. As a questioning, it is justified on the 
condition that it remain answerless. It is one of the modes of our folly, and our folly 
is essential to us. When we put not self-satisfied understanding but a consciousness 
astonished at itself at the core of human existence, we can neither obliterate the 
dream of an other side of things nor repress the wordless invocation of this beyond. 
What is certain is that if there is some universal Reason we are not in on its secrets, 
and are in any case required to guide our lives according to our lights.’15 We seem to 
be at the mercy of a condition that demands answers but that is incapable of 
supplying them. What this passage from Merleau-Ponty also gives us are some hints 
about certain traits of the enigma: a voice that speaks without speaking; the demand 
for, and impossibility of, an answer; and, as with the Sphinx, another suggestion of a 
certain monstrosity. 
 
The ‘more’ could also suggest that, in thinking the enigma of art, we are thinking 
more than the enigma of art. That thinking itself is an enigma, and that this thinking 
is either impossible or monstrous, is, perhaps, the lesson of Zarathustra’s vision of 
the enigma in Friedrich Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Here the Rätsel is 
identified as the vision of the most solitary man, ‘a young shepherd, writhing, 
choking, convulsed, his face distorted; and a heavy, black snake was hanging out of 
                                                 
14
 Sir Thomas Browne, The Major Works, edited by C.A. Patrides, Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 
1977, p.307. 
15
 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Signs, translated by Richard C. McCleary, Evanston, Illinois, 
Northwestern University Press, 1964, p.203. 
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his mouth’.16 Zarathustra tells of his vision on board ship, a few days out from port, 
having identified an appropriate audience, that is those Sucher and Versucher, who 
live in danger, drunk on Rätsel, who delight in the doubled light of twilight. These 
are people who hate the closure of calculation [erschließen], preferring the leap of 
guessing or surmise [erraten]. For Nietzsche, the vision of the enigma is not for 
common eyes. Vision itself is uncommon. To see [sehen] is to see the abyss 
[Abgrund], the abandonment of ground, and seeing the enigma of the most solitary 
man is, perhaps, to shudder with horror. Zarathustra’s vision comes after a glimpse 
into the thought of the eternal return. In his climb up the mountain, with the dwarf of 
gravity on his back, he comes to a gateway marked Augenblick, moment or glance of 
an eye, which marks the confluence of two eternities, one flowing back into the past 
and one into the future. It is following the dwarf’s failure to answer his questions 
about the Augenblick that the vision occurs and both dwarf and gateway disappear. 
Standing amongst wild cliffs, in the most desolate of places, Zarathustra sees the 
solitary man. He challenges his audience to solve the enigma of what he saw, but 
none of them are capable of meeting it. That vision in itself is shocking is signalled 
by the fact that, in his challenge, Zarathustra uses the word schauen, which means to 
see, look or behold, but Schauer means shudder, while schauerlich means horrific, 
terrible or dreadful. It is true that Zarathustra’s vision changes as the shepherd, after 
exhortations by Zarathustra, bites off the head of the snake and is transformed into a 
laughing being surrounded by light. But even this vision is unsettling. The laughter is 
unearthly and inhuman and it is a laughter that Zarathustra longs for, a longing that 
consumes him and makes it impossible for him to live or die.  
 
On the way to the enigma 
 
A certain thematic is building around the figure of the enigma. To take matters 
further, I want to make a preliminary enquiry into the enigma and its relation to 
Heidegger’s thought. In turning to Heidegger, a number of questions arise about 
precisely where he begins to think the enigma, whether his thought could be said to 
be a thinking of the enigma, whether it has its beginning in the enigma, or whether to 
                                                 
16
 Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, translated by R.J. Hollingdale, Harmondsworth, 
Penguin Books, 1961, p.180. Werke VII, Also Sprach Zarathustra, herausgegeben von Giorgio Colli 
und Mazzino Montinari, Berlin, Walter de Gruyter & Co, 1968, p.197. 
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begin to think is to be always already in the enigma. Where to begin is a question 
that preoccupied Heidegger and the possibility of a return to the beginning out of 
which would arise an other beginning is one that accompanies him throughout his 
thinking. Where to begin is a matter of finding an appropriate point in Heidegger’s 
thinking where the enigma is introduced in such a way that what the enigma is 
remains open, but where its importance in terms of thinking is established. One 
starting point is in his lectures on Nietzsche, where he considers Zarathustra’s vision, 
but I will come to that in the first chapter. As Simon Critchley17 has shown, one 
could start with Being and Time but there the focus is on Dasein, which isn’t the 
focus of the enigma in the later writings. Instead, I will begin with the Country Path 
Conversations, written in 1945 and published in 1995, a collection of three 
dialogues, the first of which involves a Scientist, a Scholar and a Guide. 
 
In this conversation, in a discussion about whether thinking is getting away from the 
discussants, or whether they are getting away from thinking, the enigma is 
approached through the question of what constitutes a nearness and a farness to 
thinking, where thinking does not have the character of an object [Gegenstand]. 
What is at stake, says the Guide [Weise] is the nearness and farness to this non-
objective thinking. Nearness and farness stand in relation to something that is not an 
object, something that is not part of the economy of human representation, something 
that does not belong in what the Guide calls ‘technology’. This is a form of cognition 
and theoretical comportment, which objectifies that which it brings into its purview 
and, therefore, submits it to a representational-mathematical calculus, the thinking 
Heidegger identifies as metaphysical. For the Guide, thinking cannot be approached 
in technological or metaphysical terms. If nearness and farness do not belong in a 
subjective framework then they must belong somewhere else. The Scientist 
[Forscher] postulates where this could be when he says that nearness and farness 
prevail [walten] through themselves [selbsttätig], and are both independent 
[Selbstständige] in the manner that space is independent. Both nearness and farness 
establish themselves from out of themselves, rather than being established by a 
subject. Nearness and farness enable the possibility that there are objects and 
objective relations, granting [gewähren] the arena wherein these relations can take 
                                                 
17
 Simon Critchley, ‘Enigma Variations: An Interpretation of Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit’, Ratio (new 
series), Oxford, Blackwell, XV, 2 June 2002, pp.154-175. 
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place. The Guide calls nearness and farness a unity, but this is a unity that has no 
name and the thinking of which is demanded by nearness and farness themselves. In 
the difficulty of thinking nearness and farness comes the demand to think them. It is 
in this devilish demand [arge Zumutung] that the Scientist identifies nearness and 
farness as an enigma, an enigma he finds oppressive but which the Guide finds 
beautiful and liberating [Befreiendes]. 
 
While it is the Scientist who first raises the figure of the enigma, it seems that he is 
taking the hint from the Guide, as Weise implies. Der Weise is a wise man or sage, 
and Weisheit means wisdom, but Weise also means the way or manner, and weisen 
means to show or point so that wisdom seems to come from pointing something out. 
Hinweis means tip or piece of advice, allusion or hint, while hinweisen means to 
point out. So the Guide is one who points out, who hints at or alludes, one who can 
point people along the way. It is not a question of being too prescriptive, of forcing 
the issue, of providing propositions that can be tested. That Heidegger himself saw 
the Weise in this way is perhaps indicated by the Guide’s own comments that there 
are, presumably, no wise ones or sages, but only those who can guide us, where the 
guide is not one who knows, a Wissende, but one who merely indicates, who shows 
the way, who can point out the place from which hints or signs come to human 
beings and who can point out how these hints could be followed. It is a question of 
indirection. If one is to think non-representationally, which seems to be the way that 
nearness and farness are to be approached, then it is not possible to do so if one does 
it through propositions and, if propositional thinking appears in the form of an 
activity, then hinting points towards a certain passivity. Hints can only be taken, 
writes Adam Phillips in his essay ‘A Stab at Hinting’, and ‘each hint taken furthers 
the drama; but the play is not one we can know’.18 Hints begin things, he says, but it 
is impossible to know beforehand precisely what will be a hint for us to take. In a 
way, taking the hint means accepting responsibility, responding to the hint in taking 
it up. It is only through the hints of the Guide that the enigma arises, the hints being 
taken by the Scholar and the Scientist, but it is also the fact that what the Guide finds 
liberating and beautiful is only a liberation into perplexity [ratlos], which, the Guide 
says, is presumably [vermutlich] demanded [zugemutet] by the enigma itself. The 
                                                 
18
 Adam Phillips, The Beast in the Nursery, London, Faber and Faber, 1998, p.72. 
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enigma demands this insolubility when we come face to face with it. But this is to be 
too emphatic. As the Guide says, we can only presume that the enigma makes this 
demand, and in this presumption we cannot know it; we can only conjecture. The 
demand is not an object of knowledge. What is required is a different way of 
thinking, a thinking, says Krzystof Ziarek, that is not ‘advancing positive statements 
or making cognitive claims but rather [is] a thinking of inflections, dislocating and 
simultaneously withdrawing itself from the paradigms of thought’.19 Because there is 
only this vermutlich, because we cannot know that the enigma is insoluble, we are 
presented with a demand that an attempt be made to find a solution. Therefore the 
question of the enigma remains open. In not knowing that the enigma cannot be 
solved lies the possibility that it can be. It is this, perhaps, that draws us into the 
enigma. It is also here that we might be able to glimpse just one sense of what 
nearness and farness to the enigma might be. It is a question of approach. The Guide 
says that we never attend to this demand of the enigma. All too often, the matter is 
left to rest without it becoming a concern. Perhaps merely pointing it out is enough to 
pass over it. The Scientist would rather ignore it, but the Guide believes that the 
enigma can only be laid to rest if there has been a prior thinking about it. If the Guide 
is correct in this, then how thinking approaches it becomes central to the enigma’s 
nearness and farness. The questions of whether the enigma can be solved over time, 
whether human agency can force a solution through, or whether there are other 
possible ways of comportment towards the enigma, are all situated in the nearness 
and farness to the enigma, where the enigma itself is this nearness and farness.  
 
The question of nearness and farness is a question of belonging and has a bearing on 
human belonging. Nearness and farness seem to suggest a place to which they both 
refer. There has to be a where to which there is a nearness and a farness. But it would 
be wrong to think that this place is where human beings happen to find themselves. 
The Scientist fears that he has become a stranger [Fremder] in his own area of 
expertise, what he calls his house of physics, and the Guide elaborates this 
estrangement into a general statement about the human not being at home in his own 
dwelling [in seinem Haus nicht zuhause]. That means, says the Scholar, ‘that the 
human does not know his own habitat, so that he would be missing from his own 
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premises – that is, be absent in his own presencing’.20 These last two phrases 
translate one phrase in the German: so daß er im eigenen „Anwesen“ abwesend 
wäre. Heidegger is playing on the current meaning of Anwesen as meaning a large 
property and on its now covered over meaning of presencing. The Guide conjectures 
that in this strange absence [seltsame Abwesenheit] lurks the enigma of nearness and 
farness and, in response, the Scientist feels the uncanny [unheimlich] stirring in the 
unhomely [unheimisch]. If the enigma is nearness and farness then it would seem 
that the enigma has a relation to the unhomeliness and uncanniness of the human 
being. 
 
Negation also enters into the heart of the enigma, in the sense that nearness and 
farness prevail in negation, in that it is both a withdrawal and a bringing forth. This is 
elaborated further by the Guide when he talks about the enigma that is a 
simultaneous divulgence and covering up. The enigma reveals [verraten] but also 
veils [verhüllen] that which removes the shroud [Verschleierung] and the more it 
uncovers the more perplexed we are left: ‘The concealed [Verborgene] of the enigma 
is unconcealed when we find the solution: but never such that the enigma is 
discovered. Even where we first only come upon the enigma, this is not a discovery 
[Entdecken].’21 The closer we get to a thing, and we get closer the more the shroud is 
removed, the less we penetrate into that thing, so that what is concealed in the 
enigma is the concealing. The solution of the enigma reveals only this process, if it is 
a process, of concealing and unconcealing. The concealing is unconcealed but that 
which is concealed is not. The enigma itself is never disclosed. Merely pointing out 
the enigma is not to discover it. Thus, in saying that nearness and farness are the 
enigma, we have not discovered the enigma. The enigma itself is near and far 
precisely because its solution is its continued perplexity. In a way, its giving away is 
also a betrayal – verraten also means betray - in that what is betrayed is not the 
enigma itself but the possibility of a solution. In the conversation, the matter is 
largely left at an impasse which is summed up by the Guide. It is precisely this 
question of what it means to let the enigma lie [sich beruhen zu lassen]. Is it just a 
question of leaving it by the wayside and passing by [übergehen] or does it mean to 
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enter [eingehen] into the perplexity of the enigma and linger [verweilen] in the face 
of it? Perhaps it is just a question of what it would mean to ignore the enigma, where 
ignorance is a not-knowing, whether the not-knowing is meant objectively or 
whether it refers to a knowing that stands outside metaphysical or technological 
thinking. 
 
This conversation gives an indication of what is at stake in the enigma and what a 
thinking of the enigma in Heidegger might be. Before looking in more detail at 
Heidegger, however, I want to look at two other twentieth century philosophers, 
Emmanuel Levinas and Theodor Adorno, both of whom thought through the figure 
of the enigma. Both of these philosophers can be seen to exist in a nearness and a 
farness to the thinking of Heidegger. Levinas began his career as a disciple of 
Heidegger but came to define his position in terms of an otherwise than being, 
whereas Adorno was consistently hostile towards Heidegger. The question of how 
near to, and how far from, Heidegger they are remains beyond the scope of this 
thesis, however. What I would like to do is to examine briefly the thinking about the 
enigma of each of these philosophers to see what insights arise from their thought. 
Initially, I will look at Levinas, specifically the essay ‘Phenomenon and Enigma’, 
first published in 1957, and collected in En découvrant l’existence avec Husserl et 
Heidegger. 
 
Facing the enigma 
 
Levinas introduces the enigma as the name [nous l’appelons] of that which is 
unrepresentable, of a manifestation that manifests without manifesting. It is the way 
the other has of seeking recognition while remaining incognito; it is an appearance 
which withdraws at the very moment of appearing, he says. He ties its meaning to its 
Greek etymological origins and compares its self-effacement, its modesty, with the 
triumphalism of the phenomenon. This return to the Greek shows a strategic 
nearness, perhaps, between Levinas and Heidegger, but, more importantly, it says 
something about the enigma and, while the etymology of enigma is not literally 
relevant to that of Rätsel, it does have relevance to the figure presented by the 
enigma. Ai1nigma is a dark saying or a riddle and comes from ai0ni/ssomai which 
means to speak in riddles or to hint a thing, to intimate or shadow forth. These Greek 
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terms are linked to ai]noj which means tale, story or fable. This same word with 
different diacritical marks has meanings, such as dread and terrible, and is linked to 
deino/j, a word that is hugely important for Heidegger in his discussion of Antigone. 
What these meanings tell us is that the enigma is a tale which tells of something, 
which does not quite mean what it says or say what it means. It never speaks directly, 
only obliquely. It is indirection, a straying from the path. It hints at something, 
provides intimations, but never explicitly says. It is something that lurks in the 
shadows, indistinct, never fully coming into the light. The enigma is a se manifester 
sans se manifester, in which, for Levinas, the other seeks recognition, but it is a 
recognition that does not belong to cognition. To manifest is to make something 
plain but a manifestation that does not manifest is to make something oblique.  
 
What is essential for Levinas about the enigma is the way a meaning [sens] that is 
beyond meaning, a meaning that is, in a sense, uncontainable, is then inserted into 
the meaning that remains in an order. An uncontainable meaning insinuates itself into 
an order of signification but without being subject to the laws of that signification. 
Sens underlines the lack of fixity in the meaning that Levinas describes, because it 
can also mean sense or direction, so there is always the question of whether it makes 
sense, whether one is going the right way. In a sense, sens is the provision of an 
opening rather than the fixing of a meaning, because if one senses something, it does 
not mean it is definitively known. For Levinas, the enigma is a sens that cannot be 
contained within what he later names as the ‘philosophical tradition of the West’, 
that is ‘consciousness, thematic exposition of being, knowing’.22 It is the incognito in 
cognition, that which is disguised in cognition, that which escapes cognition and 
remains unassimilable to it. It is both in cognito and incognito in the cognito, that 
which remains concealed in the unconcealed. It is a light that shines in its being 
extinguished. It is not, says Levinas, the ambiguity of two equal terms, a mere 
equivocation, both of which have an equal claim and appear in the same light: ‘In an 
enigma the exorbitant meaning is already effaced in its apparition.’23 In its 
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exorbitance, which literally means to go off track, meaning has strayed from the 
path, just as it could be said the three discussants in Heidegger’s first Country Path 
conversation have strayed from the path of thinking in coming face to face with the 
enigma. It is a phantom meaning, ghostly, spectral, haunting, one that has withdrawn 
[s’effacer] into the background. There is, again, a certain modesty here, which 
Levinas counterpoints to the arrogance of the phenomenon or being. If there is an 
order to the enigma, then it is the order of the sans, the without. This sans disturbs 
the sens of order and gives us an appearance without appearing, a manifestation 
without manifesting or an advancing without advancing. The enigma is a form of 
disturbance [dérangement], something troubling, but not one that can be 
accommodated within what Levinas calls the spiritual adventure of being. It does not 
break up a category only to reinvent that category more broadly, nor is it an 
incomprehensibility that will become comprehensible. It is not a simple puzzle 
whose meaning can be figured out. Nor is it merely absurd, irrational or surprising. 
The disturbance occasioned by the enigma is not ‘the simple parallelism of two 
orders that would be in a relationship of sign to signified, of appearance to thing in 
itself, and between which, as we have said, the relationship would reestablish the 
simultaneity of one single order’.24 It is, it seems, a form of resistance, resisting 
order, comprehension, categorisation, being. The enigma is a form of what Levinas 
will later call anarchy – and one should see this term in all its etymological layering 
as being without rule, principle, beginning or origin – in Otherwise than Being where 
he describes the proximity to the other as an anarchic relation with a singularity that 
is not mediated by any principle or ideality, where the possibility of any signification 
arises as a consequence of the relation with the other.  
 
The question of time also figures in the enigma. The disturbance that Levinas claims 
the enigma occasions demands a present that is fissile, one that is split or capable of 
being split. The enigma is not part of a representational order that is able to 
appropriate or recuperate it: ‘The alterity that disturbs order cannot be reduced to the 
difference visible to the gaze that compares and therefore synchronizes the same and 
the other.’25 It is instead the supreme anachronism, says Levinas, which precedes the 
entry of the disturbance, the enigma, into any order, otherwise it would still be a 
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participation in this order and therefore collapsible into the synchronicity of the 
representing gaze. As with anarchy, which he explicitly links with the Greek a0rxh/ in 
Otherwise than Being, and enigma, I think that we are again meant to be attentive to 
the etymological layerings that constitute the term anachronism.26 Anachronism 
belongs to another time and is out of its own time. It comes from the Greek terms 
xro/noj and xroni/zw meaning time and to spend time, to linger or tarry, with the 
prefix a0na meaning back or backwards. It literally means timed back. The 
anachronism is to be prior to any commitment, says Levinas in Otherwise than 
Being, in an anteriority that is “plus ancienne” than the a priori. Presumably his 
quotation marks around this term are meant to signify that while anachronism is 
more ancient in one sense, in another it cannot be older because it is not part of the 
order of a chronology in which the term ‘older’ would make sense. What 
anachronism means, therefore, is that the other has always left before arriving; its 
past could never have been present. It partakes in what Levinas calls the meanwhile, 
the entretemps, which can be neither an order nor a disorder, because disorder is just 
another order, where the expected event becomes part of a past without ever having 
been lived. It is an irretrievable past which cannot be brought back in the way, 
Levinas claims, memory brings back the past, or the way that the sign recaptures the 
signified.27 The representing subject always arrives too late: ‘Something takes place 
between the dusk in which the most ecstatic intentionality, which, however, never 
aims far enough, is lost (or is recollected) and the dawn in which consciousness 
returns to itself, but already too late for the event which is moving away.’28 The 
subject seems to be asleep at the most crucial moments. Consciousness, Levinas 
writes in Otherwise than Being, always finds itself delayed behind its present 
moment and unable to recover it. 
 
The enigma, however, is not some form of irrational interruption of the rational, says 
Levinas. It is co-extensive with the phenomenon which it disturbs in so far as the 
phenomenon carries the trace of the saying which is already in retreat from the said. 
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The phenomenon is the said, that is the said is part of a representational framework 
available to synchronization, but the saying that leads to this said is not part of this 
same framework. The saying is not an experience of the cognizing consciousness. 
The significations that arise in the natural world do so because of a transfer of 
meaning from the anthropological to the natural, that is, it is the human as the 
signifying animal which confers meaning on the natural world but only on the basis 
that it is always already one step behind this natural world. These significations 
never reach to the saying: ‘Significations which link up cover over the traces of the 
saying that left them, as the perfect crime artist inserts the traces of his violence in 
the natural folds of order.’29 It would seem that, like Macavity the mystery cat, the 
saying is not there. The traces of the saying are covered up, or rubbed out, leaving 
only a trace of this rubbing out. The criminal aspect of the saying is emphasised 
again by Levinas in an essay on the trace where the criminal, in wiping out his 
fingerprints, wipes out his presence: ‘Its [the trace’s] original signifyingness is 
sketched out in, for example, the fingerprints left by someone who wanted to wipe 
away his traces and commit a perfect crime. He who left traces in wiping out his 
traces did not mean to say or do anything by the traces he left. He disturbed the order 
in an irreparable way. He has passed absolutely.’30 The enigma is entirely bound up 
with the phenomenon, not so much as an absence, but as the mark of an unreadable 
mark, such as smudged fingerprints. What is left behind is a trace, but, says Jill 
Robbins, ‘it is the mark of the effacement of a mark. As it is the mark of the 
effacement of a mark that was already the mark of an absence…it is a double 
effacement, a double erasure, a re-mark and a re-tracing’.31 It is inaccessible to the 
present and belongs to an immemorial past, standing outside the duality of presence 
and absence. When the trace leaves a trace, she says, it leaves. 
 
An enigma is beyond all cognition, says Levinas, where cognition is that which rests 
[reposer] on phenomena, which is unfolded by the being of beings, where order is 
ordered together in the light. The enigma is outside of being, or other than being, if it 
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is the disturbance through which the other as other is manifested in its non-
manifestation, where the other is other than being. Beyond the cultural life of 
propositions, known truths, significations and so on, lies the saying – the face, the 
other, the enigma – which, says Levinas, is an unheard-of [inouïe] proposition – 
inouïe also means unprecedented, extraordinary, incredible – an insinuation 
[insinuation] which is immediately reduced to nothing. The saying, as insinuation, 
winds and curves its way in – it is never a direct approach, always circuitous, perhaps 
even underhand – and is then obliterated. In Levinas’s oxymoronic formulation, the 
saying is an insinuating proposition, directly indirect, which then disposes and dis-
insinuates itself. The disappearance of the saying is likened by Levinas to Banquo’s 
description of the disappearance of the witches in the opening scenes of Macbeth, 
‘“the bubbles of the earth’”.32 But if the insinuation is immediately reduced to 
nothing, how is it possible to speak of it? Through the duplicity of the enigma and its 
partner, subjectivity, says Levinas. The duplicity of the enigma consists of its 
keeping open a relation between the saying and the said, between the language that 
constitutes the saying and the language that constitutes the said, between insinuation 
and proposition. Subjectivity is summoned in its singularity by the other and arises as 
a response to this summons and the insinuation is retained as this singular 
subjectivity – singular because the summons is an exclusivity – but without it being 
possible to translate the call into any kind of objective language. This subject, quite 
different to the extreme privacy of the singular ego, as Levinas puts it, is a responsive 
listening: ‘The enigma, the intervention of a meaning which disturbs phenomena but 
is quite ready to withdraw like an undesirable stranger, unless one hearkens [tendre 
l’oreille] to those footsteps [pas] that depart, is transcendence itself, the proximity of 
the other as other.’33 What is at stake here is an attentiveness, a hearkening to the 
enigma, a form of lingering in proximity to it - tendre l’oreille suggests a stretching 
towards it. It infers that it is a question of seeing the enigma as enigma, or hearing 
the enigma as enigma, a question of tarrying in the face of it, but without it being 
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brought into the representational-mathematical calculus. Subjectivity, as Levinas 
defines it, is this response to the elusive stranger and, as such, becomes an openness 
to it, rather than a subject that represents the enigma to itself. The signifyingness 
[signifiance] of an enigma is not reducible to a grasping conceptualisation. Instead, it 
‘comes from an irreversible, irrecuperable past which it has perhaps not left since it 
has already been absent from the very terms in which it was signaled’.34 
 
Adorno and the enigma of art 
 
If, for Levinas, the enigma is the phenomenon of the non-phenomenon and marks the 
approach of the other, for Adorno the enigma is the philosophical figure, whether it 
is the enigma of art or philosophy. In an essay from 1931, ‘The Actuality of 
Philosophy’, an early statement of his opposition to Heideggerian ontology, Adorno 
defines philosophy, in contradistinction to science, in terms of its prevailing idea 
being interpretation [Deutung] rather than research [Forschung]. Philosophical 
process is one of enträtseln, of deciphering or making unenigmatic, through 
interpretation but without ever having a final, certain key to interpretation. 
Philosophy is given only fleeting hints [verschwindende Hinweise] of the enigmatic 
figures [Rätselfiguren] of the existing [Seienden] and its interlacings 
[Verschlingungen]. The history of philosophy, says Adorno, is nothing other than the 
history of such interlacings. That there is something destructive in these interlacings 
is marked by the fact that verschlingen means to devour or consume, as well as to 
entwine or become entangled or twisted. It can be used in phrases such as becoming 
engulfed by darkness. Philosophy seems to be a knotting entanglement always on the 
point of disappearing into darkness. For Adorno, the question of interpretation does 
not coincide with the question of meaning [Sinn]. It is not a question of justifying 
reality and declaring it to be meaningful: ‘Every such justification of that which 
exists is prohibited by the fragmentation in being itself. While our images of 
perceived reality may very well be Gestalten, the world in which we live is not; it is 
constituted differently than out of mere images of perception.’35 What philosophy 
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has to read is incomplete, contradictory and fragmentary [brüchig], says Adorno, and 
is an attempt to banish the blind demonic forces that may be responsible for much of 
what is given to us to read – philosophy as a way of learning to live with demons. 
This is not to suggest that interpretation is a method of reading through appearances 
into a secret world beyond; it is not the Kantian dualism of the intelligible and the 
empirical: ‘He who interprets by searching behind the phenomenal world for a 
world-in-itself which forms its foundation and support, acts mistakenly like someone 
who wants to find in the enigma [Rätsel] the reflection of a being which lies behind 
it, a being mirrored in the enigma, in which it is contained. Instead, the function of 
enigma-solving is to light up the enigma-Gestalt like lightning and to negate it, not to 
persist behind the enigma and imitate it.’36 There is no meeting between fixed 
meaning and authentic [echte] philosophical interpretation. Instead, it is a momentary 
simultaneous lighting up and consuming of that meaning. It is, then, a question of 
seeing the enigma for what it is in a moment [Augenblick], that is both illuminating 
and destructive. As Alexander García Düttmann writes, when philosophy is figured 
as interpretation the ‘answer must consume the question, and the solution the 
enigma, for the meaning cannot exist independently of the enigma and the question. 
It is in this very consumption that question and answer, enigma and solution, become 
suddenly manifest and appear as if they were illuminated…The solution is not a 
piece of knowledge at one’s disposal once the enigma has been consumed, for this 
would again result in justification. The solution is an experience without knowledge: 
the enigma does not resolve itself in knowledge’.37 It is, he says, only because the 
enigma is consumed that it is possible to speak of it. The enigma becomes possible 
only in its aftermath, only in what remains after its consumption, but it is never an 
experience available to cognition. The enigma has always passed, irretrievable, 
perhaps. It is a memory but not the grasping, seizing memory that Levinas identifies 
with the representing gaze. 
 
Philosophy is interlaced with the enigma but the enigma is only in its recollection, 
just as the enigmatic character of the work of art is the recollection [Erinnerung] of 
the shudder, not its living presence. This is how Adorno characterises the work of art 
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in Aesthetic Theory, which includes an extended meditation on the enigma of art. For 
Adorno, what aesthetics should be doing is not comprehending [begreifen] artworks 
as hermeneutical objects, as objects for the conceptualizing gaze, but comprehending 
them in their incomprehensibility [Unbegreiflichkeit] and it is in the context of this 
demand that Adorno examines the enigma. The statement about the enigma of art as 
recollection comes in the ‘Paralipomena’ section of Aesthetic Theory and is mirrored 
by a comment in the section ‘Enigmaticalness, Truth Content, Metaphysics’, where 
art is described as the legacy [Erbe] of the shudder [Schauer], which is a form of pre-
conceptual, pre-categorical experience of what is there and which is not reducible to 
conceptual experience, as James Gordon Finlayson notes: ‘[T]he shudder is, 
epistemically speaking, a positive experience that is true to what is there prior to 
conceptual identification - the amorphous, the undifferentiated, the strange. It is an 
impulsive somatic experience that momentarily registers the presence of what 
occasions it.’38 We are brought up short face to face with that which is absolutely 
other to us, registering its sheer strangeness, without being able to grasp it 
conceptually. Conceptual, reflective thought is the way the subject then seeks to 
domesticate this experience of the strange and become its master. For Adorno, 
modern art is able to bring forth the shudder, is the occasion of its evanescence, and 
what constitutes this ‘experience of the modernist sublime’ is, J.M. Bernstein writes, 
‘the memory of the experience of the terror and strangeness in the face of threatening 
nature. Shudder is the memorial experience of nature’s transcendence, its non-
identity and sublimity, at one remove’.39 The enigma, as the legacy of the shudder, is 
bound up with this memorial experience. Art reminds us of what is repressed as 
reason and technology advance, says Bernstein. The enigma is what remains of the 
shudder but it is a remainder that is only a recollection in the shudder’s wake. As the 
legacy, or inheritance, of the shudder, art has been handed down by that which no 
longer is. A legacy is a gift given in, and through, a testamentary performance. The 
testament is a written document in which that which was once owned by someone 
living is formally given over. The writing marks an absence, but it seems to be an 
absence that was once present in that it is the testament of a once living human being, 
the mark of someone who has left. The written document, however, only has 
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meaning in the event of the absolute absence of death, so that art’s relation to the 
shudder is a relation to its absolute absence. To experience art is to experience the 
recollection of the shudder, which is only experienced in, and as, this recollection. It 
is a memorial experience. 
 
But if the enigma figures a non-conceptual memorial, it also remains bound up with 
history, for Adorno. It is history that has made the work of art an enigma; it is history 
that keeps at arms length what Adorno calls the embarrassing question of its reason 
to be; and it is history that gave artworks their authority. The enigmatic character of 
the work of art is a knitting together, a growing together with history, he says. What 
Adorno writes is that the enigma bleibt verwachsen with history. Verwachsen means 
to grow or knit together. History and the enigma weave in and out of each other. But 
there is something grotesque about this interlacing. As an adjective, verwachsen can 
also mean deformed, stunted or overgrown. Could one read here that the enigma is 
deformed by history or that history is deformed by the enigma? Is the enigma a kind 
of disfigurement? It is not a question of the enigma being irrational, says Adorno. As 
such, the disfigurement does not mark an irrationality, but perhaps arises from an 
excess of rationality. Adorno says that it is the rationality of artworks that figure the 
enigma. The more an artwork is governed by a method, the more it is ruled by formal 
plans, the greater the emphasis on the enigma, the more the enigma is thrown into 
relief, says Adorno. The enigma is a lapidary saying, and it is through form, says 
Adorno, that artworks resemble language seeming ‘to say [bekunden] just this and 
only this, and at the same time whatever it is slips away’.40 The artwork expresses 
something singular but in the moment [Momente] of this expression, the saying 
withdraws. It is a saying that unsays itself in the saying and this is the enigma, a 
saying that can only be said in its disappearance, in its being wiped away. The saying 
escapes. It seems that the work of art is an intimation that vanishes, or the record of a 
vanishing intimation. 
 
The character of the enigma is expressed from the perspective of language in this 
doubled movement of saying and withdrawing and it is this characteristic that, says 
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Adorno, cavorts clownishly, which suggests that the enigma is something of a joke or 
a trick, a grotesquerie. The figure the clown presents is a disguise; the clown’s make-
up is a mask, which turns the clown into a genus, or into something impersonal. The 
clown is also a figure that can be disturbing or monstrous. This comic absurdity is 
expressed, says Adorno, in the way that the enigma makes itself invisible if one 
participates within the artwork. Stepping outside this immanent context entails the 
return of the enigma as spirit [spirit]. The enigma is invisible to those participating in 
the artwork, whether as creators or spectators, and is only visible as a ghost, if it is 
visible at all, to those who have broken the contract with the artwork’s immanent 
context. There is a distinction between those who remain within the artwork and 
those who abstract themselves from it. Either way, however, the enigma remains 
insoluble, unknowable to the former and inscrutable to the latter. Art’s enigma, says 
Adorno, becomes an outrage to those who have no feeling for art, for whom art is 
inexplicable. Art’s truth is confirmed at precisely the point where art is completely 
negated by those for whom art is utterly alien and art’s enigmatic character is defined 
by the gap between what the unmusical hear and what the initiate hears, a gap that 
exists for all art, whether it is music, poetry or painting. This constant pull is between 
the conceptual and the mimetic, according to Menke, which gives rise to the 
enigmatic character of art: ‘Art works become enigmatic when we neither reenact 
them purely immanently nor view them externally as one discourse among many, but 
instead, allow these two perspectives to clash with one another.’41 
 
Art falls silent before questions of its purpose and its point, says Adorno. Before the 
demand to justify itself, in which the demand seeks to master the work of art through 
a form of conceptual address, the artwork becomes an aposiopesis, a mute breaking 
off. Art is a becoming silent, says Paul Celan in ‘The Meridian’: ‘[T]he poem clearly 
shows a strong tendency towards falling silent [Verstummen]’.42 But to understand 
art’s enigmatic character is not the same as understanding the work of art. In fact, the 
better an artwork is understood, the deeper the enigma that constitutes it becomes 
and even though the potential for a solution is contained therein, the solution is not 
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objectively given. The enigma holds out this promise of a solution but always 
withdraws it. The fulfilment of the promise is always its non-fulfilment. Artworks, 
says Adorno, are hidden through their visibility and here he references the letter in 
Poe’s short story, ‘The Purloined Letter’, which was hidden precisely because it was 
placed in a position where it was visible.43 Although Adorno does not elaborate on 
this, in the story the letter is concealed in its not being concealed and it escapes 
observation because it is so easily observed. The concealer of the letter, the Minister 
D-, is both poet and mathematician and it is implied in the story that it is the turning 
to the poetic that leads to such a concealment. But crucial to the success of this 
concealment is the fact that the letter is disguised and it is, perhaps, only because 
Dupin is also something of a poet – he confesses to writing ‘certain doggrel myself’44 
– that he is able to see through both the concealment in unconcealment and the 
letter’s disguise. Even the Minister himself seems to be disguised. Dupin calls him 
the most energetic human being alive, but only when unseen. But, if the analogy does 
not quite work, in that the letter is discovered, although the Minister is unaware that 
it has been, the principle is established of the non-evident in the evident and it is this 
enigma that Adorno believes is best exemplified by music: ‘Of all the arts, music is 
the prototypical example of this: It is at once completely enigmatic and totally 
evident. It cannot be solved, only its form [Gestalt] can be deciphered, and precisely 
this is requisite for the philosophy of art.’45 
 
Music is exemplary for Adorno and it is this exemplarity which informs his 
contention that to view understanding or comprehension [Verständnis] as the sole 
means with which to approach art is, in fact, to move further away from it. That such 
Verständnis is a form of looking and, that in looking or seeing, that which is seen 
disappears [verschwindet] is made clear when Adorno draws an analogy with a 
rainbow, where, if one gets closer to the rainbow, it disappears. Understanding 
[Verstehen] does not get rid of the enigmatic character of the work of art. 
Interpretation always calls for further understanding, as if, says Adorno, waiting for a 
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word that can solve the artwork’s constitutive and ever deepening obscurity. It seems 
that for Adorno interpretive understanding is a waiting for Godot; only a Godot can 
solve it. It is only through an imaginative immersion in the work of art that one can 
even begin to make a step towards understanding, but even this is deceptive 
[trügerischte], because it is still not a solution: ‘Those who can adequately imagine 
music without hearing it possess that connection with it required for its 
understanding. Understanding [Verstehen] in the highest sense – a solution of the 
enigma that at the same time maintains the enigma – depends on a spiritualization of 
art and artistic experience whose primary medium is the imagination. The 
spiritualization of art approaches its enigmaticalness not directly through conceptual 
elucidation, but rather by concretizing its enigmaticalness. The solution of the 
enigma amounts to giving the reason [Grund] for its insolubility, which is the gaze 
[Blick] artworks direct at the viewer [Betrachter].’46 The solution of the enigma is 
the ground of its insolubility and this solution is the look that the artwork presents to 
its observers. The artwork gazes back at those who would gaze at it, at those who 
would strive to understand it, and this gaze is the demand that the content of the work 
of art be understood but this understanding only comes through mediation, through a 
theoretical comportment towards the work of art. It is never a direct experience, so 
the enigma itself remains beyond this theoretical comportment. 
 
The enigma, like a work of art, is both determinate [bestimmt] and indeterminate 
[unbestimmt], in that both are question marks [Fragezeichen], says Adorno. But is a 
question mark the question itself? The mark points to a question without articulating 
that question so that in this case both the enigma and the work of art, as marks, point 
to the question, they are both signs of the question. But these question marks cannot 
be reduced to a singular meaning [eindeutig]. There is nothing clear or unambiguous 
about them and even synthesis fails to deliver them from ambiguity. Structurally, 
says Adorno, the work of art and the enigma both demand [erzwingen] and conceal 
[verschweigen] the answer. As signs, however, they remain unreadable. As 
erzwingen means force, the enigma’s structure is one of both force and withdrawal, 
the force of a saying which then disappears. Art’s aim is to determine the 
indeterminate, says Adorno, this is what gives purpose to the work of art, which is 
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given its legitimation as the figure of an answer. But the figure of an answer is not 
the answer itself, as Adorno makes clear when he likens the work of art to écriture 
which illuminates the art of the past. All works of art are writing, he says, they are 
hieroglyphs for which the code has been lost. Just as Hegel saw Egyptian art as 
paradigmatic of a certain sense of art, so does Adorno, but whereas, for Hegel, this 
art was merely a stage in art’s progression, for Adorno a dead Egyptian language 
becomes a metaphor for the work of art, for the enigma, and interpretation of this 
dead language can never reach its destination; the enigmatic character of the artwork 
always ‘outlives the interpretation that arrives at the answer’,47 he says. Art presents 
a kind of inscrutability even where it is most intensely engaged, such as the musician 
who intimately knows and understands the score, or the actor who inhabits the lines 
of the play; even here, Adorno says, neither knows what they play, in a certain sense, 
but this performance is still the manifestation of a mimesis which only leads to an 
understanding on this side [diesseits] of the enigma. Through performance, the 
enigma is approached but it is an approach that does not penetrate to the other side of 
the enigma. Immanence to the work shows the work still to be enigmatic. Art, for 
Adorno, Shierry Weber Nicholsen says, is mimetic rather than conceptual: ‘Being 
nonconceptual, it cannot be unenigmatic, because it cannot have a discursive 
meaning. Further, it is enigmatic because it lost its purpose when the mimetic 
migrated from ritual into art.’48 The enigma is, she says, the difference between an 
absolutely exterior experience of the work of art and an absolutely interior one.  
 
The enigma of the work of art consists in its being broken off [Abgebrochensein] and 
in this is the denial of what it wants to be, says Adorno. Artworks are like broken off 
memorials in graveyards, but only retrospectively can they be seen this way. The 
work of art is a memorial to a meaning that it never had, if one takes this simile 
literally. The memorial in the graveyard points towards someone that once had 
meaning, the person to whom the memorial is erected, just as the testament points to 
the person who has left it, but it never was this person, nor can it be said to be a mark 
that this person has left behind. In this it is unlike the testament. It is a remembrance 
of something that is now past but to which it never had a relation prior to this 
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remembrance. The relation occurs in the remembrance. Even more, the memorial has 
been fractured in some way, whether deliberately or accidentally, Adorno does not 
say, but this fracturededness points towards the essential incompletion of the work of 
art. In a sense, the artwork is radically incomplete – Kafka is exemplary for Adorno 
here – and is always threatening to fall back into the myth from which it has been 
precariously rescued. The enigma of art emerges out of a historical process, says 
Adorno, through which it has lost its magical and cultic functions. Art, as enigmatic, 
is what remains after these are gone and it is as enigmatic as the horror that comes 
from out of the primordial world, says Adorno. It is, he claims, the seismogram of 
that horror. Art is the record of a primordial horror. A seismogram is never the actual 
event nor is it an experience of the event. It is a mechanically produced record, 
converting the shuddering of the earth into a form of script, a writing that purports to 
show the occurrence of the event of an earthquake. It is a sign and mark of the event, 
something that points to the event and says this happened but, like the broken 
graveside memorial, like the experience that is experienced only in recollection, it is 
only a record of something having happened. 
 
Every artwork asks “Is it true?” but then refuses to answer it discursively. This is the 
truth content of the work of art and the enigma, in demanding a solution, points to 
this truth content, which can only be reached through philosophical reflection, but 
this reaching is only ever after the unreachable. Artworks both have truth content and 
don’t have it, says Adorno: ‘[T]hey are the physiognomy of an objective spirit that is 
never transparent to itself in the moment in which it appears’.49 The enigma gazes 
out of the work of art and, like the Sphinx, demands an answer that is always the 
same [dieselbe], says Adorno, but this same can only come from difference and not 
from a unity which is, perhaps, the deceptive promise of the enigma: ‘Whether the 
promise is a deception – that is the enigma.’50 One can see that for Adorno, as for 
Levinas, there is a certain duplicity about the enigma. Adorno writes that art is the 
broken promise of happiness. It is a promise of plenitude that can never be realised. 
That is to say that the enigma is this broken promise, and it is this broken promise as 
the memorial in the graveyard, the experience experienced only as recollection, or 
the seismogram that is only ever a record of the shudder. The enigma points to this 
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shudder, it is the question mark that can never articulate the question and, in this in-
articulation, can never provide an answer. For Adorno, the enigma is an 
inarticulation. 
 
Design of the thesis 
 
Both these, necessarily preliminary, propaedeutics to the figure of the enigma in the 
work of Levinas and Adorno – and one could foresee the necessity of a deeper 
excavation of this figure in their thought – provide hints for how the enigma is to 
appear throughout this thesis. One can see a movement and a structure that are both 
emblematic of the enigma as it is pursued in relation to the work of Martin 
Heidegger. It is not my intention now to summarise what has just been expounded in 
this introduction. I merely wish to mark such notions as promise, of saying and 
unsaying, of the sign as unreadable – and perhaps monstrous – of the memorial, of 
the uncanny and so on. All of these are dealt with, to a greater or lesser extent, as we 
move through the readings that are presented here. It is pre-eminently a reading that 
is the form of this thesis. In essence, it is an examination of the enigma – of art, of 
being, of truth – through four stagings. Each staging takes a reading of Heidegger’s 
and then applies a reading to that reading. Each chapter can be described as a meta-
reading which both stays within the Heideggerian reading, to the extent that a certain 
immanence is a mark of the reading, while seeking to go beyond the Heideggerian 
reading. In ancient Greek, meta had a number of meanings, including in the midst of, 
among, of moving into the middle of or of being in pursuit of, as well as meaning 
beyond or behind or after. The idea of the meta in the meta-reading is to mark a 
certain positioning in relation of the one reading to another, of an insinuation, 
incorporating all those meanings just mentioned but, perhaps, especially in terms of 
the after in its temporal, causal complexity, wherein one reads both according to 
Heidegger and in spite of him, where one is in pursuit of him, while restaging the 
movement of his arguments.  
 
Each staging of the enigma has a chapter devoted to it, making four in all, and, in 
each chapter, art, or a specific work of art, is central to the staging. In the first 
chapter, it is art in general – putting aside just what such an ‘in general’ would look 
like, whether, indeed, it is possible to speak of art in general – that is the focus, while 
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subsequent chapters concentrate on Hölderlin’s poem ‘The Ister’, the Antigone of 
Sophocles and the philosophical poem of Parmenides. In each of these, however, it is 
Heidegger’s reading that is at stake and it is only in relation to those readings that the 
underlying work becomes a theme for my reading. Therefore, whether Heidegger’s 
reading of Hölderlin actively misconstrues the poet is not addressed in this thesis, nor 
do I consider Heidegger’s place in the field of Parmenidian scholarship. The first 
chapter is a consideration of Heidegger’s essay ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’. It is 
here that the enigma of art is introduced, but only in the Afterword, the Nachwort. It 
is a brief reference in which the task of the enigma is laid out and this first chapter is 
precisely an initial attempt to undertake that task. In the second chapter, I turn to 
Hölderlin and his poem ‘The Ister’. Heidegger lectured and wrote many times on 
Hölderlin’s poems, including Germanien, Der Rhine, and Andenken. ‘The Ister’ is 
one of Hölderlin’s great river poems and it is in these lectures that Heidegger gives 
us a brief definition of das Rätsel – the only place, as far as I am aware that he does 
so – where it is identified with the doubled movement of the river and which leads to 
the question of the possibility of being at home and the necessity of a journey into 
the foreign. The question of the home, of the heimisch and the heimlich, and 
therefore of the unheimlich, is pursued further in chapter 3, where the figure of 
Antigone from the play by Sophocles becomes the focus. In a reading of the choral 
ode, given in the lectures on ‘The Ister’, Heidegger identifies Antigone as the 
uncanniest of the uncanny, which then leads into a thinking of the home and the 
hearth, the poet as sign and the nomo/j. Finally, chapter 4 looks at the poem of 
Parmenides as it is filtered through a number of texts by Heidegger. It is in his 
thinking on Parmenides that the enigma plays its most prominent role, where it 
seems to be embedded in the very terms that Heidegger uses. Here we see the way to 
tautology being mapped out, a mapping that includes a0lh/qeia, es gibt and Ereignis.  
 
A note on the translation of das Rätsel 
 
The question of translation is one that looms large in the thought of Heidegger. For 
example, the translation of the Greek word into Latin has had dire consequences, as 
far as he is concerned. In the transposition of ancient Greek thought into Roman 
philosophy lies the Bodenlosigkeit of Western thinking, the loss of ground, its 
rootlessness. A failure to attend to what is essential in the word is at the heart of this 
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catastrophe, this overturning. Translation is a kind of going astray, says John Sallis,51 
but it is, perhaps, in going astray that translation can do justice to the translated. 
Translation begins, says Heidegger, only when the translated transports us into the 
realm of thinking from which the translated has come. In the case of Parmenides’s 
word a0lh/qeia this does not mean giving it a literal translation, rather it means 
attending to its saying in its saying, so that we come into the realm of experience 
from out of which Parmenides says this word. Turning now to the word of this thesis, 
das Rätsel, it can be variously translated as riddle, puzzle, mystery or enigma. Of all 
of these, it seems to me, only enigma approaches the kind of translation that is called 
for, a translation that takes us back into the realm of Heidegger’s thinking, that does 
justice to what das Rätsel is calling for in terms of that thinking; only enigma 
suggests the troubling insolubility that attends to Heidegger’s use of das Rätsel 
throughout the texts under discussion here. 
 
A note on citations 
 
Where both German and French texts, and their English translations, are used I give 
the English first followed by the original. I have used existing English translations in 
all cases and modified them where necessary. In general, when I cite German, French 
and ancient Greek terms, these words are quoted as they appear in the texts under 
discussion. 
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Chapter 1 
 
To see the enigma 
 
In the Nachwort to ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’, Heidegger writes that in what we 
have just read, these deliberations [Überlegungen], he is concerned with the enigma of 
art, the enigma that art itself is. The task in the essay is not to solve the enigma, but to 
see [sehen] the enigma as enigma. Although this ‘as’ structure is not quite how 
Heidegger formulates it here, it is implied. In the lectures on ‘The Ister’, this structure is 
made explicit: ‘[W]e must try to bring the enigma as enigma closer to us’,1 he writes. 
Whether ‘The Origin’ has been a successful attempt to see such a phenomenon remains 
open, while other questions present themselves, such as what Heidegger means when he 
says that the task is to see the enigma and what does see mean? Is the enigma a 
phenomenon as such? One question Heidegger answers in the essay is just this question 
of what seeing means. During a discussion of the Greek term te/xnh, in which he 
explicitly rejects any notion that this term means technical or practical accomplishment, 
Heidegger argues that, rather than meaning craft or art, te/xnh means knowing, but not in 
an epistemological sense in which a subject knows an object. Rather, te/xnh is a form of 
seeing, or having seen, in which seeing in a broad sense ‘means the apprehension of 
something present as something present [vernehmen des Anwesenden als eines 
solchen]’,2 or as something that comes to presence. This kind of knowing, this seeing, is 
linked to truth as a0lh/qeia, which for Heidegger is not truth as correspondence to the 
facts but is ‘the unconcealment of beings’3 and ‘the clearing and concealing of that 
which is’.4 To see the enigma, therefore, would be to apprehend it as something present 
in its presencing. 
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However, as soon as Heidegger has introduced the enigma in the Nachwort, he then 
explicitly contrasts the enigmatic character of art, and how he approaches art in ‘The 
Origin’, with how art is approached through aesthetics, or his version of aesthetics. It is 
clear from the essay itself that Heidegger is setting up ‘The Origin’ as being against 
aesthetics, both in the way he discusses matter and form and in the way that artist and 
audience are displaced. Heidegger claims that from the very beginning of specialised 
thinking [eigene Betrachtung] about art and artists, this thinking [Betrachten] was 
referred to as aesthetic. Heidegger’s usage of the term aesthetics, says Robert 
Bernasconi, should not be confused with the autonomous discipline that appeared under 
this name in the eighteenth century. Rather, aesthetics covers all thinking about art since 
the time of Plato and Aristotle and the point of this identification, says Bernasconi, ‘is 
intimately tied to his attempt to overcome metaphysics, the history of Western 
ontology’.5 In Nietzsche, from 1936, Heidegger identifies aesthetics as the relation of 
humanity’s state of feeling to the beautiful. Aesthetics arises at that point when great art 
and great philosophy come to an end, he says, which is the time of Plato and Aristotle. 
That this conception of aesthetics, and the role of Aristotle and Plato, does not change is 
shown by ‘The Question Concerning Technology’, written in 1953, where art is given a 
privileged, non-aesthetic position prior to Plato and Aristotle: ‘The arts were not derived 
from the artistic. Art works were not enjoyed aesthetically. Art was not a sector of 
cultural activity.’6 
 
Aesthetics objectifies the artwork, makes it available to sensory experience, and 
therefore makes it an object for a subject. Such sensory apprehensions [sinnlichen 
Vernehmens] are today called experiences [Erlebnis], says Heidegger, and aesthetics, 
which is how human beings experience art, claims that it has something to say about 
art’s essential nature. But this is not Heidegger’s view. As far as he is concerned, 
aesthetics cannot speak about the essential nature of art. In fact, aesthetics as experience 
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– and experience is the standard in aesthetics for the appreciation, enjoyment and 
creation of art, claims Heidegger – is possibly where art dies, a slow, lingering, 
centuries-old death. The way that people now talk about immortal art and its eternal 
value – what one could call aesthetic chatter - in fact deals with nothing, he continues, 
precisely because the glib way that great art is referred to fails to involve an original 
thinking [Denken], a type of thinking that is greatly feared today, says Heidegger; 
perhaps great art, and its essence, has departed. If we attend to Heidegger’s language on 
thinking here, we can see that for him aesthetics doesn’t think as such about art at all. In 
aesthetics, thinking is betrachten, which means to observe or look at. A Betrachter is an 
observer, the ultimate stance of the aesthetic. True thinking about art is characterised as 
Denken.  
 
Heidegger asks whether art is still an essential and necessary way in which truth happens 
that is decisive for the historical existence of human beings and, if this is no longer the 
case, why it is so. Hegel’s judgement – that art no longer counts as the supreme way in 
which truth finds its own existence – stands, according to Heidegger, in that it still 
awaits a decision, because behind this judgement is the whole tradition of Western 
thought since the Greeks, which refers to a specific happening of the truth of beings. As 
John Sallis writes in Transfigurements, in invoking Hegel’s judgement here Heidegger is 
not simply reaffirming it.7 Rather, what he is doing is reinscribing the Hegelian move in 
a question as a question, he says, and, by doing so, Heidegger is placing Hegel in the 
metaphysical realm in relation to a truth of beings that arose in Greek philosophy. 
Heidegger claims that this decision about art can only be made out of a thinking of the 
truth of beings. In the meantime, because the judgement stands, it is necessary to ask 
whether it is conclusive, he says. These kinds of questions can only be asked through an 
examination of the essence of art and asking the question of the origin of the work of art 
is a move towards this essence. The meaning of the word origin is thought out of the 
essence of truth, says Heidegger. This truth is not the truth associated with science and 
knowledge, and which is distinct from the beautiful and the good, but is the truth of the 
                                                 
7
 John Sallis, Transfigurements: On the True Sense of Art, Chicago and London, The University of 
Chicago Press, 2008, p.156. 
 39 
unconcealment of beings as beings, truth as the truth of being. Art can only be renewed 
if there is a break with metaphysical truth, says Sallis, and ‘the alleged pastness of art 
can be put in question only if there is a break with this truth’.8 
 
In the displacement of aesthetics, beauty is also displaced, as are the artist and audience. 
Beauty only appears when truth puts itself into the work; beauty arises out of the activity 
of truth in the work of art, says Heidegger, it belongs to the coming [Sichereignen] of 
truth. He claims that this specific convergence of beauty and truth has become concealed 
and beauty has become an object for subjective pleasure. This concealment occurs 
through the Platonic-Aristotelian conceptual pairing of matter [u9lh] and form [morfh\], 
through which reality becomes objectivity, which becomes experience. The essence of 
truth that is concealed corresponds to the essential history of Western art. In the same 
way that philosophy becomes metaphysics, thinking on art becomes aesthetics. It is not 
possible to get to the essence of art through a consideration of beauty by itself, in the 
same way that it is not possible to do so through experience, Heidegger claims. When 
beauty becomes an object, what is covered over is the appearing of beauty as the being 
of truth in, and as, the work. In this way, aesthetics is complicit in the forgetting of the 
truth of being, which Heidegger has identified as the key thrust of Western metaphysics. 
‘The Origin’ sets itself up against this tradition. If we take aesthetics and seeing in 
Heidegger’s terms, we can conclude that in seeing the enigma, we are not being asked to 
see it in terms of a subject grasping an object, in which the subject represents the object 
to himself. We are meant to see the enigma as something that presences and as 
something present within the play of concealment and unconcealment of Heidegger’s 
conception of truth. The enigma of art happens in the artwork in close proximity to, or 
out of, the happening of truth in the artwork. Art is the setting-itself-to-work of truth 
and, as such, it is the ground of history, says Heidegger. Art allows truth to arise and 
‘arises as the founding preservation of the truth of beings in the work’.9 This letting-be 
of truth, the bringing ‘into being from out of the essential source in the founding leap’10, 
is what Heidegger means by the term origin. Art is an origin because it is a distinctive 
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way in which truth comes into being, becomes historical. As William McNeill writes: 
‘The great work of art opens up the being of beings as a whole, it first opens up a world 
for human beings.’11 Through this opening up, he continues, the work of art grants 
significance and meaning to beings, establishing them historically and in their relations 
to one another. Art, as poetry, for Heidegger, is the founding of truth, with founding 
understood as bestowing, grounding and beginning. This founding can only happen, 
however, out of the essential repose [Ruhe] of art. 
 
In order to examine whether such a seeing of the enigma occurs, we need to start from 
out of this repose, which Heidegger also characterises as the artwork’s self-subsistence 
or its resting-in-itself. McNeill writes that the artwork ‘rests in itself, in its own 
singularity, it holds itself within its own limits, within what is proper to it; it holds itself 
back in its very accomplishment’.12 An English term that captures this repose is 
composure, as Christopher Fynsk points out13, precisely because it brings out two 
fundamental aspects of the work of art, the fact that it is as something created and the 
fact that it is a form of resting or repose; when one is composed one is calm, tranquil or 
serene. What is this composure and how does it arise? It happens through, or is, the 
conflict of two essential traits in the work of art, world and earth, claims Heidegger. 
World and earth, however, are not things in themselves, or powers, as Gregory Fried 
reminds us, but are terms, part of a vocabulary, for thinking about how structures of 
sense and meaning happen temporally through and for Dasein. World is ‘the horizon of 
intelligibility within whose circle beings and activities make sense’.14 It is the context of 
meanings which we inhabit. J.M. Bernstein writes that the world ‘is not to be construed 
as an object before us, but rather as the disposition of men and things with respect to one 
another in virtue of which they possess the kind of place, duration and worth they do or 
can have’.15 On the other hand, earth, says Fried, is ‘the givenness of the sense of being, 
the thrownness of possibilities, that can never be fully laid bare because this givenness 
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of sense always already informs the fore-structure of Dasein’s understanding of 
Being’.16 Earth defies conceptual analysis, says Heidegger. As an example, he gives us 
the rock upon which the temple stands and sets up a world. The heaviness of the rock 
can never be penetrated, even if we smash it to pieces or measure it. What we have is 
either a mess of fragments or a number. In both cases, the rockness of the rock remains 
ungrasped. In this manner, earth eludes us: ‘The earth is openly illuminated as itself only 
where it is apprehended and preserved as the essentially undisclosable, as that which 
withdraws from every disclosure [Erschließung], in other words keeps itself constantly 
closed up.’17 Although the earth can be set forth in myriad ways, ‘the earth itself cannot 
be finally, once and for all, revealed’.18 
 
What happens in the work of art is the setting up of a world, which is seen in terms of 
disclosure and holding open, and the setting forth of the earth. This setting forth of the 
earth moves the earth into the open of a world and holds it there, says Heidegger. It is 
the element in which the arising of everything that arises is brought back to itself as it is 
in itself and given protection, he continues. Earth presences as the protector. This 
coming forth and rising up in turn lights up that which provides a dwelling for man. 
These two traits – world and earth - belong together in the unity of the work-being. This 
unity [Einheit] is what is sought via a reflection [bedenken] on the self-sufficiency 
[Insichstehen] of the work of art and tries to say in words the closed, unitary repose 
[einige Ruhe] of this resting-in-itself [Aufsichberuhens]. The work in its constancy, its 
repose, its determination, its intensity of purpose, stands out against the unruliness of its 
surroundings and in so doing brings out these surroundings as what they are. But it is 
wrong to think that this repose is merely a resting, according to Heidegger. It is a repose 
that is a happening [Geschehen]. He seems to claim that Ruhe is the opposite of 
movement but almost immediately qualifies this opposition by claiming that is it not an 
opposite that excludes but one that includes. Rest and movement belong together in an 
inclusive opposition. But what kind of rest is it that includes movement in an inclusive 
opposition and what happens to these terms – rest and movement, inclusive and 
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exclusive – if rest is thought in this way? Perhaps we need to think Ruhe as prior to this 
distinction between rest and movement. There could be an analogy here to the notion of 
passivity that marks something like the thrownness of Dasein, which is a form of 
passivity that is prior to the usual opposition between active and passive, in the way that 
a thrown Dasein has to take responsibility for its thrownness. Meanings are qualified by 
what are normally thought to be their opposites so that the term opposition undergoes 
something of a transformation if it is thought of as inclusive. If rest is not simply rest, 
then opposition is not simply opposition. When speaking of the opposition of rest and 
movement, Heidegger uses the term Gegensatz, which can also mean antithesis in 
philosophical terms, although the play of rest and movement is not dialectical. The one 
does not subsume and transform the other in a synthesis. Perhaps a better analogy would 
be a musical one. Gegensatz can also mean countersubject, a musical term which 
denotes a theme in a piece of music, a fugue for example, which is used as a 
counterpoint to the main theme in the same piece. While there is a difference – it is 
difficult to say which of world or earth is the main theme – this notion might be worth 
bearing in mind when trying to think the nuanced idea of rest that Heidegger introduces 
here. George Pattison, following a thought of George Steiner’s, believes that musical 
structure can be used to illustrate the thinking of the later Heidegger. This is not to say 
that his work should be read as ‘merely emotive-expressive’ but that it has ‘a kind of 
structure that resists incorporation into any linear progression in which the various parts 
are ordered hierarchically and in which discord and conflict are resolved into a final 
unity’.19 When Heidegger uses the term Gegeneinander to describe the opposition of 
world and earth, we are not meant to see these terms in a hierarchical order, nor their 
unity as a final one. 
 
Heidegger calls Ruhe an inner collection of movement [innige Sammlung], a gathering, a 
kind of coming together of motion. This rest is extreme agitation [höchste Bewegtheit], 
he says. This is the kind of rest of the work that rests-in-itself. We can get near to this 
repose if we can ‘grasp the movement of the happening [Geschehens] in the work-being 
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of the work as a unity’.20 This gathering together points towards the kind of relation 
there is between world and earth which is exhibited and happens in the work of art; in 
Heidegger’s thinking about art, it is less a question of art being an exhibition of 
something, rather it is one where art is a happening, an event. There is a unifying 
relation between world and earth that happens in the work of art. World and earth are 
essentially different, says Heidegger, but they are never separated from one another. The 
earth provides the ground for the world and this earth rises up through the world. It is 
not an empty unity where opposites are not concerned with each other but one where 
striving and opening compete with withdrawal and closing, he says. In this, therefore, 
there is an interdependence or co-dependence. The one can never do without the other: 
‘The earth cannot do without the openness of world if it is to appear in the liberating 
surge of its self-closedness. World, on the other hand, cannot float away from the earth 
if, as the prevailing breadth and path of all essential destiny, it is to ground itself on 
something decisive.’21 The unity of the happening appears as the relation [Bezug] 
between the setting up [Aufstellen] of a world and a setting forth [Herstellen] of the 
earth. This movement of world and earth must be grasped as a unity which, as a form of 
gathering, provides the resting-in-itself [Insichruhen] and standing-in-itself 
[Insichstehen], effectively the self-subsistence, of the work, says Heidegger. The relation 
between world and earth is a form of mutuality which is unresolved and irresolvable, yet 
at the same time is resolved in a unity, a resolution without resolution, perhaps. In the 
same way that it is not an empty unity, it is also not just a simple opposition. It is, on this 
basis, a full unity, an accomplished unity, a plenitude born out of opposition, and a 
differential unity. It is, as Christopher Fynsk points out, ‘an identity founded in 
difference’.22 
 
This oppositional co-dependency is termed strife [Streit] by Heidegger. But, he says, this 
strife cannot simply be reduced to discord, dispute, disruption or destruction. Strife is 
not a rift [Riss] in the sense of a tearing open but is the intimacy of the mutual 
dependence of the contestants [Innigkeit des Sichzugehörens der Streitenden]. The rift 
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takes the contestants into the source of their unity, their common ground, their 
belonging-togetherness; they are not allowed to break apart. Strife raises both the world 
and earth into the self-assertion of their essence and by setting up a world and setting 
forth the earth, the work brings strife into its fullness. Strife reaches its zenith in fighting 
the fight between world and earth and the work-being of the work consists in this fight. 
The unity of the work happens in this fight, which Heidegger calls a simple intimacy 
[Einfachen der Innigkeit]: ‘The fighting of the fight is the continually self-surpassing 
gathering [Sammlung] of the agitation of the work. The repose of the work that rests in 
itself thus has its essence in the intimacy of the struggle.’23 Our first sight of what is at 
work in the work is enabled from out of the work’s composure, which is crucial for what 
is happening in the work of art and, therefore, for art itself. 
 
Truth happens in the repose of the work of art. The happening of truth in the work is the 
contest between world and earth and, in this contest, repose comes to presence. But in 
this contest, there can be no winner. There is always a contest and, as such, a certain 
equilibrium is achieved. Even though there is conflict, it is never a question of the one 
vanquishing the other, and therefore the contest becomes harmonious, in the same way 
that two parts of a piece of music can be said to be in harmony, because neither part can 
do without the other. Rather than being antagonistic enemies, world and earth are 
agonistic contestants. Agonistic is drawn from the ancient Greek term for contest or 
challenge, a0gw/n, which can also mean assembly or gathering. As has been seen, 
gathering [Sammlung] is used by Heidegger to describe the way the work of art comes 
together. A0gw/n is also a verbal dispute between two characters in a Greek play, two 
characters who belong together within a formalised structure. It is this sense of 
belonging together in a structure that I want to convey by using the term agonistic, rather 
than the more belligerent term antagonistic. World and earth are part of a formal 
structure of contestation, rather than being in a conflict which is a fight to the death. But 
if this is a formal structure then the question of victory becomes problematic. It is just a 
question of whoever gets the last word being the winner. Victory, therefore, is a purely 
formal matter. Winning is a case of speaking last. But if victory is purely formal, then 
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what kind of victory is it? If winning is predetermined, then victory has already been 
withdrawn from the character speaking second. Victory is always already defeat. Marc 
Froment-Meurice picks up on this when he describes the outcome of the struggle 
between world and earth: ‘Earth, or rather reserve (itself double), will always have the 
final word; but since it is the word given by the other, the world, the earth sees its 
victory stolen from it. By the very fact that it will always appear victorious, it will 
appear, and thus will be defeated. This is not a simple dialectic in which the loser wins, 
for this would always suppose that the goal is to win, to aim accurately, to say the 
truth.’24 
 
This contesting equilibrium can therefore be called repose, or composure, precisely 
because of the balance achieved in this mutual, agonistic fight. Strife is a composition. 
In this conflict is grounded the work’s Insichruhen, or its Insichstehen, its resting-in-
itself, its self-subsistence, its self-sufficiency. In the gesammelten Bewegnis of the 
conflict, repose comes to presence. Gesammelten is translated as intense but this 
translation misses the meaning of collectivity that the term contains, linked as it is to 
gesamt, meaning whole or entire, and Gesamt, totality or complete. Bewegnis means 
movement. In this collective movement of the conflict, there is a certain type of fullness, 
completion, accomplishment and unity involved. There is a gathering together of 
movement within the work’s resting-in-itself. Repose is a movement of gathering 
together. This suggests that the work of art is brought to a unified whole in the 
equilibrium of the strife of world and earth. This unification points towards the self-
sufficiency of the work of art, grounded as it is in itself, without any dependence on 
anything external to it. The work composes itself in the conflict of world and earth. In 
the strife, the unity of world and earth is won. The work of art is, in itself, autonomous; 
it gives itself its own law. 
 
Julian Young claims that the whole notion of strife, the primal conflict, can be dismissed 
and that Heidegger himself performs such a dismissal in the turning to Ereignis that is 
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instituted in the years 1936-38, a turning which is virtually contemporaneous with ‘The 
Origin’ (1935-36). Young’s claim is based on two main theses. Firstly, he claims that to 
think that each and every artwork is agitated is to misconstrue the nature of the artwork, 
or that it is a generalisation too far. Not every work of art is agitated, he says. Works of 
art may, indeed, inspire awe in the way that world and earth come to presence but this 
awe is inspired not by conflict but by their coming to presence ‘in a serene harmony 
with each other’.25 He gives Raphael’s Sixtina as an example of a serene work of art. His 
second thesis is based upon the series of footnotes that Heidegger appended to the essay 
when it was republished in 1960. These footnotes indicate that the Urstreit is to be 
replaced by Ereignis, according to Young, as well as highlight a general dissatisfaction 
on Heidegger’s part with the essay. Heidegger says that the whole project of ‘The 
Origin’ is somehow inadequate (unzureichend) because of the inappropriate way that the 
term truth is used in relation to the concealing and unconcealing of the clearing. 
 
In answer to Young’s first point, one has to question whether the strife between world 
and earth can be seen simply as agitation, whether it is ‘essentially warfare between the 
forces of disclosure and those of concealment internal to a self-conflicted Being’.26 It 
has already been seen how closely Heidegger relates Streit to Ruhe throughout his 
description of the struggle between world and earth. It is clear that there is a co-
dependency between world and earth that is, in a certain way, a harmony and cannot be 
reduced to agitation. A strife that is ‘the intimacy of the mutual dependence of the 
contestants’,27 that is gathered together into a unity, is not just agitation and we could 
‘all too easily falsify the essence of the strife were we to conflate that essence with 
discord and dispute, and to know it, therefore, only as disruption and destruction. In 
essential strife, however, the opponents raise each other into the self-assertion of their 
essences’.28 The relation between strife and repose that is exhibited in the work of art 
may well be paradoxical and it is perhaps this paradoxical relation that is at the heart of 
the work of art. In writing of the strife, Heidegger is not saying that all artworks are 
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agitated but that all artworks are paradoxical in the way that strife rests and rest strifes.29 
It is also worth noting that when Young refers to agitation he is referring to the term 
Bewegtheit, which means emotion but is linked to bewegen meaning to move, and which 
he translates in his own version of ‘The Origin’ as agitation in the passage considered 
above. A little later, in the same paragraph, he translates the same term merely as 
movement. In the Zusatz, which Heidegger wrote twenty years after the original essay, 
the term Bewegtheit is used again and Young once more translates it as movement. 
Movement is a far less loaded or emotional term than agitated, which brings in meanings 
such as troubled or disturbed. There is, perhaps, on Young’s part, a desire to intensify 
his thesis through the translation and, rather than saying extreme agitation, Heidegger 
could be intensifying his terms, calling rest that is the inner collection of movement the 
supreme movement [höchste Bewegtheit]. 
 
The second point that Young puts forward to support his claim is that the notion that 
truth battles its way to presence is replaced in Heidegger’s thinking by the more serene 
happening that is theorised around the term Ereignis. ‘Heidegger dismisses the Urstreit 
from his thinking…it makes no further appearance in connection with art or with 
anything else.’30 It is beyond the scope of this thesis to follow the fortunes of strife in 
Heidegger’s subsequent work, nor can justice be done here to the movement of Ereignis 
in his work, although I will return to it in the final chapter, but this citation from the 
Beiträge zur Philosophie, written during the years 1936-8, but not published until 1989, 
is just one example that can be used as a way of questioning whether Young is entirely 
right, perhaps suggesting that the relation between Urstreit and Ereignis cannot be so 
easily dismissed. Heidegger writes: ‘As the grounding that takes the strifing of the strife 
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[Streites] into what is opened up by strife, Da-sein is awaited by humans and is carried 
in the inabiding which sustains the “t/here” and belongs to enowning [Ereignis].’31 In 
addition, in the winter of 1942-43, Heidegger again returns to the notion of the Streit in 
his lectures on Parmenides. Here, truth as a0lh/qeia is the result of a struggle [erstritten] 
between concealment and unconcealedness which are in mutual conflict [Streit]. It is not 
a question of human beings struggling for truth, rather it is a question of truth itself 
being essentially a conflict [in seinem Wesen ein Streit]. For Heidegger, Streit cannot 
just be equated with war, discord or competition but, he asks, how can we come to 
define po/lemoj if we have not penetrated the conflict that is indigenous [heimisch] to 
truth? We have, he says, been alienated from this conflictual essence for a long time. 
 
It can be seen even in this brief consideration that the dismissal of Streit is not as 
straightforward as Young would like it to be. Part of his motive for this dismissal comes 
from the marginal glosses Heidegger added to the essay in 1960. Young’s claim is that 
Ereignis replaces the primal conflict as the essence of truth because Heidegger footnotes 
this and calls it Ereignis. But is this a replacement, a renaming or a clarification? Is 
Heidegger seeking to claim retrospectively that when he describes the essence of truth as 
the primal conflict in ‘The Origin’ that he was thinking the thought of Ereignis all along, 
that the thinking of truth in ‘The Origin’ was consistent with his later thinking of 
Ereignis? These questions must be left hanging here but they do serve to indicate that 
one should not be too peremptory in dismissing the strife of world and earth. What also 
needs to be borne in mind here is that ‘The Origin’ is already making a case that there is 
a certain passivity involved in the coming forth of the earth. The setting up of a world 
belongs to the being of the work and this setting up of the world, in its turn, brings the 
materiality of the work into the open of the world of the work. A work of art, in this case 
a temple, sets up the world and allows the earth ‘to come forth for the very first time’,32 
and this allowing is a letting [lassen], not a forcing or pushing. In fact, Heidegger writes, 
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‘Earth is that which cannot be forced, that which is effortless and untiring’.33 While it is 
the work that is doing this – ‘The work lets the earth be an earth’, writes Heidegger and 
he also glosses this as Ereignis34 – it can only do it because in the move that sees the 
setting up of a world, there is also the move that allows the coming forth of the earth, 
implying that it is not a violent conflict, but more a case of opening a space. 
 
There is another reason why Young seeks to keep a distance between the later Heidegger 
and the notion of the strife and this has to do with the deeper question of Heidegger’s 
involvement with National Socialism during this period, the middle to late 1930s. It is a 
matter of record that Heidegger publicly declared his support for Hitler and National 
Socialism during his rectorship of Freiburg University. What is not as clear is the extent 
to which Heidegger later repudiated his National Socialist views. A separate industry has 
developed arguing totally opposed positions, suggesting either that Heidegger remained 
a Nazi for the rest of his life or that he abandoned National Socialism after his brief 
flirtation with it. Young subscribes to the latter view and he sees the dismissal of the 
primal conflict as part of Heidegger’s break with fascism. He believes that the notion of 
the primal conflict does not have its source in the theory of truth but rather in the 
militaristic rhetoric of the time. Young identifies Urstreit with the Sturm und Drang 
imagery that he claims was prevalent during the Nazi era, although Sturm und Drang 
was a late eighteenth century movement in German philosophy, literature and music, 
with which Hamann, Goethe and Haydn were associated. It is possible that Young has 
mistaken this for the avowedly Nazi and racist ideology of Blut und Boden. Whatever he 
is referring to, the fact of the matter is that Young believes that the Urstreit is tainted by 
Nazi associations and is using the reference to Sturm und Drang as part of his thesis that 
Heidegger makes a decisive break with his Nazi affiliations and part of this break 
involves the jettisoning of the Urstreit. 
 
But if Young’s dismissal of the Urstreit is, at the very least, questionable, there are other 
questions to be raised about the notion of Ruhe. Heidegger argues that the mode of 
                                                 
33
 Ibid. 
34
 Ibid. Heidegger’s emphasis. 
 50 
movement determines the mode of rest: ‘Je nach der Art der Bewegung ist die Weise der 
Ruhe.’35 Here, je nach means according to, or depending on, so that a literal translation 
might read something like, ‘according to the type of movement is the manner of rest’. 
The implication is that movement has some kind of priority over rest. Movement 
determines the type of rest or rest itself. ‘Only what moves can rest’,36 says Heidegger. 
When movement is just the changing in place of a body, then rest is merely the limit 
case of movement, but when rest can include movement then rest can be an inner 
collection of movement, he claims. But if movement determines rest, if rest rests only in 
accordance with movement, how can rest then include movement? This suggests that 
rest is determined by that which it includes, that which is a part of it. The priority of 
movement over rest seems to have shifted in favour of a rest that subsumes movement 
within itself. Rest is the limit case of movement but is also determined by it and 
movement is the condition of possibility of rest. However, perhaps we are just within the 
circle that, Heidegger says, characterises thinking about art and the work of art. At the 
beginning of ‘The Origin’, he says that we can only determine what art is from the work 
of art and that what the work is can only be determined out of an understanding of art, 
hence the circle. We have to move in this circle. Thinking in a circle is neither defective 
nor makeshift, but a strength and the feast of thought, he claims, and that ‘[n]ot only is 
the main step from work to art, like the step from art to work, a circle, but that every 
individual step that we attempt circles within this circle’.37 Clearly, then rest and 
movement are part of this circle but, even if we are willing to accept this circularity, 
there is still the question of how and why rest should include movement. Heidegger just 
claims that there is a form of rest that includes movement but does not say how this can 
be. There seems to be an elision in the argument here. Heidegger gives us the case of 
rest as the limit case of movement when something merely changes its place, but he does 
not seem to do the equivalent for rest that includes movement. He merely asserts that 
there is such a thing and that this is the rest of the work that rests in itself. It is just this 
unified rest that we are trying to express when we reflect upon the work of art. It may 
well be that the argument is defective here, but the essential point is that this moving-
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resting forms the composure of the work of art out of which truth is set forth and where, 
according to Heidegger, seeing the enigma of art becomes a possibility. 
 
As has already been stated, Heidegger introduces the notion of enigma in the Afterword 
of the essay, with the implication that the essay has been intimately tied up with this 
question. The term enigma appears four times in a short paragraph at the beginning of 
the Nachwort. It appears nowhere else in the essay, nor does Heidegger give us a 
definition of the term here. This does not mean that we should merely dismiss it as a 
rhetorical flourish, nor should we take it to mean that art, in the final analysis, is 
multiply interpretable. Apart from the, perhaps, banal nature of such a statement, it is 
clear that Heidegger is not offering us an interpretation of a specific work of art, one that 
can take its place alongside other interpretations. Rather he is trying to say something 
about the essential nature of art, although he does discuss a painting of some shoes38 by 
Van Gogh, without specifying which painting, and a temple at Paestum although, as 
Sallis points out39, he does not mention which of the three temples it is. In thinking of 
the enigma of art, in thinking the enigma - and perhaps to see the enigma is merely to 
allow thinking to approach it – it would be wrong to believe that art is some kind of 
object that can be described or classified, that can be related to a general aesthetics, or 
that it is part of the cultural process of connoisseurship and aesthetic appreciation. It 
remains outside the museum and the economy of exchange that constitute the art market. 
Heidegger makes this distinction in the Nachwort where there is a contrast between his 
thinking about art and the wrong turning taken by aesthetics. Is it a question, then, of the 
mode of being of the enigma, one in which the ‘is’ of ‘the enigma is’ becomes part of 
what is at stake, or where the enigma is a refusal of the metaphysical question ‘what 
is…?’? Can one say of the enigma what John Sallis writes of Plato’s other beginning, 
the unsaid or unthought in Plato’s text: ‘[I]t remains unsaid because it resists saying, 
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because it withdraws from lo/goj, refuses to submit to the question: ti\ e0sti?, “What 
is…?” And yet, it is not simply unsayable but is somehow inscribed.’40  
 
What is the claim that Heidegger is making? He claims that art is an enigma and that it is 
the task [Aufgabe] to see the enigma. He does not say whose task this is, although the 
implication is that it is a task for all of us, nor what kind of task it is. What is a task? As 
Aufgabe, it is a form of responsibility and it is a gift, something we are given to do. It is 
also a form of giving up, in terms of a giving over and a surrendering. Who or what has 
given us this task? Is it art itself that demands that we take up this responsibility or is it 
each work of art that reframes anew the demand that we attempt to see art for what it is, 
that is as enigma? There is also the question of whether it is possible to see the enigma 
of art in art itself or whether this seeing is only possible through a consideration of art, 
such as Heidegger has just given us, although he disclaims that he is attempting to solve 
the enigma. This does seem to be the implication of Heidegger’s comment that his essay 
on the origin of the work of art is an attempt to see the enigma. The suggestion is that 
the enigma is only accessible – in the limited way prescribed – through a form of 
commentary on art. At the end of the essay, he says that such reflections are necessary 
for art’s coming-to-be. Perhaps we can only see the enigma as enigma in the 
Überlegungen that we devote to art, which would give a curious priority to 
commentaries on art over and above the works of art themselves. It appears that in order 
for us to see the enigma as enigma, there has to be some sort of mediation. It is not a 
mediation that is determined by aesthetics, but it is a mediation nonetheless. Does the 
enigma, therefore, not happen in the work of art itself, does it not, indeed, come to 
presence in the way truth, and the strife of world and earth, are said to do? 
 
Is it possible to identify the enigma with a specific aspect of Heidegger’s thinking on art, 
either with world and earth or, indeed, with truth for that matter? Kai Hammermeister 
thinks so and claims that Heidegger specifically links earth to enigma, with the enigma 
signalling the ultimate unknowability of art, as Hammermeister explains: ‘Heidegger, 
too, insists that art remains ultimately unknowable. Long before Adorno, he speaks 
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of…the enigma of art. Every work of art contains a moment that cannot be understood, 
that remains hidden and resists all attempts of elucidation. Heidegger calls this moment 
earth.’41 I do not think that it is so easy to link it to earth, as Hammermeister claims 
Heidegger does, for two reasons. Firstly, Heidegger himself says that it is art that is the 
enigma. This suggests that it is the unity that Heidegger claims art is that is being named 
as the enigma, not one specific part of it. Secondly, there would seem to be little point in 
introducing another term to cover the same thing. It would merely add another layer 
where it is unnecessary. However, as will be seen, the movement of truth and the 
movement of enigma exhibit distinct similarities which perhaps undermines such an 
easy dismissal of Hammermeister’s claim here.  
 
But if Heidegger does not give us an explicit definition, what does he mean? In plain 
terms, an enigma is something puzzling, mysterious or ambiguous. It comes from a 
Greek term meaning to speak allusively, obscurely, or in riddles. Ultimately it derives 
from the Greek term for fable, ai]noj, as discussed in the Introduction. I should, 
however, reiterate what I said there about an etymological account of the term enigma 
because one must not lose sight of the fact that we are dealing with the German term 
Rätsel, not the Greek-derived term enigma. Any examination of the term has to take this 
into account. Heidegger himself gives us just such an examination in the lecture on 
Hölderlin’s poem ‘The Ister’. Simon Critchley says that an enigma has perceptual and 
linguistic aspects: ‘Perceptually, an enigma is something one cannot see through. It is 
undurchsichtig, obscure, opaque and not transparent. Linguistically, an enigma is a 
riddle.’42 Gerald Bruns claims that for Heidegger an enigma is a dark saying, ‘not a 
riddle or conundrum or a logical puzzle that we could eventually work out or whose 
answer we might guess, but a saying shrouded forever in darkness’.43  For Heidegger, 
Bruns claims, the main point about an enigma is that it can never be penetrated or 
brought into an open view and, like Hammermeister, he equates it with the earth: 
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‘[T]here is no way of shedding light on what it means in the sense of a content or 
message that can be conceptually retrieved. It resists philology of every sort, ancient, 
modern, or postmodern. It won’t be purified of its earthly character.’44 McNeill makes a 
number of references to the enigma in The Glance of the Eye, whether it is the enigmatic 
way that the materiality of the temple emerges, or the nothing that emanates so 
enigmatically from the work of art. But he never seems to question the enigma as 
enigma. It is seemingly simply given. Veronique Foti sees the artwork in its created 
form as the withdrawal ‘from explanatory schemata into the enigma of its sheer 
“thatness” and “suchness”’45 and equates the earthiness of the artwork with its enigmatic 
suchness. 
 
The enigma is resistant to all conceptuality. Is Heidegger saying, therefore, that art is 
resistant to any concepts that we might bring to it? But again, in saying this, it may well 
be that all that is being said is that art is resistant to any final interpretation and this, 
perhaps, is to say very little. Certainly Hammermeister sees little in the enigma beyond 
this notion that art does not, and cannot, submit to a single, final interpretation: ‘Because 
all art contains this moment of earth, no one experience will ever come to terms with the 
work; no single interpretation will ever suffice.’46 But in speaking of interpretations, we 
are perhaps falling back into the very aesthetics that Heidegger seeks to avoid. Certainly, 
Heidegger’s take on how we respond to art does not correspond to how we interpret it, in 
that our response is not the response of individual subjectivities. Nor does the enigma 
arise as a result of the activities of the artist. It is not something at which the artist 
consciously or unconsciously aims. Art’s enigmaticalness is indifferent to the claims of 
the artist and the role of the artist is put into question by Heidegger, as will be seen. It is 
not a question of the artist making the work difficult or obscure. To say that the poetry 
of Paul Celan is obscure – Celan sees obscurity as being assigned to poetry through 
difference and estrangement - is not the same as saying his poetry allows us to see the 
enigma as enigma. Heidegger does not intend to give us a defence of the necessity of 
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obscurity in art. If art is an enigma, then its relation to the role of the artist might be one 
where the artist questions what a work of art is, what art is, which is probably the 
paradigmatic question of a modernist approach to art.  
 
But if art is an enigma, and is always already an enigma, then this enigmaticalness exists 
prior to the work of the artist and the work of art. Irrespective of what the artist does, if a 
work of art is produced then art appears as enigmatic. But perhaps it is wrong to say that 
it exists prior to the work of the artist. It is not something that exists somewhere for the 
artist to pluck out of the air, in the same way that Heidegger says that truth does not exist 
in the heavens waiting for human beings to grab it. In a sense, the enigmaticalness of art 
is somehow prior, perhaps pre-phenomenally, or pre-originally, to the work of art but it 
appears, if in fact it could be said to appear at all, only after the fact of the work of art. 
The structure is one in which that which is logically anterior can only be discerned in 
that which comes after it. This is the structure of the pre-original, a term borrowed from 
the work of Emmanuel Levinas, where the pre-original is a non-phenomenal, non-
cognitive and non-presentable movement. Not starting from itself, nor self-producing, 
the pre-original is dependent on a prior event and yet it is that which makes the event 
possible. It involves an immemorial past that can never be brought into the present but it 
is not another origin. Is it possible to apply this term to art? Is art the prior event that 
makes the work of art possible, but is also dependent on the work of art, does art itself 
rise up in the work of art?  
 
Heidegger says that the task is not to solve the enigma. However, it is in the nature of an 
enigma that it cannot be solved, that no answer is adequate to the mysteriousness that it 
presents. An enigma that is capable of a solution is no longer an enigma, it is merely 
something that is in need of clarification and that can be clarified. This impossibility of 
solution is what creates the enigma as enigma, gives it its very structure and allows it to 
remain open. Yet, the absence of a solution also closes the enigma off to us. If art is an 
enigma, then art has this same structure. It is something that is not capable of being 
solved and therefore remains open, but at the same time is irrevocably closed, again 
because of the absence of a solution. In this, art, like the enigma, is always in the play of 
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this opening-closing. But in recognising that there is no solution, perhaps a solution can 
only be glimpsed through the presentation of this absence of solution, as Novalis 
indicates: ‘If the character of a given problem lies in its insolubility, then we solve the 
problem by presenting its insolubility.’47 In an essay on Novalis, commenting on this 
and other passages from his work, Manfred Frank writes that the work of art ‘gives us 
the promise that it will be imperatively demanding, in that it does not place a result in 
our hands, it does not settle our minds, but rather agitates us’.48 This agitation, he says, 
leads to an undetermined seeking for a foundation which is never found. How far is this 
from Adorno’s idea that the task of aesthetics is to comprehend the incomprehensibility 
of art, that the solution of the enigma is, at the same time, the maintenance of the 
enigma? In his consideration of the section from Thus Spoke Zarathustra, ‘Vom Gesicht 
und Räthsel’, Heidegger says that what the enigma contains [enthalten] and hides 
[verbergen] only becomes open [offenbar] through the guess or surmise [erraten]. Any 
kind of calculation does not get near to it because what is discovered has already been 
calculated in advance. Instead, in erraten, ‘we take a leap, without guidelines, without 
the rungs of any ladder which anyone can clamber up anytime. To grasp [fassen] the 
enigma is to leap, especially when the enigma involves being as a whole’.49 To catch 
hold of the enigma is to take flight, to leave the ground. The direction towards the 
enigma that is figured in erraten is the direction of a journey into unconcealment. In 
brief, the enigma is not calculable by metaphysical thought and it would be a complete 
[gründlich] misunderstanding of the enigma if we think that our encounter with it is a 
question of solving it. The erraten of the Rätsel is so that we can experience the fact that 
the enigma as enigma cannot be pushed to one side. The enigma has to be confronted 
through a journey into the open, he says. 
 
But what kind of openness is this? It is, perhaps, to this openness that Heidegger refers 
when he says that it must remain open whether and how there is art at all. There can 
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never be a definitive decision as to whether art actually is or not. But he then claims that 
there is a place where there is no doubt that there is art: ‘But since it must remain open 
whether and how there is art at all, we will attempt to discover the nature of art where 
there is no doubt that art genuinely prevails. Art presences in the art-work.’50 But if we 
remain in the open question about if, or whether, and how art actually is at all, how is it 
possible to make the claim that art undoubtedly [ungezweifelt] appears in the work of 
art? We seem to move from a position of uncertainty of openness to one where there is 
no doubt in the space of a single sentence. Is this art’s enigma then? That art genuinely 
prevails in the work of art yet we cannot say how or whether it actually is? That art is 
unspeakable could be the implication of the term entsprechen, which means to 
correspond, when Heidegger writes that art is just a word to which nothing real any 
longer corresponds. Perhaps art only arises in the conjunction of work and artist, but this 
arising is always both after the fact of work and artist and prior to it. To be able to speak 
of works of art and artists already presupposes the fact of art, for a decision about art to 
have already been made, but this decision can only be made on the basis of the work of 
art and the artist. This decision is one that can never be fixed in a rule and must be made 
anew, must begin again, each time a work of art is created afresh. What art is, whether 
art is, must always remain open but how and whether art is has always already been 
decided in the work of art and closed itself off. We cannot say what art is but we can 
identify art in the work of art. Art is somehow given in the work of art but this gift is 
unspeakable. But is it a giving that can never be resolved into a gift? Perhaps we should 
be thinking of arting rather than art, rather than trying to fix it into a concept. 
 
In asking the question whether the enigma of art is the undecidability of whether and 
how art is and the fact that art undoubtedly is in the work of art, has the enigma of art 
been solved? Have we said what art is? By no means. All that has been stated is this 
undecidability, that structurally the enigma is this dual movement of withholding and 
giving. ‘The Origin’ is not meant to be a solution to the enigma and, as Froment-
Meurice reminds us, ‘Heidegger emphasizes that he is in no way responding to the 
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“enigma” of art; he is not going to say what that might be’.51 Heidegger repudiates the 
notion that the enigma of art could be an answer to the question of what art is. In the 
Zusatz, written twenty years after the essay, Heidegger writes: ‘What art may be is one 
of the questions to which the essay offers no answer. What may give the impression of 
such an answer are directions for questioning (compare the first sentences of the 
Afterword).’52 The second sentence of this quotation refers to the sentences that 
introduce the notion of the enigma of art. Clearly Heidegger is cautioning us against the 
idea that the enigma is the answer to what art is. Rather the enigma is a direction that a 
questioning about art can take. But art is only a means to an end, says Heidegger: 
‘Reflection on what art may be is completely and decisively directed solely toward the 
question of being. Art is accorded neither an area of cultural achievement nor an 
appearance of spirit; it belongs, rather, to the Event [Ereignis] out of which the 
“meaning of being”…is first determined.’53 Reflections on the enigma of art are part of a 
reflection on the enigma of being, a reflection that is bound up with the enigma of the 
appearance of being. 
 
The question of the decision of art is linked with the impossibility of a solution to the 
enigma’s insistent demand that one is sought for. The enigma is a demand for a solution 
from which we cannot be absolved. But, while submitting to the demand of finding a 
solution, we have always already been absolved from the possibility of meeting this 
demand. This sense of absolution is part of the very structure of an enigma but the 
absolution is never a final or definitive one. If it was, then there would be little point in 
confronting the enigma. This impossibility of absolution can never be mere paralysis. 
For the enigma to be an enigma, it has to hold open the promise of a solution, it has to 
admit that possibility. If this holding open, this possibility, was not structurally part of 
the enigma, then the enigma would not be what it is, an enigma. It would, in fact, be 
radically hermetic. John Sallis writes, in his book Transfigurements, of the future of the 
work of art54, of the promise of art, a promise that does not necessarily have to be made 
                                                 
51
 Froment-Meurice, That is to Say, p.149. 
52
 Heidegger, Off the Beaten Track, p.55/p.73. 
53
 Ibid. Heidegger’s emphases. 
54
 Sallis, Transfigurements, p.152. 
 59 
by anyone, a promise that is made by art itself. It is a promise that is made from out of 
the future that resolves itself into a hope, rather than offering certainty or likelihood, he 
says. Art’s promise concerns how the future may be shaped and art’s own role in 
deciding what that shape might be.  
 
A promise, says Sallis, is a setting forth of a pledge into the future. In a sense, it is a 
sending of a pledge. But it is also true to say that a promise is irrevocably mired in a past 
that did not take place. A promise relates to something that has not happened with the 
intention of putting right this non-happening. Therefore, even as it points towards the 
future, a promise is given over to a past that remains unfulfilled. A promise is an 
intimation, a hint that gestures to the future in marking the past. In a sense, the enigma 
offers a promise, a promise that a solution is possible – it always holds open the promise 
of a solution - but it is a promise that has always already been withdrawn. The promise 
arises only in this prior withdrawal. The promise of a solution is after the fact of its 
impossible resolution. The enigma points to a future that is always already 
immemorially past. Because the solution never arrives, because it is withdrawn, that is 
the promise is withdrawn, the solution already belongs to the past, therefore, a past that 
was never present and can never be recuperated. This is the radical powerlessness of the 
enigma, the powerlessness of art. The work of art points, or refers, back to art, tries to 
make a decision about art, but the work of art can never finally decide what art is. One 
could use a figure of speech that Emmanuel Levinas uses in Otherwise than Being and 
say that in the enigma the promise of a solution is the sound that can only be heard in the 
echo of its withdrawal, after the fact of that withdrawal having been made. Elsewhere, as 
I have shown in the Introduction, Levinas uses the term enigma to designate the way 
otherness manifests itself without manifestation. The enigma is a meaning beyond 
meaning inserted in the meaning that constitutes an order and which advances while 
retreating. ‘In an enigma,’ he writes, ‘the exorbitant meaning is already effaced in its 
apparition.’55 This captures, to an extent, what is being articulated here, but it is 
important to emphasise that the movement of advance and retreat is never simultaneous. 
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The retreat has already occurred prior to any advance. There is a kind of temporality at 
work in which that which is prior is only discernible after the fact of its withdrawal. The 
promise, the enigma’s possibility of solution, is never something that could be present in 
terms of its being lived through. It, the enigma, remains immemorially past. The past has 
passed without the completion of a present. ‘The supreme anachronism of a past that 
was never a now…is the enigma’s word,’ writes Levinas.56 The enigma never comes to 
presence in the way that world and earth presence in their strife. The promise never 
appears as such at all, it is never a happening, an event. 
 
What is the impact of this interruptive temporality, which is an anterior temporality, on 
the self-subsistence, the resting-in-itself, of the work of art? Is it a breach in the self-
sufficiency of the work that disrupts the founding of truth in what Heidegger calls its 
threefold of bestowing, founding and beginning, something that remains improper in the 
proper happening of truth, or is it, in fact, truth itself? Directions towards answering 
these questions can only be given by returning to the question of the happening of truth 
in the work of art. So far, although truth has been mentioned here in relation to the work 
of art and to the strife of world and earth, there has been no attempt to explain in any 
detail either Heidegger’s concept of truth or how the enigma of art is related to this 
conception if, indeed, it can be seen as a relation. How then does Heidegger define 
truth? First of all, truth is not the correctness of propositional statements (x is y), truth as 
correspondence, or truth as the ‘agreement of knowledge with the facts’.57 This is not 
because these definitions are incorrect, but because they rely upon a prior truth, 
according to Heidegger, and it is this prior truth with which he is concerned. This prior 
truth is the condition of possibility for truth as it is ordinarily understood: ‘In order, 
however, for knowledge, and for the sentence that forms and expresses it, to correspond 
to the facts it is necessary, first of all, that the fact which is to be binding on the sentence 
show itself to be such. And how is it to show itself if it is unable to stand out of 
concealment, unable to stand in the unconcealed?’58 
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The last word of this quotation translates Heidegger’s term Unverborgenheit which is 
his translation and reconceptualisation of the ancient Greek term a0lh/qeia which was 
either translated as truth, or corresponded with the concept of truth. This alternative 
translation reflects both Heidegger’s etymological understanding of the Greek and his 
contention that truth as unconcealment was unthought in both Greek and subsequent 
philosophy and, although unconcealment remained hidden in Greek philosophy, it did 
determine the presence of everything present. Heidegger, in ‘The Origin’, translates 
a0lh/qeia as the ‘Unverborgenheit des Seienden’, the ‘unconcealment of beings’,59 and 
what this means is that for truth to happen as correctness, there has to be a prior 
disclosure, a region or a world has to open up. A world is opened up in which beings can 
discover things and other beings in it, which they can interpret, and which sets the 
context for the kind of beings and things that can be discovered or interpreted in it. 
Discovery and interpretation are dependent upon this opening up of a context. It is 
important to note, however, that this is not the subjective creation of a world. Human 
beings are always already thrown into this world and, as human subjects, we do not 
presuppose the unconcealment of beings, says Heidegger: ‘With all our correct 
representations [Vorstellungen] we would be nothing – we could never make the 
presupposition of there being something manifest to which we conform ourselves – if 
the unconcealment of beings had not already set us forth into that illuminated realm in 
which every being stands for us and from which it withdraws.’60 The opening of a world 
is something that in its happening allows human beings ‘access to those beings that we 
ourselves are not and admittance to the being that we ourselves are’.61 Not only do we 
gain access to other beings but we also come into our own being. This access is by no 
means as clear cut as this description would suggest, however. In the midst of this 
openness, this Lichtung, variously translated as clearing or lighting, or sometimes both at 
the same time, something is held back, or hidden. Something is concealed in 
unconcealment, but this concealment, says Heidegger, can only occur here in the 
illuminated [Gelichteten]. This concealment reigns [waltet] in the midst of beings and 
does so in a twofold manner, he continues. It appears as both Versagen, refusal, and as 
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Verstellen, obstruction. Refusal is a refusal of the totality of being, says Fynsk, and it 
‘appears in the conflict of truth as the self-closing of the earth, and it is the source of the 
work of art’s own withdrawal’.62 This refusal is that which presents itself to us when ‘all 
we can say of a being is that it is’.63 This is the beginning of the clearing of what is 
illuminated, says Heidegger, the fact that we can say that such and such a thing is. What 
that thing is is withdrawn from us in concealment as refusal. 
 
Alongside concealment as refusal, there is also concealment as obstruction, although 
obstruction does not quite capture the full meaning of Verstellen. This term means to 
adjust or to change and to block or obstruct. In its link to Stellen it is an alienating of 
place or position. Through this root term, Verstellen is linked into a whole semantic 
network around presenting and positioning that is part of the language of ‘The Origin’, 
from Aufstellung, setting up, to Herstellung, setting forth, which are used in relation to 
world and earth, and from Ausstellung, exhibition, to Erstellung, construction. It is also 
the root word for Darstellung and Vorstellung, presentation and representation 
respectively, which are key terms in German aesthetic theory, and Gestell, enframing, 
which becomes an important term for Heidegger, especially in ‘The Question 
concerning Technology’ as the name for the essence of modern technology, which 
frames human beings as a usable reserve. Perhaps in seeing art in terms of Verstellen, 
rather than as Darstellung or Vorstellung, Heidegger is referencing his move away from 
an aesthetic standpoint, that Verstellen is not just a displacement in relation to 
unconcealment but also a displacement of aesthetics. Verstellen is usually translated as 
obstruction or dissembling in ‘The Origin’, but as Fynsk reminds us, it can also be 
understood as disguise. What he doesn’t say, though, is that this disguise relates to 
disguising the voice and in effect one could say that saying is disguised. Obstruction, 
however, is not quite the same as dissembling or disguise. Obstruction can simply mean 
one thing getting in the way of another by accident. Dissembling and disguise suggest 
that there is an ulterior motive to this obstruction, that there is a deliberate attempt to 
obscure or obstruct – to deceive - and that the motive is not quite seemly. There is a 
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pretence and one’s real motives remain hidden. Nothing is as it seems to be. Heidegger 
initially seems to suggest that this other manner of concealment is simply obstruction. In 
a jostling for position, one being may get in front of others and so hide them, or cast a 
shadow over them, so that many, or all, of the other beings are denied except one. This is 
not simply refusal, says Heidegger. Instead, a being appears [erscheint] which is other 
than what it is. To present oneself as other than what one is is to appear as something 
other. As appearance [Schein], a being can deceive us and this ‘is the condition of the 
possibility of our deceiving ourselves rather than the other way round’.64 That this is 
deception, that the being as appearance can deceive, and is not just obstruction is 
underlined by the fact that Heidegger here uses the words trügen and täuschen, which 
can mean deceive, betray or simply mistake, and not just Verstellen. Appearance can 
cause us to be mistaken in what we see and do, it can lead us astray and into 
transgression. It can make us overreach ourselves, says Heidegger. Fynsk links this 
deception, dissembling, disguise to the Heraclitus fragment which claims that fu/sij 
loves to hide, a fragment which Heidegger concerns himself with in his writings on 
Heraclitus, and asks: ‘But what would hiding, which surely cannot appear insofar as it 
hides itself (and it must appear in art), disguise itself as, except disguise, when disguise 
appears as disguise, when disguise appears? In art, concealment appears (erscheint) 
inasmuch as the event of truth – a play of concealment and unconcealment – somehow 
comes to show there. But it appears in disguise or as disguise. What else is art but 
Schein (semblance, mere appearance), even if this Schein must be thought as grounded 
within the horizon of truth? So in art, we think we see disguise…But according to 
Heidegger we see in fact reserve, withdrawal.’65 
 
If someone or something appears in disguise or as disguise it is impossible to determine 
whether this person or thing is in disguise or is appearing as disguise. Disguise precludes 
this determination. If someone is in disguise, then this remains unknown, unless the 
disguise fails, in which case it is no longer disguise, or the disguise is torn off and the 
identity revealed, in which case disguise no longer appears as disguise. The fact of 
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disguise remains veiled and this veiling is constitutive of the disguise. It remains hidden 
and in remaining hidden it can never be grasped. Disguise is always disguised and this 
disguised disguise constitutes a withdrawal prior to its appearance because it is non-
appearing. If disguise poses as itself, then it always withdraws itself, precisely because 
to be seen as disguise is to see through it. Fynsk likens this disguise as disguise, what he 
calls the work’s self-contrasting, to a theatrical performance, a kind of posing in a 
theatrical sense, he says, which is perhaps inseparable from it and Heidegger too brings 
in a theatrical metaphor when he states that the clearing ‘is never a fixed stage with a 
permanently raised curtain on which the play of being enacts itself’.66 But if it is a 
performance, it is a performance without dramatic irony. There is no privileged position 
from which the audience can see Iago’s machinations while they remain hidden to 
Othello. Neither is there a final revelation at the end of the performance. Art, as Schein, 
remains in disguise, remains veiled, and we can never be sure, says Heidegger, whether 
concealment is either Versagen or Verstellen because concealment itself conceals and 
obstructs itself and the clearing only happens as this twofold concealment. In a later 
(1950) gloss on this happening, Heidegger terms it Ereignis. Perhaps we can begin to 
see a relation to enigma here. As we have seen, an enigma is a saying that in its saying 
says something other as this something other withdraws. It is never graspable, it stays 
out of reach. It is essentially undisclosable, but this is never disclosed as such; this 
disclosure has already withdrawn. It disguises itself. Enigma is a form of disguise, a 
mask, misdirection. It is a disguised saying. Is this to say, then, that art is always 
disguised in the work of art and that this disguise is impenetrable, in which case it is no 
longer seen as disguise? Is the enigma of art the fact that the work of art disguises art, 
without actually appearing as disguise? 
 
This double concealment accounts for the strangeness of truth, what Bruns calls its 
estrangement: ‘The otherness of truth is not merely an accidental divergence from 
essence, an error or mistake or falsehood. It is rather that truth itself is inscribed by a rift 
that splits it, so to say, lengthwise, joining the familiar and the strange, openness and 
refusal, clearing and dissembling, unconcealedness and withdrawal, darkness and 
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light.’67 There is something alien, or alienating, about truth whose essence is ruled by 
this twofold concealment, this denial, Heidegger calls it. This alienating effect is 
captured by Heidegger’s statement that the essence of truth is un-truth [Un-wahrheit]. If 
the hyphen doesn’t put us on our guard and alert us to the fact that we – as Bruns points 
out – shouldn’t take this statement as a propositional one, then Heidegger himself makes 
this clear: ‘We put it this way emphatically to indicate, with a perhaps off-putting 
directness, that refusal in the mode of concealing is intrinsic to unconcealment as 
clearing. On the other hand, the sentence “the essence of truth is un-truth” should not be 
taken to claim that truth, fundamentally, is falsehood. Equally little does it mean that 
truth is never itself but, dialectically represented, is always its opposite as well.’68 Truth 
is never a simple opposition, nor is it a dialectical movement. Truth can only come forth 
as itself because the clearing that enables this to happen finds its origin in the concealing 
denial of Versagen, refusal. World is opened up by earth as refusal. Verstellen, 
obstruction, brings in the possibility of error because beings can be covered over. To be 
in the truth is to be capable of being wrong, of transgressing: ‘To the open belongs a 
world and the earth. But world is not simply the open which corresponds to the clearing, 
earth is not simply the closed that corresponds to concealment. World, rather, is the 
clearing of the paths of the essential directives with which every decision complies. 
Every decision, however, is grounded in something that cannot be mastered, something 
concealed, something disconcerting. Otherwise it would never be a decision. Earth is not 
simply the closed but that which rises up as self-closing.’69 Truth happens only by 
establishing itself in the strife and space it itself opens up. In a sense, therefore, truth has 
already happened prior to its being established [Einrichtung]. This establishing is a kind 
of setting up into the one – the Ein of Einrichting, which recalls the unity [Einheit] of 
the strife of world and earth. This is not to say that truth somehow exists elsewhere, 
among the stars as Heidegger frames it, for human beings to grasp it. It is the openness 
of beings that allows the place, enables the possibility of a somewhere. The clearing of 
the openness and establishment in the open belong together. This is the essence of the 
happening of truth, its historicality, says Heidegger.  
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The work of art is one of the sites privileged by Heidegger for the happening of truth. 
But how does truth happen in the work of art? Truth is established in it through the 
bringing forth of a unique being, a unique happening or event: ‘The establishment of 
truth in the work is the bringing forth of a being of a kind which never was before and 
never will be again.’70 This being is brought into the open in a way that what is to be 
brought forth – the work of art – opens up the open into which it comes forth. The time, 
the place, necessary for any work of art to be brought forth is opened up by the work of 
art. For there to be a bringing forth, there has to be an open but this open can only be on 
the basis of a bringing forth. Each can only be on the basis of the other. Perhaps the 
musical analogy is again operative here. A fugue comes forth on the basis of its theme 
and countertheme, its countersubject. The theme could not be a theme without its 
countertheme. In a way, it is dependent on the latter as it only emerges as theme in the 
light of the countertheme. The same goes for the countertheme. It would not be what it is 
without the theme and the fugue could not come into its own without the play of theme 
and countertheme. Truth, as theme, could not be truth without the countertheme of un-
truth, world could not be world without earth. Thinking of truth in these musical terms 
also highlights something about the temporal structure. The theme only comes to be 
recognised as theme after the fact. By bringing in the countertheme we recognise the 
theme but only after it has happened. This movement of theme and countertheme, of 
counterpoint, is one in which each of them calls forth the other into their fullness, a call 
and response, wherein the call is first heard in the response and the response is only 
heard through the call. The being can only be on the basis of the open and the open on 
the basis of the being. A work of art is a work only on the basis that, in the bringing 
forth of the work of art, truth, as the openness of beings, is brought forth. This is what 
Heidegger calls creation [Schaffen]. Creation is the bringing forth of the openness of 
beings in a unique being and brings truth to happen in the work of art. 
 
The work of art announces the fact that it is, claims Heidegger. The thrust that this work 
is and the unceasingness of this thrust constitute the constancy [Beständigkeit] of the 
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self-subsistence of the work. This thrust is the ‘that’ of createdness at its most pure. Any 
inquiry into the work’s self-subsistence [Insichstehen] has to take into account the fact 
that the work is as something worked, he says. Its reality [Wirklichkeit], its workly 
character, is dependent on the work of the artist, on the fact that it is produced by the 
artist. Heidegger makes a distinction between that which is made (i.e. by the craftsman) 
and that which is created by the artist. But this createdness is not determined by the 
creative activity of the artist but by the work itself. Creation is the allowing of something 
to come forth in what has been brought forth. This is a redefinition of the meaning of 
creation. For Heidegger it is not the artist’s creativity that is at issue, but the fact that it is 
his work – and for Heidegger it is probably always a ‘he’ – that allows the createdness of 
the work of art to shine forth. Creation is not a matter of someone putting something 
together to create a work of art, but something that inheres in the work itself. It is not a 
subjective activity, although this is not to deny that the artist does, indeed, produce 
something. It is that the essence of creation, or createdness, is in the work and it is the 
work that determines this createdness. In this movement of coming forth and bringing 
forth, creation or createdness, explains Heidegger, is a receiving [Empfangen] and a 
taking [Entnehmen], within the attraction [Bezug] towards unconcealment. Creation, 
therefore, is not so much an active doing, but more of a passive receptivity and 
acceptance. Empfangen means to receive, but it also means to greet or welcome. 
Creation is a welcoming receiving. Entnehmen means to take, with the movement being 
a taking out of, or from, a kind of removal or withdrawal, but still a taking on in that in 
removing or withdrawing, there is an acceptance of responsibility for what is being 
taken. 
 
There are two essential determinations for createdness, says Heidegger. One is the 
curious notion of the Riss, which means both rift and tear, sketch and plan. The second is 
that createdness is explicitly created into what is created as creation arises out of the 
work. The notion of Riss has already been touched upon earlier in this chapter. It is that 
which brings together, while holding apart, the agon of world and earth. It is not a mere 
chasm, says Heidegger, rather it is that which figures the mutual dependency of the 
agonists. It is a unity, but not a unity that merely unites. The Riss, in being brought forth, 
 68 
is entrusted back into the earth, into the paint of the painting, the stone of the sculpture 
or the wood of the carving, says Heidegger. Fynsk puts it like this: ‘The conflictual 
relation of world and earth, then, is traced out in the Riss, which, in turn, is fixed in 
place and set up in the work in figure or shape (Gestalt).’71 It is a double movement in 
that the Riss both opens up the conflict and is set into this opening by the earth as it 
emerges in relation to the world. The Riss, says Fynsk, is not something that is either 
posited or presented by the work: ‘It is…unpresentable, for it is no thing that is. It 
appears only, and can only be…in the movement of repetition by which it is drawn out 
in the work’s setting forth of the earth…The work’s form essentially retraces this 
opening tracing that makes possible any delimiting form.’72 Nor is it something that acts 
as a ground, says Bruns. He claims that the Riss is not something that we can finally 
make sense of. It is, he says, ‘a radically heterogeneous notion, a singular word, best 
understood as a parody of the concept of deep or basic structure’ and that it should not 
be idealised and converted ‘into a hidden unifying principle, as if beneath earth and 
world there were a transcendental ground or ultimate foundation’.73 It is, perhaps, a 
letting-go of the ground, he concludes. What happens to art, Bruns asks, if the tradition 
is thought of as rift rather than ground? He answers: ‘Here it would not be enough to 
think of tradition as an allegorical process that integrates the other into an edifice of the 
same, say, a vast typological master narrative; it would also have to be thought of as a 
satirical process in which the other is encountered in its otherness as a radical difference, 
a singularity, a refusal of typology, a questioning of self-identity, a resistance to 
interpretation, an unsilenceable questioning.’74  
 
As we have just seen, creation is a form of receptivity, an assumption, in the sense of 
taking possession of something, which is also a form of responsibility, and this ties in 
with Heidegger’s assertion that the work of art is not certified as such because it has 
been made by an artist: ‘That createdness stands forth out of the work does not mean 
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that it should be a salient feature of the work that it is made by a great artist.’75 It is not 
that ‘N.N fecit’, Heidegger says, but ‘factum est’. It is not that he made this but that it 
was made. Heidegger likens creation to fetching or getting [holen], to the extent that all 
creation is a Schöpfen, which is translated as fetching, but also has an old meaning of 
create, as schaffen, in terms of creating a work of art. A Schöpfer is a creator, but it can 
also refer to God as creator. Generally, Heidegger uses holen for fetch or bringen for 
bring but uses Schöpfen in relation to creation in this sentence: ‘Because it is such a 
fetching-forth [holen], all creation is a fetching [Schöpfen], as in fetching [holen] water 
from a spring [Quelle].’76 Clearly Heidegger wanted to underscore, or to give validity to, 
his notion of creation as a form of fetching by bringing in the term Schöpfen, with its old 
meaning of artistic creation, although schöpfen now means to draw, take or summon. 
Creation, then, comes not from the artist but from somewhere other. This being made, 
the factum est, is what is announced by the work of art. This ‘that’ of being-created 
signifies ‘that an unconcealment of beings has happened here and, as this happening, 
happens here for the first time; or this, that this work is rather than is not. The thrust that 
the work, as this work, is and the unceasingness of this inconspicuous thrust constitute 
the constancy of the self-subsistence of the work. Precisely where the artist and the 
process and circumstances of the work’s coming into being remain unknown, this thrust, 
this “that” of createdness, steps into view at its purest from the work’.77 This passage has 
a number of important implications, as far as gaining an understanding of what is meant 
when Heidegger calls art an enigma. The fact that the work is means that truth happens 
in the work of art. But it is not a simple happening. In fact, truth happens only as having 
happened. In coming to the fact of truth we are already too late, it is already past. Truth 
speaks, but only as having spoken. 
 
In his own meditations on the enigma, Levinas writes that what ‘is essential here is the 
way a meaning that is beyond meaning is inserted in the meaning that remains in an 
order, the way it advances while retreating’.78 While Levinas would no doubt dispute 
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that this formula can be applied to Heidegger’s thinking here, it does seem to me to 
capture something essential about what is being said about art and the work of art. 
Because truth has already happened, it could be said to be retreating while it advances as 
happening here for the first time. The non-recuperability of the having-happened of truth 
is underlined further by Heidegger when he talks about the coming together of the artist 
and the process and circumstances of the work’s coming into being. The point where 
these three aspects of the work of art come together to produce the that of createdness is 
unknown, says Heidegger, and remains unknown [unbekannt bleiben]. The that of the 
work of art emerges out of unknowability, it is beyond cognition. What is more, it is in 
this unknowability, in this having-happened, where the work of art finds its self-
subsistence, its Insichruhens. The repose, the composure, of the work of art rests in the 
unknown and in an irrecuperable past. Do we glimpse the enigma here? I want to quote 
from Levinas again, because it seems to me that he gets very close to what is happening 
in ‘The Origin’, although Levinas would not accept the point I’m making here. It is quite 
clear that in this essay, ‘Phenomenon and Enigma’, Levinas has a certain contempt for 
Heidegger’s thought of being, even though he isn’t referred to by name. In the run-up to 
the extract I quote, he likens being to a game of blind-man’s buff where the call of 
presence penetrates even through the blindfold. He then goes on to say: ‘But what in an 
enigma has signifyingness does not take refuge in a sphere that is present in its own way 
and awaits a concept capable of finding it and grasping it there. The signifyingness of an 
enigma comes from an irreversible, irrecuperable past which it has perhaps not left since 
it has already been absent from the very terms in which it was signalled (“perhaps” is the 
modality of an enigma, irreducible to the modalities of being and certainty).’79 If art is 
an enigma, as it has been described here, then art is not there in a way that it can be 
found and grasped in a concept. It is, perhaps, already absent from the terms in which it 
is set up. 
 
Creation, or createdness, is one aspect of the happening of truth in the work of art. The 
‘work cannot be without being created’,80 but nor can it come into being without 
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preservers [Bewahrenden]. The relation of preservation to truth [Wahrheit] is clearly 
signalled by Heidegger’s use of Bewahrung so that the preservers of the work of art 
stand in relation to truth. As with createdness, preservation is not to be seen as 
something that has been achieved, or as the action of a knowing subject that sets itself 
objectives and pursues them. Preservation is a form of passivity in that it is an allowing 
to be [sein lassen]. Who are the preservers? The preservers are human beings, but in our 
relation to the work of art we are not to be seen as an audience, as spectators who 
represent the art object to ourselves. This relation is not something that can be brought 
into the experience [Erlebnis] of a knowing subject, where knowing is merely ideas and 
opinions about something. For Heidegger, knowing is a willing and willing is a 
knowing, but this knowing is a form of passive allowing in which the human being 
[Mensch] lets himself stand out into the unconcealment of beings, an opening out into 
being, a letting-being-happen. What is preservation? It is, says Heidegger, the passive 
allowing [lassen] of a work of art to be a work. But in this passivity, a certain 
displacement takes place. We are taken out of where we are and transported somewhere 
other. The more that the non-violent thrust of the work of art proclaims that this work is, 
as this work, the more it is transported into the openness of beings, which it itself opened 
up, the more human beings are carried into the openness, says Heidegger. In being 
carried into this openness, the more we are taken out of the realm of the ordinary 
[Gewöhnlichen], the more we are thrust into the extraordinary [Ungeheure]. All familiar 
relations [gewohnten Bezüge] to world and earth are changed. As the work of art is 
thrust into the extraordinary, the ‘more purely it seems to sever all ties [Bezüge] to 
human beings’,81 but, at the same time, it also seems to be most in need of human beings 
in terms of its preservation. The more solitary the work, the more it seems to stand in 
itself, the more it is a step into the open where it is preserved by the preservers. What 
they do is allow the work to be what it is for the first time. This means that preservation 
is a letting-happen of the happening of truth. But, as we have already seen, truth happens 
in the work as having happened: ‘The work thrusts forth not the “truth” itself but rather 
the fact that truth has happened and happens in the work as having happened.’82 This is 
                                                 
81
 Ibid. 
82
 Fynsk, Heidegger Thought and Historicity, p.135. 
 72 
the createdness of the work of art and it is the createdness that the preservers preserve. 
We, as preservers, allow this createdness to happen in the work, we let truth happen as 
having happened. But if truth happens in the work of art as having already happened 
through createdness, what is the relation to truth that the preservers have? Is it an 
experience that is only experienced in its recollection? Heidegger says that preservation 
‘does not individualize human beings down to their experiences but rather, brings them 
into a belonging [Zugehörigkeit] to the truth that happens in the work.’83 But what is 
belonging when what it belongs to only happens as already having happened? Is there 
not a double displacement here, the displacement of createdness and then of 
preservation? Perhaps preservation brings us into proximity to the happening of truth, 
into proximity with the work art, while at the same time art itself remains oblique and 
the enigma of art is this obliquity, which is neither a naming or a calling. The knowing 
as willing that preservation is ‘does not take the work out of its self-subsistence’84 and, 
as we have seen, this self-subsistence is the point at which art remains unknowable. 
 
The way I have described preservation so far suggests that it is a simple passivity in the 
face of the work of art. This is to miss a fundamental aspect of what is at stake in 
preservation and this aspect is delimited by a certain semantic field around 
transportation. The work is transported [entrückt] into the openness of beings and at the 
same time it carries [rückt] us into the openness. Transport is a form of displacement 
[Verrückung], but it is more than a simple displacement. Entrückt can also mean 
enraptured, being transported into a form of ecstasy, to be rapt or lost in reverie, while 
verrücken can mean to disarrange and verrückt insane. How far is the rapture, the 
derangement, here from the rapture [Entrückung] that occurs in Being and Time in the 
Augenblick where ‘Dasein is carried away to whatever possibilities and circumstances 
are encountered in the Situation’?85 This is what Heidegger calls the authentic present, 
where for the first time the human being, or Dasein, can encounter beings and be the 
being that it is. Can one ignore these meanings here? The proximity to a sense of 
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derangement, or a derangement of the senses, is very real here and I think that it is a 
proximity that Heidegger wants us to hear. After all, Heidegger could have used a 
number of words – tragen for instance – if he merely wanted to convey the idea of 
transport. What he wants to convey, it seems to me, is that there is a certain derangement 
involved with the notion of preservation, not only a derangement of the preservers, but 
also a derangement of aesthetics. The notion that a work of art transports its audience 
somewhere else is not a new one, nor is it one that has yet run its course – Vladimir 
Nabokov writes of ‘aesthetic bliss, that is a sense of being somehow, somewhere, 
connected with other states of being where art…is the norm’86 – but here Heidegger is 
not using it to suggest that the preservers are in some form of aesthetic rapture but that 
they have been displaced out of all reference to the familiar. It also suggests that 
preservation is entirely displaced from aesthetic appreciation. The thrust into the 
extraordinary is lost once it has been brought into the familiar which is precisely what 
aesthetic appreciation – as connoisseurship – and the art business do. This derangement 
takes us out of the usual and into the unfamiliar, swapping all ‘doing and prizing, 
knowing and looking’ for a dwelling [verweilen] ‘within the truth that is happening in 
the work of art’.87 Although verweilen is translated as dwelling here, I think that a 
distinction needs to be made between this term and wohnen, which is often translated as 
dwelling in Heidegger’s work. Verweilen indicates more of a lingering, a tarrying or 
resting in a place, rather than a permanent dwelling. I think that we can see in these two 
responses to art – those of aesthetics and preservation – an echo of the terminology of 
Being and Time where Heidegger talks of authentic and inauthentic modes of being, 
where aesthetics is the inauthentic and preservation the authentic. 
 
Art is the creative preservation of truth in the work, says Heidegger. All art is poetry, he 
continues, and poetry is the saying of the unconcealment of beings. Poetry’s essence is 
the founding [Stiftung] of truth and this founding works in a threefold manner as 
bestowing, grounding and beginning but these only become actual [wirklich] in 
preserving. Art is an origin in the sense that it allows something to arise. Art is ‘a 
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distinctive way in which truth comes into being, becomes, that is, historical’.88 It is this 
idea of art as the origin of the work of art, of the artist and the preservers, that William 
McNeill claims Heidegger names as the enigma of art. McNeill says that the enigma of 
art is synonymous with the enigma of the world. This is not to say that there is 
something puzzling or enigmatic about the world but that it is ‘nothing more and nothing 
less than the enigma that the world itself is’.89  This enigma is ‘the unmediated coming 
to pass of a world epoch from out of unconcealment, this event whereby a world 
begins’.90 In this, art as origin is ‘a letting-emerge, a letting-arrive that lets that which is 
to come – the work itself – come into being only as something that, at the very moment 
of its coming, of its arrival, has always already been’.91 We can see this movement in 
McNeill’s The Glance of the Eye, where he describes the temple from Heidegger’s essay 
as ‘the site and institution of an enigma’,92 in which the divine presence is enclosed and 
contained and where the enigmatic presencing of the god bestows on this temple its 
particular being. Here people come together in a historical community that arises out of 
the presencing of the divine. But the enigma always remains: ‘The temple is the sacred 
site of a promise, of something that appears in concealing itself, of something that, as 
thus apparent in its enigmatic concealment, is yet to come.’93 In the work of art, then, is 
the possibility of human praxis as such wherein ‘the opening projection of a certain 
configuration of possibility, the antecedent delineation of a world as the horizon from 
out of which human beings first come to themselves, first approach and see themselves 
in terms of certain possibilities that already call or beckon them, configuring their 
calling or vocation. It is important to note here in passing that this first coming of 
humans to themselves is already a second coming, a coming back or return, a retrieval of 
having-been. This…is precisely the temporality of the work of art as origin’.94 
 
This captures the temporal movement I have discussed above, in terms of world and 
earth and the happening of truth, but in identifying the enigma of art with the opening of 
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the world, does something go missing? Does not art disappear? While human beings 
might retrieve their having-been, can the same be said of art? McNeill says that it is the 
temporality of the work of art that corresponds to the coming of humans to themselves in 
a retrieval of having-been. What is the temporality of art? Is it the same as the work of 
art or does the notion of the enigma of art introduce an anteriority, a temporality prior to 
the work? At the opening of ‘The Origin’ Heidegger had said that it must remain open 
whether and how there is art at all but he had no doubt that art genuinely prevails 
[wirklich waltet] in the work of art. Art has its own reality in the work, it is actual and 
holds sway, is the power over the work of art. In the Zusatz, written twenty years after 
‘The Origin’, Heidegger claims that the nature of art, what it might be, is not one of the 
questions for which the essay offers an answer. It should also be recalled that at the very 
moment the ‘that’ of createdness comes into view in its most pure form in the work, that 
this is the point where the artist and the process and circumstances of the work’s coming 
to being remain unknown. Art remains something that is unknown, that can never be 
grasped, that can never be brought into a concept. The work of art is art’s residue, its 
remains, but it is a remainder without a trace, or a resonance of art. It is without this 
trace of art precisely because it has to remain open whether there is anything such as art 
at all. Is it the case that the enigma of art is the failure of art to appear as such, that each 
work of art marks this failure and that art itself can never be retrieved from its having-
been because it is a black hole out of which nothing shines? Is saying that art is always 
already the past, that it is irretrievable, saying that art can never be the historical opening 
of a people that Heidegger claims it to be, that art, rather than being an origin, is the pre-
originary, the condition and limit of the work of art but which itself does not appear? Is 
it possible to apprehend art as something present? 
 
It is this last question, whether it is possible to perceive art as something present, that the 
question of the enigma of art is directed towards. It seems to me that there is a tension in 
‘The Origin’ between the idea that art presences in the work of art and whether there is 
anything such as art at all, a tension between art as origin and art as pre-originary. This 
tension is encapsulated in the notion that art is an enigma. Art, says Heidegger, ‘arises 
[erspringt] as the founding preservation of the truth of beings in the work. To allow 
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something to arise, to bring something into being from out of the essential source in the 
in the founding leap [Sprung] is what is meant by the word “origin [Ursprung]”’.95 Art 
can be the origin of the work of art because, in its very nature, in its essence, art is an 
origin. But Heidegger also says that it must remain open whether and how there is art at 
all. The temporality at work in the enigma seems, on the face of it, to mirror the 
temporality of truth as it strifes through world and earth. The temporality of truth is a 
happening in which truth happens as having already happened. But truth does happen, a 
world does open up out of unconcealment, even if what opens up can never finally, 
definitively be brought to unconcealment. There is always the self-closing of earth but 
even this self-closing is an arising. The enigma has been discussed in terms of both a 
promise and a disguise. It was said of the promise that it promised a solution to the 
enigma but that this promise had already been withdrawn and that the promise appears, 
if it can be said to appear, only in this withdrawal. With disguise, it was said that 
disguise cannot appear as disguise because to do so would be to be seen through and 
therefore not to be disguise at all. Is it the case, then, that art never appears as such and 
that the enigma of art is this non-appearance? Is the work of art the place that art vacates 
and, if so, what happens in this vacated place?  
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Chapter 2 
 
The enigma of the river  
 
In ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’ the word enigma is mentioned four times and then 
seemingly only as an afterthought in one short paragraph in an Afterword whose date of 
writing is unknown but which falls between 1935 and the essay’s publication in book 
form twenty years later. In this retrospective glance at the essay, Heidegger hints at 
something fundamental about the enigma. The naming of the enigma of art only appears 
after the fact of art, after its happening. Whether the enigma genuinely appears in art is a 
question that still remains open. Heidegger himself says that the essay itself does not 
claim to be a solution to this enigma. The task is to see the enigma, not just in terms of 
art, but also in terms of being. This task is further ramified in a series of lectures that 
Heidegger gave on Hölderlin’s river poem ‘The Ister’. The lectures, delivered in 1942, 
were published in Heidegger’s Gesamtausgabe in 1984. In a passage that follows his 
own definition of Rätsel, Heidegger claims that we should not wish to solve the enigma. 
One of the terms he uses is dürfen which carries with it the sense of allowance, of 
permission, so in a way we are being prohibited [wir dürfen es nicht] from wanting to 
solve the enigma. As to where this prohibition comes from, Heidegger does not specify. 
Perhaps it is the enigma itself which is its own prohibition. He also says, in a phrase that 
both echoes, and goes further than, the afterword to ‘The Origin’, that ‘we must try to 
bring the enigma as enigma closer to us’1, which suggests that ‘we’ already stand in a 
relation of nearness to the enigma but that this relation involves a distance which needs 
to be overcome. It is an imperative upon us, a kind of demand that we cannot refuse. The 
enigma involves a prohibitive and imperative movement, both demand and refusal. Two 
other things need to be mentioned here. This passage in the lectures is not the first place 
that the enigma has been named. The other is that lösen, to solve, is wrapped around 
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with quotation marks, as if Heidegger wanted to abstract it from its ordinary sense, to 
put it into question, as if the solution was suspended. 
 
Heidegger’s use of Rätsel culminates in naming the river as an enigma. But in this bald 
saying, the word Rätsel is put into quotation marks. Before this citation it had come 
without such accessories, such as: Das Tun des Stromes ist ein Rätsel. What the river 
does, its activity, is an enigma. Why, just at the point that Heidegger is to give us his 
concept of enigma and, he claims, Hölderlin’s as well, does he gather quotation marks 
around the term? Does this use of quotation marks serve as a kind of doubling, a desire 
to ‘designate something other which resembles it, and of which it is, as it were, the 
metaphysical ghost’,2 as Derrida claims of Heidegger’s use of quotation marks around 
Geist? Is it a way of suspending it, of abstracting it from the ordinary? Certainly he 
seems to want to move Rätsel away from its usual meaning and return it to a meaning 
which he considers older, more original [ursprünglich] and more proper or authentic 
[eigentlich]. Heidegger’s claim is that the original meaning of Rätsel is akin to raten, 
that is to give counsel or advice, and that it is a caring reflection or thinking about a 
cared-for hiddenness: ‘dem sorgenden Nachdenken umsorgte Verborgene.’3 This appeal 
to a kind of etymological truth in which the origin of a word usurps that word’s usual 
meaning is a familiar strategy in Heidegger’s thinking. The authority of the origin 
overrules the word’s accepted meaning and its derivation is a falling off from its more 
authentic meaning, perhaps akin to the degeneration that characterises any springing-
from [entspringen] as Heidegger wrote in Being and Time: ‘The ontological source of 
Dasein’s Being is not ‘inferior’ to what springs from it, but towers above it in power 
from the outset; in the field of ontology, any ‘springing-from’ is degeneration.’4 
Heidegger does acknowledge that Rätsel as Kreuzworträtsel may point to a deeper 
meaning than the latter word would imply, but this meaning as puzzle is not one that 
particularly concerns Heidegger, nor does he specify whether this deeper meaning is a 
                                                 
2
 Jacques Derrida, Of Spirit, translated by Geoffrey Bennington and Rachel Bowlby, Chicago and London, 
The University of Chicago Press, 1989, p.24. 
3
 Heidegger, Hölderlin’s Hymn “The Ister”, p.34/p.40. 
4
 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, translated by John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson, Oxford UK and 
Cambridge USA, Blackwell, 1962, p.383. Sein und Zeit, Siebzehnte Auflage, Tübingen, Max Niemeyer 
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deepening of the meaning in terms of riddle or of counsel. It is true that Rätsel derives 
from raten, which comes from the Old High German term ratan and that it does mean to 
advise or to give counsel. It is also cognate with words from which the English read is 
derived, such as the old English raedan, which meant to advise, counsel, persuade, 
consult and decide. So there is something to be said for trying to bring back the meaning 
of counsel to Rätsel in the sense that the derivation from raten is accepted 
etymologically. Heidegger might say that it is a return to what is unthought in the 
thought of Rätsel. But why should a word’s supposed original meaning have priority in 
this manner? Did the word Rätsel ever have the meaning that Heidegger wishes to 
ascribe to it in his lectures on ‘The Ister’ or is it a meaning that was never actually 
present to the word itself? If we accept Heidegger’s assertion here, however, what can 
be said about giving counsel, what does to give counsel mean? How does Heidegger’s 
demand that we read Rätsel in this old and originary, but new, way affect the meaning 
that was given to the enigma in chapter one? These questions can only be answered by 
being attentive to what is at stake in counselling [raten] or giving counsel [Rat geben]. 
 
Heidegger does not really address what giving counsel means, in the sense that he leaves 
the question of its structure open. In order to understand what is at stake, we need to 
examine this structure. To counsel is an orientation towards the future through a thinking 
about the past that is given in the moment; there is a clear tripartite temporal structure. 
But in thinking towards the future, there is always already a leaving open, it is never a 
definitive fore-telling, rather it is a saying into the future that can never predetermine 
itself as actual. Its actuality is never given at the time of the counsel, it can only come 
after the fact. It is an offering made in hope, in a radical indetermination. Giving counsel 
is a having-already-been being-ahead-of-oneself towards the other, towards the one to 
whom counsel is given. Counsel is always a conjecture, a throwing together, an 
intimation directed towards what is coming from out of what has been. As a conjectural 
moment, its validity is always indeterminable, that is its truth can never be given in the 
moment of the saying – giving counsel is never a form of ordering, says Heidegger - and 
its truth or otherwise can only be acknowledged after the fact. It is a saying which is 
always addressed to someone but which speaks into what is yet to come, precisely 
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because it is never binding on the addressee. After all, the addressee can ignore the 
advice but, in a way, this very act of ignoring is also a way of taking on the counsel, 
even if the taking on is a rejection. What is to come still remains open. It is never an 
answer, a definitive statement about that which is, because it is always on the way. It is a 
setting forth into language that is neither prescriptive nor is it the law. Giving counsel is 
to put oneself at the disposal of the other, because it is an act that is unreciprocated. It is 
not an exchange, it is an act of generosity, in a movement that is a demand from the 
other towards the self which then gives itself up to the other in an asymmetrical act. 
 
This renaming of the enigma as counsel is the first move that Heidegger makes with 
regard to a re-orientation of the meaning of enigma, although in this re-orientation the 
counselling is still done from out of that which remains hidden. The enigma refers to 
something concealed, says Heidegger. There is a certain guardedness, something is 
withheld or kept back. The second move is to equate counsel [Rat] to care [Sorge]: 
‘“Rat” heißt so viel wie “Sorge.”’ Counsel means as much as care, says Heidegger, and 
giving counsel [Rat geben] properly [eigentlich] means ‘to take into care, to retain 
therein that which we care about, and thus to ground our belonging to it’.5 That is we 
ground our belonging to that which we take into care. But, as Heidegger acknowledges, 
giving counsel can also mean the opposite, i.e. giving an order and then leaving. It is 
merely an order or practical advice without any notion of care being attached to it. But 
the notion of utility is not the meaning that Heidegger wishes to be attached to it here. 
He merely raises it as a kind of counterpoint to the deeper, more original meaning that 
he wants us to hear in Rätsel. Whether there is a necessary connection between care and 
counsel is a question that remains open. Certainly Heidegger makes no connection 
between the two other than the assertion that counsel is equivalent to care. There is 
nothing in what he says that necessarily links the two, although the fact that counsel is 
given, that it is a gift, is suggestive of a relation that goes beyond mere utility. 
 
In trying to determine the full force that Heidegger wishes to give to counsel, and to 
determine whether counsel says as much as care, there is a need to clarify what 
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Heidegger means by care. The term that Heidegger uses is Sorge, which played an 
important role in Being and Time. Sorge indicates ‘the anxiety, worry arising out of 
apprehensions concerning the future and refers as much to the external cause as the inner 
state’,6 and is differentiated from meanings such as caring for the sick [Pflege], care as 
supervision or responsibility [Aufsicht] and care as loving care or solicitude. Care 
[Sorge] is described in Being and Time essentially as being-in-the-world.7 It is used to 
delimit Dasein’s ontological structural whole as a threefold unity of being-ahead-of-
itself, being-already-in and being-alongside. According to Heidegger, it is not to be 
identified with the isolated attitude that the subject has towards itself because the self is 
always already care because it has already been characterised ontologically by being-
ahead-of-itself. Care for oneself would be a tautology, says Heidegger, and it is only 
because Dasein is care that concern for others can be shown. Care is a tripartite temporal 
structure in which the three parts are jointly posited and belong together. Dasein, in 
being always already care, is an originary [ursprünglich] totality and care lies before any 
factical attitude or intuition of Dasein. This Dasein-centric thought of care is modified in 
later work. 
 
In the Beiträge, for example, Heidegger writes that awe [Scheu], in its sense of 
Ehrfurcht, respect and reverence, is the way of becoming near and remaining in the 
nearness to what is most remote. This awe is ‘the opening of the simplicity and greatness 
of beings and the originarily needed necessity of sheltering the truth of be-ing in beings’ 
which is what gives historical man a goal, namely becoming the founder [Gründer] and 
preserver [Wahrer] of the truth of being [Seyn] and to be the Da (there/here) that is the 
ground used by das Wesen des Seyns, translated as ‘be-ing’s essential sway’. This, for 
Heidegger, is to be care, not ‘as a minor concern with some arbitrary thing, nor as denial 
of exultation and power, but more originarily [ursprünglicher] than that’, a care that is 
‘“for the sake of be-ing [Seyn]” – not the be-ing of man, but the be-ing of beings in the 
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whole’.8 What care means as Dasein’s basic trait [Grundzug] is summed up in three 
words – Sucher, Wahrer, Wächter – which mean respectively seeker or searcher, one 
who looks for, preserver, one who protects and preserves, and guardian or watchman, 
one who keeps an eye out. Care then is an attentive looking-out-for that looks-after, 
protects and preserves. To be the Da is to be care. Da in its Wesen needs to be taken 
over in a being, Dasein, which becomes the in-between between being [Seyn] and a 
being. In the Da, there is a kind of rift, conflict or gulf [Zwiespältigkeit] which 
Heidegger identifies as ‘the inabiding sustaining of the essential swaying of the truth of 
be-ing [das inständliche Ausstehen der Wesung der Wahrheit des Seyns]’.9 But there 
seems to be a lot more going on in this phrase. Inständliche includes meanings of 
maintaining, while Ausstehen is the nominalisation of a verb that transitively means to 
endure and intransitively means to be still to come, or appear and, of a solution, still to 
be found. It has a future orientation and a sense of the unknown which is important 
because, in this short passage from the Beiträge, Heidegger identifies the Zwiespältigkeit 
as a Rätsel, an enigma. It is through the truth of being [Seyn] that human beings are 
claimed originally and otherwise and thereby named as guardians of the truth of being, 
with human-being as care grounded in Dasein. Human being as the ground of the Da-
sein that is care has a triple function as the seeker of be-ing [Seyn], identified as 
Ereignis, the preserver of the truth of being and ‘the guardian of the stillness of the 
passing of the last god’.10 In each of the manifestations briefly described here, care is a 
tripartite structure which equates to the temporal modes of past, present and future. For 
example, Sucher is the future, Wahrer the past and Wächter the present. To what extent 
does giving counsel fit here? Giving counsel, as described, is a future-oriented saying 
given from out of the past in the conjectural moment. But it is also a moment in which 
the counsel given is at the disposal or the demand of the other. The act of giving counsel 
is an act that is unreciprocated and asymmetrical. It does not operate under the law of 
exchange but as an openness that remains open. 
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Does this radical openness, an openness that is constitutive of the enigma as outlined in 
the first chapter, fit with the meaning that Heidegger wants to give to Rätsel? Is 
Heidegger’s definition compatible with the definition offered in the first chapter or are 
there grounds for saying that the definition given in this thesis says something essential 
about Heidegger’s own? The whole force of Heidegger’s argument rests entirely on a 
claim to etymological truth, a claim that insists it can necessarily demarcate and delimit 
the meaning of a word. The origin of words is hybrid and it is hard to see how this 
hybridity cannot begin to disturb the absolute meaning that Heidegger wants to give any 
particular word. In the case of Rätsel there is nothing to stop other meanings coming 
back to haunt his reconfiguration of the meaning of counsel as care. Raten, for example, 
also means to guess or conjecture – it is linked with erraten which means to guess, and 
which Heidegger equates with taking a leap without question in Nietzsche – and 
guessing is not the same as counselling. What guessing does have though is the same 
structural direction towards the future. Nor can we just ignore the fact of Rätsel’s 
meaning as riddle or enigma. All these meanings destabilise Heidegger’s meaning and 
they are perhaps like spectres that return – and Derrida has asked whether etymology 
and ghosts aren’t really the same question – to haunt the more careful thinking 
[sorgfältigeres Denken] of Rätsel that Heidegger says he has hinted at here, a careful 
thinking that is aimed at bringing the enigma closer to us. This task is to be 
accomplished through a consideration of what Heidegger calls an unpoetic assertion 
[undichterische Aussage]: ‘The river is the locality of journeying. The river is the 
journeying of locality.’11 What does this assertion mean? 
 
To answer this question, we need to return to Hölderlin’s poem ‘The Ister’ and to 
Heidegger’s lectures on it, which form an accompaniment [Beigabe]12 to the poem. The 
poem opens with an invocation: ‘Jezt komme, Feuer! Now come fire.’ This is a calling, 
but a calling that is doubled in that the call calls on that which is called, but which does 
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not effect its coming, and the ones doing the calling. That which is called, the fire or the 
coming day, comes of its own accord, says Heidegger. The call is not instrumental in 
effecting the coming of the day. The futility of such a call also says that the ones doing 
the calling are ready to receive the call. Within the call something else is conceded, he 
continues. Those who are ready to receive the call are so because they have been called 
by the coming fire itself and are called to call by the call of the coming fire. They are 
summoned to hear because they are already determined as such. They are of a vocation 
[Bestimmung] to hear. While Bestimmung is here translated as vocation it can also be 
translated as the determined, the decided or the destined. It has ‘the sense of inducing a 
person to a course of action’;13 that is, those at whom it is directed are, in some sense, 
passive receivers of such an inducement. But Stimme also means voice and perhaps it is 
in the sense of being called by a voice that vocation is used here. Being determined 
involves being voiced as those to whom the call is to be heard as they give voice to the 
call. Those people who are called into their determination and readiness to be called are 
the called [Berufenen], according to Heidegger. 
 
Those who call the coming fire are simultaneously called into their calling by the call of 
the coming fire: ‘The call says: we, the ones thus calling, are ready. And something else 
is also concealed in such calling out: we are ready and are so only because we are called 
by the coming fire itself.’14 This suggests a certain circularity in the calling and being 
called, similar to that found in the circle of art, artist and artwork in ‘The Origin of the 
Work of Art’. Readiness to call and be called can only come out of the ‘Now come, 
fire!’ says Heidegger. To be ready, however, suggests a degree of preparedness that 
cannot just be put down to a certain simultaneity. To be ready to take on a task, to be 
ready to undergo a trial, one has had to have already undergone the preparation for it. Is 
it possible for such a preparedness to spring forth fully formed at the moment of being 
called? Those who are of such a calling to hear the call have been called into this calling 
prior to the call of ‘Now come, fire!’ and if, as Heidegger claims, those of such a calling 
are the poets then these poets have always already been called into their calling prior to 
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the call. In order to recognise the call of the coming fire, and therefore to be ready for it, 
the poet has to be as already-being-ready, otherwise it would not be possible for the poet 
to call. This kind of readiness has to have been already decided upon prior to the call 
into readiness. They have to be of a calling to be called. The decision to be of such a 
calling is not one that can be brought into thinking here. It is prior to that. Prior to the 
Now’s pronouncement, the ones pronouncing it have been called by the coming fire, but 
it is not the call that is named in the Now. In a sense, the Now that marks the opening of 
the poem is an echo of the fire’s calling of the callers. This echo echoes that which is 
prior to the poem, a priority that is never brought into the language of the poem. The 
calling of the fire to the callers is only heard in the call to the fire. The Now points back 
to a time that is prior to the poem, a time that is never brought into the poem itself. The 
Now calls forth a time that has been, as Maurice Blanchot writes in another context, 
‘[e]ffaced before being written. If the word trace can be admitted, it is as the mark that 
would indicate as erased what was, however, never traced. All our writing…would be 
this: the anxious search for what was never written in the present, but in a past to 
come.’15 
 
The Now is the mark of an unmarked mark, a time that lies before the Now but that is 
never brought into the Now. Heidegger continues: ‘The “Now” names the time of 
calling of those who are of a calling, a time of poets. Such a time is determined 
[bestimmt] from out of that which the poets [Dichter] are called upon to poetize 
[dichten] in their poetry [Dichtung].’16 But if, as has already been argued, the poets have 
always already been called prior to this calling, a pre-originary calling perhaps, if their 
preparedness amounts to a prior calling, a calling that is prior to the poem, what is the 
status of this Now? And also, what is the status of this poetry? The naming of the time of 
the poets only happens after the fact of the poets having always already been called. The 
poets are called to poetize the Now which determines the time they are called to poetize 
in their poetry, according to Heidegger. The time of the poets is thus named in the poem. 
But if this Now is dependent on a prior time of the past, a past that cannot be brought 
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into the Now, then the time of the poets has already gone before the Now without ever 
having been. As Simon Critchley writes, in his essay on the enigma and Sein und Zeit, 
what is named in saying now is always the experience of, what he calls, ‘an 
irredeemable past, a past that constitutes the present as having a delay with respect to 
itself. Now is not the now when I say ‘now’. My relation to the present is one where I 
am always trying – and failing – to catch up with myself’.17 This, it seems to me, is 
where the poets are, always trying to catch up with themselves. 
 
For Heidegger, however, poetizing determines the time of the poets. Heidegger asks 
what poetizing [dichten] is. The German term dichten can mean merely to write or 
compose, but is translated in the Ister lectures by the more overwrought term, poetize. 
Heidegger says that what dichten means is to write something down [niederschreiben], a 
vor-sagen of something to be written down. Dichten is a saying [sagen] of something 
that has not yet been told [gesagt], says Heidegger. In this poetic saying [dichterisch 
Gesagten], lies a proper [eigener] beginning. But does this – the telling of a not-yet-told 
tale – quite capture what is going on here? Everything seems to hinge on vorsagen 
which Heidegger hyphenates here, a strategy that he often uses to emphasise the 
constituent parts of a word to bring out their meanings as those constituent words. 
Normally vorsagen means to recite, which means to repeat something from memory, a 
kind of summons of what has already been. It is to repeat that which has already been 
composed. In the English translation of the Ister lectures, the hyphenated vor-sagen is 
translated as fore-tell so that dichten becomes a telling beforehand, a fore-saying, of that 
which is to be written down so that when Heidegger says that dichten means to write 
down he qualifies it by saying that it is a fore-telling of something to be written down. 
Poetizing involves a fore-telling and a writing down. The act of writing is not what 
constitutes dichten as such but the fore-telling that is constitutive of the writing down. 
The fore-telling is only discernible in the writing down and it only appears after the fact 
of the writing down and is experienced only in this recollection. 
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In his essay, ‘Andenken’, Heidegger writes that the foretelling [voraussagende] word is 
in a strict sense prophetic, not in any Judeo-Christian biblical sense - prophecy is not 
soothsaying and the poet is not a seer - but in the sense that it opens up a space for the 
holy: ‘The holy which is foretold poetically merely opens the time for an appearing of 
the gods, and points into the location of the dwelling of historical man on this earth…the 
“prophetic” element of this poetry must be grasped in terms of the being of the prophetic 
foretelling.’18 When Heidegger says that the foretelling word must be taken in the strict 
sense of prophetic he refers in the text to the Greek term profhteu/ein, which means 
interpreter of the gods, someone who is an intermediary between gods and men and 
gives wise counsel. In its strict sense, however, it is a speaking before, or a prior 
appearing, as the term derives from pro, meaning before, and fai/nw, which means to 
make clear, to come to light, and appear. The prophetic is literally a fore-saying, or fore-
appearing, a thinking forward that thinks back, that in thinking forward has already 
thought back. An orientation towards what is coming can only come from out of what 
has already preceded it. Heidegger says that the poets can compose what is prior to their 
poetry only if they say that which precedes [vorausgehen] everything that is actual 
[Wirklich]. It is this prophetic movement that points [weisen] towards the historical place 
on earth of human beings. The prophetic is a gesture. But, as Blanchot reminds us, in his 
essay ‘Prophetic Speech’, the prophetic is also a radical destabilising of what is actual. 
Prophecy is not just a future language, he says. It has a relation to time that is much 
more important than the simple discovery of future events. Prophetic speech ‘makes the 
future it announces, because it announces it, something impossible, a future one would 
not know how to live and that must upset all the sure givens of existence. When speech 
becomes prophetic, it is not the future that is given, it is the present that is taken away, 
and with it any possibility of a firm, stable, lasting presence’.19  
 
Is this destabilisation what Heidegger means when he writes in his essay on Andenken 
that the ‘becoming-real of the possible, as the becoming-ideal of the actual…has the 
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essential character of a dream’20? Is it this divine dream that the poets need to say but 
which also destabilises them? It throws them out of a carefree abode [sorglosen 
Aufenthalt] in familiar reality [vertrauten Wirklichen] into the terror of the nonreal [in 
den Schrecken des Unwirklichen]. But the nonreal is not a mere nullity, says Heidegger. 
This is because it can be either the no-longer-actual or the not-yet-actual. The nonreal 
contains both of these and largely remains undecided between them. Heidegger equates 
the unreal to the not-yet-real, which can also be called the possible, and which is the 
state between being and not-being. It is from out of the nonreal, where the poet has been 
thrown in his violent expulsion that he can utter his poetry. In fact, what Heidegger calls 
‘this divinely terrible nonreality [dieses furchtbargöttliche Unwirkliche]’,21 is the poem 
itself, a poem that cannot be composed in advance and which the poets have to say. The 
poem becomes, therefore, a kind of recitation from out of the nonreal. Not only that, the 
prophetic foretelling is the locality [Ortschaft] of the historical dwelling [Wohnen] of 
human beings, a dwelling that seems to take its distance from the desert that Blanchot 
says is the result of prophetic speech which ‘endlessly awakens in us the terror, 
understanding and memory of the desert’ and opposes ‘all stillness, all settling, any 
taking root that would be rest’.22  
 
In looking at the fore-telling word here, one needs to be mindful of the fact that, in the 
‘Andenken’ essay, Heidegger uses the word voraussagen, which means to foretell, rather 
than vorsagen, as in the lecture on ‘The Ister’. In this movement of fore-telling-writing-
down, we can again see the movement that enables and is enabled in the call of the Now. 
The question here is whether what constitutes the Now has already been withdrawn and 
whether the trace has already been erased before it has been traced. This is to ask 
whether the Now belongs to a never written past, a past still to come, in which the poem 
is always the failure of poetry, that the poem marks, without marking, the site where 
poetry fails to appear. This is, in effect, the movement of the enigma that was outlined in 
the previous chapter. Does Heidegger himself recognise such a movement? He does 
write that ‘this “Now” will never let itself be grasped “historiographically,” for instance 
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by attempting to establish the historical dates of well-known historical events and trying 
to relate the “Now” of the poem to those points in time by means of calculation’.23 
However, while the Now escapes such calculative, metaphysical thinking it does, he 
says, name [nennen] the Ereignis, usually translated as the event or event of 
appropriation: ‘The distinctive significance of the “Now” demands that in this word of 
time we also come to hear something distinctly significant and await a concealed 
fullness of poetic time and of its truth.’24 There is a fullness there, an accomplishment, 
even if it is still concealed. 
 
However, the Now, it seems to me, is the non-marking mark not so much of a concealed 
fullness as of the impossibility of this fullness, of a lack of accomplishment, and if the 
Now names Ereignis, and the Now is as I’ve described it, then Ereignis too is marked by 
this same lack. Rather than foretelling opening up the time for the gods and granting 
humanity its historical dwelling, it refers back to the always already readiness of the 
poets, a readiness that is always prior to and determines the Now but without being 
brought into it. There is, perhaps, a suggestion that Heidegger has an understanding of 
this when he writes that to call out ‘Now come’ to that which is coming already ‘is a 
superfluous and futile act’25 and yet the word Now as it is pronounced at the beginning 
of the poem ‘gives the entire poem its own singular [eigenen und einzigen] tone’.26 The 
same word is simultaneously superfluous [überflüssig], unnecessary and futile, and yet it 
also provides the poem with its singularity and what is its own [eigen]. The poet is both 
superfluous and essential and, perhaps, the poem is the mark of this superfluous 
essentiality. Inserted into that which is most proper, there is an excess that overflows the 
proper, the ownmost. What also has to be marked here is the fact that Hölderlin never 
finished ‘The Ister’, he did not give it a name and nor did he publish it. As Heidegger 
acknowledges, the poem just breaks off and falls silent. This could suggest that for 
Hölderlin that there was never a fullness or accomplishment here. Perhaps Hölderlin 
recognised that poetry was essentially failure, that what he wanted to bring into the 
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poem was always already denied it. William S. Allen writes that Hölderlin’s poetry 
exposes the poetic word as one that simultaneously offers and undermines a relation to 
what is. He goes on: ‘This, for Hölderlin, would seem to constitute the tragic nature of 
poetry, in that its writing reveals its word to be endlessly evasive and resistant to that 
which it is attempting to reach.’27 While Heidegger mentions the contingent status of 
‘The Ister’, it does not trouble him unduly. It never becomes problematic as far as his 
thinking on the poem goes. He accepts quite readily that the title of ‘The Ister’ is an 
appropriate one, based on the fact that Hölderlin in the poem names the upper course of 
the river as the Ister, and the fact that there are other named river poems, such as ‘The 
Rhine’.  
 
We have seen that Heidegger wants to separate poetic time from any notion of 
calendrical time, that it is not the same as what he called ordinary time in Being and 
Time. But nor is it as simple as posing a poetic time in contradistinction to calendar time. 
Heidegger claims that the time of the activity of poetizing is not straightforwardly 
identical or even the same as the timespace of that which is poetized. Even further, 
poetic time is different in each case, that is each poet, or each essential poet, poetizes 
anew the essence of poetizing itself. Each poem is its own poetic time. Poetic time does 
not exist waiting for the poem to participate in it but comes as new into the poetry. This 
is singularly and especially true in the case of Hölderlin; he is the exemplary poet, 
according to Heidegger. No calendrical date can be given for the Now of Hölderlin’s 
poetry, he says, although Heidegger himself is not averse to using the dates of the 
composition of poems as a way of linking those poems; he does this specifically with 
‘The Ister’ and ‘Andenken’. In fact, says Heidegger, the Now, the called and the calling, 
is a more originary [ursprüngliches] date, that which is given [ein Gegebenes] and a gift 
[eine Gabe], a gift that is given through the calling. While Heidegger does not mention it 
specifically here, perhaps because the etymology is Latin rather than ancient Greek, 
although there is a Greek cognate, this is another appeal to etymological truth. The 
German term Datum comes from datus, the past participle of the Latin dare, meaning 
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give. A date is that which is given, a gift. Heidegger lets us know he knows this through 
his inter-linguistic punning. The Now is the originary date, the originary gift or given.  
 
As with art in ‘The Origin’, the Now of poetic time does not come about because of the 
creative act of the poet. The Now is both a calling and a sending, a destiny as translated, 
and it is because of this sending that the Now cannot be captured in any kind of 
calendrical or calculative reckoning. The distinctive significance [die Auszeichnung] of 
the Now demands that we also hear [vernehmen] something distinctly significant [etwas 
Ausgezeichnetes] and that we await a concealed fullness of poetic time and its truth. The 
‘Now come’ appears to speak from a present into a future, that is the Now as present 
names the come as future, but this naming is also a calling. However, says Heidegger, 
initially the Now speaks towards that which has passed, into that which has already 
happened. A decision has been made and it is this decision, in deciding what has already 
happened, that alone sustains [tragen] all relations [Bezug] to that which is coming. Only 
what has been enables any relation to what is coming to take place. The occurrence, and 
Heidegger brackets this off in quotation marks as if to suggest a certain non-occurrence, 
of this decision, this appropriation or event has always already happened and it is the 
Now that names this as Ereignis. The Now is a calling, a sending and a naming 
[nennen]. In this tripartite structure of the Now, there is the present (naming), the future 
(sending) and what has been (calling). 
 
The poem names a Now, according to Heidegger, and in doing so it brings in poetic time 
as a naming-calling-sending. It is my contention, however, that the Now is the erased 
trace of a prior time that is never figured in the poem, a prior time that is never 
appropriate or appropriated. The structure of the Now can, I believe, also be traced in the 
Here, which Heidegger claims is also named in the poem. According to Heidegger, the 
Here names the locale [Ort] where human beings wish to build. This Here is determined 
by the river, he says, the river that is named the Ister. This is the Here where those 
calling, that is the poets, have come from the rivers. They build where the river makes 
the land fertile. This is what Hölderlin’s poem says, according to Heidegger. The Here 
seems to be relatively simple to determine, compared to the Now, which involves a 
 92 
complex echoing call and counter-call structure. Instead the Here is that place by the 
river which is enabled by the river. The river makes it possible to live in the fertile land. 
‘Here, however, we wish to build’, says Hölderlin, in a line that ‘stands proud and 
emphatic [entschieden] in the first strophe’,28 according to Heidegger. A decision is 
made here, the Here is the decisive vicinity in its determination [bestimmt] by the river. 
But, to echo the aber in Hölderlin’s line ‘Hier aber wollen wir bauen’, this does not 
quite tell the whole story. In Heidegger’s accompaniment to the poem, a curious ellipsis 
occurs. Immediately prior to the line just quoted, we read the following: 
 
 We, however, sing from the Indus 
 Arrived from afar and 
 From Alpheus, long have 
 We sought what is fitting, 
 Not without pinions may 
 Someone grasp at what is nearest 
 Directly 
 And reach the other side. 
 Here, however, we wish to build.29 
 
Heidegger avoids the lines from ‘long have’ to ‘the other side’. Instead we have an 
ellipsis. What should we make of this omission? For a long time the poets have sought 
what is fitting [das Schickliche], that which is proper or appropriate to them. While the 
fitting has been sought, it is not something that can be grasped directly or without great 
difficulty, or perhaps not at all. It is only with wings [Schwingen – translated as pinions. 
The Hamburger translation has the prosaic ‘wings’30] that one can get directly to the 
other side. The implication is that the poets do not have wings so there is no direct 
access to that which is nearest. The other side cannot be reached without a detour, ohne 
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Umweg it says in the notes to the Beißner and Schmidt edition of Hölderlin’s poetry.31 Is 
there a suggestion here that that which is most fitting, that which is most proper or is 
one’s own, is that which is most difficult to grasp or bring to oneself? Despite this 
difficulty, this is precisely where the poets wish to build, in the impossibility of grasping 
what is proper to them. One could argue that this is precisely the problem for Hölderlin, 
that poetry is this impossible building. Heidegger identifies the Here with the river and 
the land that abuts the river which, in turn, makes the land around it fit for living. He 
claims that Hölderlin’s line ‘Hier aber wollen wir bauen’ somehow stands apart from its 
context. If this was the case, there would be no need for an aber, a but. However, we 
wish to build here, here where the difficulty is at its greatest, where achieving the other 
side is impossible; the poet does not have wings after all. What is fitting for the poets 
has been sought long and hard and it is only possible to reach the other side directly with 
wings. What is fitting to the poets is ungraspable but it is precisely at this point, at the 
ungraspable, where they wish to build. That which is nearest to us can only be grasped 
in an impossible leap. They wish to place themselves in the place of grasping the 
ungraspable, of comprehending the incomprehensible, an impossible task. As already 
mentioned, Heidegger does not refer to this passage at all in his lectures on ‘The Ister’. 
He does, however, briefly allude to it in his essay ‘Andenken’ where he identifies the 
wings with the paths that enable the movement of passing over from one side to the 
other, a passing over that he identifies as being from the foreign [Fremde32] to the 
homely [heimisch33], which, although difficult, is not that insurmountable: ‘And if we 
are permitted to think with the word paths, not only on striding and climbing, but also on 
stepping over and climbing over, then the paths name the transition for passing over to 
the other side. Not without wings may…one cross over from the side of the foreign to the 
side of home (“The Ister,” IV, 220).’34 It seems that Hölderlin’s passage to the home is 
much more difficult than Heidegger perhaps allows, that the home is not just a case of 
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building in the fertile land, that the fertile land may always already be a desert, that we 
are always already estranged from the home. In 1801 Hölderlin, in a letter to his friend 
Casimir Böhlendorff, writes: ‘But what is our own has to be learnt just as much as what 
is foreign [Fremde]. For this reason the Greeks are indispensable to us. Only it is 
precisely in what is proper [Eigenen] to us, in the national, that we shall never match 
them because as I said, the free use of what is our own [Eigenen] is hardest of all.’35  
 
If these considerations of the Now and the Here give clues to a reading of the enigma, a 
reading that perhaps goes against the grain of Heidegger’s own thinking, then what 
Heidegger means by the enigma can begin to be glimpsed with his first mention of the 
word. It comes in an initially brief discussion of Hölderlin’s poem ‘Voice of the People’, 
a discussion that focuses on two specific words, which, Heidegger says, present an 
enigma [Rätselhaft sind diese beiden Namen]. These two words are die Schwindenden 
and die Ahnungsvollen, translated as vanishing and full of intimation in the following 
extract from the poem: 
 
 You are God’s voice, thus I once believed 
 In holy youth; yes and I say so still! 
 Unconcerned with our wisdom 
 The rivers still rush on, and yet 
 
 Who loves them not? And always do they move 
 My heart, when afar I hear them vanishing 
 Full of intimation, hastening along not 
 My path, yet more surely seaward.36 
 
The rivers are ‘full of intimation’ and ‘vanishing’, with the former naming the relation to 
what is coming, the latter naming the rivers going away into what has been. Both are, 
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says Heidegger, in a concealed, unitary relation to what has been and what is coming 
and, therefore, to time. Even more than this, not only are the rivers as intimative and 
vanishing timely, but they are time itself: ‘The flow of the rivers does not simply run its 
course “in time,” as if the latter were merely an indifferent framework extrinsic to the 
course of the rivers. The rivers intimate and vanish into time and do so in such a way 
that they themselves are thus of time and are time itself.’37 But if the rivers are time in 
their vanishing and intimation, then time itself is an enigma, because these two terms 
present an enigma. Time, as the poetic rivers, is an enigma and it is in the vanishing and 
intimation that the enigma resides. Before examining these two terms in more detail, 
Heidegger further deepens our understanding of the enigma. After another excursion 
into how metaphysics interprets art, Heidegger proclaims that Hölderlin’s poetry is not 
concerned with symbolic images at all and, even more, that it stands entirely outside of 
metaphysics and aesthetics. While it is still possible to interpret this poetry from within 
metaphysics, he continues, any reading done in such a way would be in vain. This 
assertion arises out of Heidegger’s contention that Hölderlin’s hymns are not symbolic 
images and nor are they to count as symbols of a higher level or of a deeper, religious 
context. 
 
Arising from this contention that the rivers and river poetry stand outside of 
metaphysics, Heidegger presents an argument about what the river does and what this 
doing signifies through the way the poem ends: 
 
 Yet what that one does, that river, 
 No one knows.38 
 
Heidegger claims that these lines tell us that the river’s [Strom] flowing [Strömen] is an 
activity that takes its own time [ein Tun zu eigner Zeit], that this activity is concealed 
and that in this concealment lies a distinction. The poet knows of the concealment 
because, if he did not, he would not be able to tell of it. The poet unveils the 
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concealment of the river’s activity and knows that this activity, its flowing, is concealed, 
but the poetic essence of the river remains concealed in the knowledge of the poet. What 
the river does, no one knows, not even the poet. Whatever the river does, though, says 
Heidegger, is an enigma [Das Tun des Stromes ist ein Rätsel]. In not knowing what the 
river does, the poet does not know the enigma. What constitutes the river’s doing is its 
flowing, its ‘rivering’ [sein Strömen]. The river rivers. In this rivering is the river’s 
actuality [Wirklichkeit], and the rivering is the actual [wirklich] river. But the Strömen of 
the river is not quite its Tun. Heidegger says that not even the poet knows what the river 
does [tun] but, even so, the poet knows its activity [Tun]. But if the poet does not know 
what the river does how does he then know its flowing when what the river does is its 
flowing? How can the poet not know what the river does and yet know it when what the 
river does is named as its flowing or rivering? The poet is suspended in the between of 
Tun and Strömen. Heidegger’s claim is that what the poet does not know is not the 
flowing as such but what is decided in this flowing [was in diesem Strömen sich 
entscheidet]. A decision is made in the flowing but what this decision is is not given by 
Heidegger explicitly here and even if it was, there would always be something 
remaining: ‘Every decision, however, is grounded in something that cannot be mastered, 
something concealed, something disconcerting. Otherwise it would not be a decision.’39 
In the event, we cannot begin to know what is decided in the flowing of the river without 
attending to what is said poetically of the river. We have to listen more carefully 
[sorgfältiger]. What can be said is that the poet, in knowing the flowing of the river, but 
not what is decided in this flowing, is in the position of awaiting the decision, a waiting 
that is a whiling. The poet must wait a while. What the river does is an enigma, says 
Heidegger, the river itself is an enigma, therefore the decision must reside in this enigma 
and remain in it. 
 
This is, perhaps, the implication of the announcement at the beginning of the fourth 
strophe of ‘The Rhine’, which tells of the enigma that has purely sprung forth but, in 
such a way, that even song can scarcely unveil it. Heidegger claims that in this scarcely 
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[kaum] is the knowledge that only song can even begin to approach the telling of the 
origin of the source, springing forth and the flowing of the river. Therefore, only poetry 
can bring us closer to the enigma. But in this scarcely lies an insufficiency, an 
inadequacy, which Heidegger himself recognises, but which he does not explore, an 
insufficiency that potentially disables poetry in its approach to the enigma. In German, 
the lines read as follows: 
 
 Ein Rätsel ist Reinentsprungenes. Auch 
 Der Gesang kaum darf es enthüllen.40 
 
Darf is the singular present of dürfen and, as discussed above, has the sense of being 
permitted, being allowed, and it could be argued that song has to seek permission to tell 
of the enigma but that it is a permission that is withheld, the promise that is withdrawn 
prior to the giving of the promise. The enigma is beyond the capabilities of song or 
poetry in its saying. The question remains as to who or what is withholding permission, 
but perhaps it is the enigma itself that is the withholding if we think of the enigma as 
that which is the prior withdrawal of a promise that would have been already given. 
 
In its activity, the river determines the dwelling place of human beings on the earth. This 
is what Hölderlin’s line ‘Hier aber wollen wir bauen’ tells us, according to Heidegger. 
Dwelling, he says, is not the mere practical and technical possessing of accommodation, 
although that is a part of it, but is the taking on of an abode [nimmt eines Aufenthalt] and 
the abiding [ein Innehalten] in this abode. The human being especially is held and 
maintained through abiding in an abode. Aufenthalt means residence or abode, but it can 
also mean stay, sojourn or wait. Innehalten means to pause or stop. Both of these terms 
suggest something that is not quite permanent, which Heidegger emphasises by saying 
that abiding is a whiling [Der Aufenthalt ist ein Verweilen], a kind of lingering, tarrying, 
or hanging around. It is in this whiling-lingering-tarrying that human beings find rest, 
says Heidegger, but, as in ‘The Origin’, this is a rest that does not involve the ceasing of 
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activity: ‘Rest [Ruhe] is a grounded repose [Beruhen] in the steadfastness of one’s own 
essence. In rest, the human essence is preserved [aufbewahrt] in its inviolability.’41 
Heidegger links this inviolability to the Greek term h9 a0suli/a, the sanctuaries or 
asylums, which, he says, names the inviolability and holiness of the locale. This is a 
reference to Hölderlin’s Pindar fragment called ‘Die Asyle’, which consists of a 
translation from the Greek and a short commentary on the poem. Heidegger quotes 
extensively from this fragment and the language is a kind of echo of Heidegger’s own 
appropriation of Hölderlin’s language, in terms such as Ruhestätten and die Ahnendes,42 
places of rest and the intimative respectively. In this place, the human being finds 
sanctuary, free from being grasped. Heidegger says that Hölderlin does not refer to 
graves when speaking of asylums ‘but rather those locales [die Orte] where the activity 
and life of nature is “concentrated,” where “something intimative” gathers around 
human beings’.43 In this manner, the abode has its locale. Heidegger names the way in 
which the locale determines the abode and the manner in which the locale is the locale in 
each case as the locality of the locale [die Ortschaft des Ortes]. It is the locality of the 
locale, the placeness of the place, that gives [verschenken] rest to the abode – in the 
Parmenides lectures Heidegger calls Ortschaft a gathering holding of what belongs 
together. It is by being in place that rest is granted to human beings in their abode. The 
abode derives its restfulness from out of the desire to build, but the river must have 
already provided such a place in order for the desire to build to take place. Human 
beings find their rest in the whiling of an abode. The locality of the locale, in this 
instance here by this river, is inviolable and holy and, in effect, grants these to the 
human beings who dwell there: ‘The river “is” the locality that pervades the abode of 
human beings upon the earth, determines them to where they belong and where they are 
homely [heimisch]. The river thus brings human beings into their own and maintains 
[behält] them in what is their own [im Eigenen].’44 The Eigene of the human beings, to 
which they belong and have to belong if they are to be fulfilled in what is destined for 
them, is determined by the river. The river is essential for the Eigene of human beings. If 
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Heidegger suggests initially that coming into one’s own is relatively straightforward, he 
immediately complicates it, echoing Hölderlin in his letter to Böhlendorff, by saying that 
‘to dwell in what is one’s own is what comes last and is seldom successful and always 
remains what is most difficult. Yet if the river determines the locality of the homely, 
then it is of essential assistance in becoming homely [Heimischwerden] in what is one’s 
own’.45  
 
Before exploring the locality of the river further, and it is in the river’s relation to its 
place and its wandering that we encounter the enigma further, it is worth going back to 
Hölderlin’s Pindar fragment because, although Heidegger does not explore this here, it 
has relevance both to the sense of counsel that Heidegger wishes to give to Rätsel and 
also to the sense of enigma that this thesis is exploring. The fragment concerns Themis, 
daughter of Zeus, who is also his counsellor and advisor – Hölderlin calls her ‘Die 
wohlrathende Themis’ – she who gathers together the Agora but is not the decision 
maker, says Catherine Burnett: ‘[S]he maintains the order of things and oversees the 
conservation of tradition. She secures the customs and the conventions, the collective 
conscience of society.’46 Themis personifies justice in Greek mythology but she is 
distinct from her daughter Dike, who represents the individual order, while Themis 
represents the social order. It is she who orders and organises the affairs of humans in 
the community and it is this dual sense of gathering together and counselling that seems 
to be echoed in the gathering of humans by, and through, the river and in the caring-
counselling that Heidegger wishes us to hear in Rätsel. It is the creation of sanctuaries 
where humans can rest and be free from seizure that the Pindar fragment is concerned 
with. By referencing this poem Heidegger suggests that here, where we wish to build, is 
equivalent to the sanctuaries that Themis, which literally means ‘that which was put in 
place’, gave birth to and which is celebrated in Hölderlin’s translation of Pindar. In the 
poem they are called ‘the gold-riveted’, the ‘shiningly fertilized places of rest’. In these 
Ruhestätten human beings are free from the foreign, the alien, [denen nichts Fremdes 
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ankann], according to Hölderlin’s short commentary, ‘because in them the working and 
life of nature was concentrated’,47 a line that Heidegger quotes directly and indirectly. 
 
In the next clause of the commentary, which Heidegger does not quote, Hölderlin refers 
to ein Ahnendes, an intimation which is an experience of something that was 
experienced before, but seems to be experienced only in its recollection. It is an 
intimation as recollection [wie erinnernd]. Ahnen means to foresee or to know in terms 
of voraussehen, to foresee, but Ahne also means ancestor or forebear. So ahnen as 
intimation is a pointing towards the future as a pointing towards the past. While it 
suggests a certain foreseeing – and in Greek mythology Themis could foresee the future 
– it is a foreseeing that occurs as memory, as recollection. Dieter Henrich remarks, in an 
essay on Hölderlin’s Andenken that foresight is only on the basis of recollection 
[Erinnerung]: ‘Only those who can recollect are able to foresee. For foresight is not a 
mere apprehension of future events; rather we are always anticipating the future in 
relation to what lies in wait for it. This is why foresight is always the foresight of 
something soon to be past, and so of a recollection to come.’48 But if foresight can only 
arise on the basis of recollection, the experience that is recollected can only be 
experienced as this recollection. It is an experience, says Blanchot, that is experienced as 
‘something which never yet takes place [but] happens nonetheless, as having long since 
already happened’.49 But what kind of experience is it if the experience happens as 
memory, as having happened? Can the prior experience be said to be an experience at all 
if it is only experienced as its own memory? The status of this prior experience is such 
that one can no longer say definitively that it has happened before if it can only be 
experienced as recollection. Like the Now, which points to a time that cannot be 
incorporated into the Now, recollection points to an experience that it has only in this 
recollection. 
 
                                                 
47
 Friedrich Hölderlin, ‘The Sanctuaries’, Poems and Fragments, p.645/p.673. 
48
 Dieter Henrich, The Course of Remembrance and Other Essays on Hölderlin, edited by Eckhart Förster, 
translated by Taylor Carman, Stanford, California, Stanford University Press, 1997, p.221. 
49
 Maurice Blanchot, The Writing of the Disaster, translated by Ann Smock, Lincoln & London,  
University of Nebraska Press, 1995, p.14. 
 101 
The meaning of ahnen becomes important for Heidegger in terms of his discussion of 
the river as enigma. I have already referred to the lines from ‘Voice of the People’ which 
introduces Heidegger’s thinking around Hölderlin’s terms Ahnungsvollen and 
Schwindenden, terms which effectively determine a thinking that claims the river is an 
enigma, and it is to these two terms that I return. From these lines, we learn that the 
rivers stand in an asymmetric relation to human beings. The rivers are unconcerned with 
human wisdom [Weisheit]. This is because, says Heidegger, they have their own, proper 
knowledge [eigenes Wissen] which he identifies with the spirit of the river [Stromgeist], 
that which determines the river on its proper path [eigene Bahn], which is almost torn 
[Reißen] free from any relation to human beings. Hölderlin himself writes that the 
river’s way is not the poet’s way. There is a relation, but it is a relation of love from the 
human towards the river. The river is a violent, tearing, rushing thing that has its own 
path that is not concerned with the way of humans and yet there is still a belongingness 
to the rivers and a going along with them [ein Mitgehen mit ihnen], but it is a 
belongingness that is violent: ‘It is precisely that which tears onward more surely in the 
rivers’ own path that tears human beings out of the habitual [gewöhnliche] midst of their 
lives, so that they may be in a center outside of themselves, that is, be excentric. The 
prelude to inhering [Innehalten] in the excentric midst of human existence, this “centric” 
and “central” abode [Aufenthalt] in the excentric, is love. The sphere proper 
[eigentliche] to standing in the excentric middle of life is death.’50 Human beings are 
torn out of their comfortable existence, by the absolute demand of the rivers, into a 
centre that is not a centre, that displaces human beings out of the ordinary. The first step 
[Vorstufe – literally fore-step] towards an abiding [Innehalten] in the excentric abode is 
through love, a love that goes towards the rivers but which is not reciprocated. The 
violent indifference of the rivers is met with love, an all-encompassing love – who loves 
them not, writes Hölderlin – but it seems that the abode only becomes a proper abode 
and one can only dwell in this excentric centre through death. But death is not the path 
taken by the rivers, if death is the path of human beings that Heidegger refers to when he 
writes: ‘The vanishing rivers, full of intimation, do not take the path of human beings.’51 
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This separation, says Heidegger, announces something extraordinary [Ungeheure], a 
word it could be argued that he takes from Hölderlin – it occurs later in the lecture in his 
examination of Antigone – because he then quotes from Hölderlin’s ‘Anmerkungen zum 
Oedipus’. He says that ‘the extraordinary [Ungeheuren] way “in which god and human 
are paired and the power of nature <the holy> and what is most intrinsic to human 
beings become limitlessly One in anger [Zorn]”’.52 But, as with the elision of the wings 
in ‘The Ister’, Heidegger elides the fact that Hölderlin is here writing specifically about 
the tragic and how it is presented. He also elides the second part of this quote where 
Hölderlin writes that the boundless [grenzenlos] becoming-one cleanses itself through 
boundless separation which is given form in the always conflicting dialogue [immer 
widerstreitende Dialog] of tragic theatre. Everything is speech against speech, says 
Hölderlin, in which each one cancels [aufheben] the other out, a mutual co-cancelling. 
Hölderlin likens the drama to the Court of Inquisition. The conflict ends in a kind of 
radical forgetting, which is also a mutual radical infidelity [Untreue]. Heidegger picks 
up on this infidelity, or unfaithfulness, but seems to elide this mutuality. From what 
Heidegger says, it would seem that the power resides in the rivers and that the human 
being must give way. Through love, human beings can go along with the river but this 
Mitgehen does not involve taking the same path. Human beings must make way 
[ausweichen] for the path of the rivers. Not taking the same path is the way in which 
human beings make way and, as such, the way in which the power of nature and the 
spirit of the river can be grasped [ergriffen]. In a parenthesis, Heidegger again quotes 
from one of Hölderlin’s writings on Greek tragedy, this time Anmerkungen zur 
Antigonä. Its purpose seems to be to identify the way in which a going along with the 
rivers is a making way [ausweichen] for them, with the way in which the highest state of 
consciousness makes way for consciousness. In giving way, human beings can, in some 
sense, harness this power. Strange perspectives [Befremdliche Ausblicke] on how this 
seizure, this grasping of the power of nature and the spirit of the river, can come about 
are opened up through the relationship of vanishing and intimation, says Heidegger. In 
its intimative vanishing, the river abandons the human landscape, an act of seeming 
unfaithfulness to that landscape. But it is out of this unfaithfulness, it seems, that the 
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river can be maintained: ‘It almost seems as though the spirit of the river could be best 
retained in the form of such vanishing, as though thoughtful remembrance proper [das 
eigentliche Andenken] belonged to this enigmatic unfaithfulness [dieser rätselhaften 
Untreue].’53 
 
Rivers flow in a two-fold direction but this flowing is also a singular journey. Within 
this singularity and its two-folded direction is another doubling. In terms of vanishing, 
this is a being-underway into what has been [das Gewesene]. As intimation, it is a going 
into that which is coming [das Kommende]. But, as already mentioned, ahnen has a dual 
meaning in that it both points towards the future in terms of foreseeing and gestures 
towards the past in terms of a provenance. Janus-faced, ahnen seems to mark a chiasmus 
in which past and future join together in a looking forward that is also a looking back: 
‘[W]e must here give thought to the fact that intimation does not simply relate to that 
which is coming, but at the same time relates to that which has been.’54 Similarly, 
vanishing does not just disappear into the past. Instead, it involves an intimation of what 
has been which arises in Erinnerung, which is here translated as ‘inner recollection’ but 
which can also mean memory or remembrance. What has been [das Gewesene], as what 
has been and as that which essentially prevails [das Wesende], is only attained through 
this form of inner recollection but this attainment only occurs in what Heidegger calls 
genuine inner recollection [echte Erinnerung] which is both a turning towards the 
undisclosed and a turning inwards into what has been: ‘Genuine inner recollection is 
intimation [Ahnen]’,55 says Heidegger, effectively saying that vanishing is intimation. 
 
We are, perhaps, not far from the language and thought of Hölderlin’s ‘Die Asyle’, 
where intimation was, as remembering [wie erinnernd], an experience of that which had 
been experienced before. As Henrich points out, Erinnerung was important for 
Hölderlin, in that it combined ‘thinking, remembering, intimacy, and a course of 
transformation’.56 It should also be recalled that, for Adorno, the experience of the 
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shudder is an Erinnerung. There seems to be an echo of ‘Die Asyle’ in the language and 
movement of memory here. Memory, as Erinnerung, is a foreseeing and Heidegger 
makes the claim that this type of memory is a more originary intimating than the 
intimating that is mere suspicion or assumption [vermuten]. But only perhaps, says 
Heidegger, although this perhaps appears to become more durable as he claims that 
inner recollection would become the profoundest intimation if that which is to come 
comes out of that which has been. Erinnerung is that through which we attain what has 
been as that which has been. But Erinnerung is not just about returning to something 
that has gone and staying there. It is also an intimation, that is a turning towards that 
which is undisclosed in the return. Erinnerung is, perhaps, a more originary intimation 
than that intimating which merely has a premonition of something coming [das nur in 
ein Kommendes hinausvermutet]. The most profound intimation is the intimation that 
sees in that which is to come the unthought in what has been. Genuine Erinnerung is, 
therefore, an intimation of the future drawn out of that which has been but which has 
been undisclosed in what has been. It is the renaming of the past into a future 
potentiality although figured as a return to what has been, which is the movement of the 
Anfang, as discussed below. Erinnerung, as this intimation, is the recollection out of the 
past into an unthought past that is still to come. Intimation, and especially the 
Ahnungsvollen, proceed and extend into what is coming and what has been. The 
Ahnungsvollen are those with genuine Erinnerung – the Ahnungsvollen will be renamed 
later as the poets – and it is essentially creative.  
 
But if the river can be said to be both vanishing and full of intimation, from what 
standpoint does the river appear in its two-fold directionality? If we return to Hölderlin’s 
‘Voice of the People’, it is quite clear that the river in its vanishing and intimation stands 
in a relation to the poet. The poet both hears the Schwindenden and Ahnungsvollen and 
names them as such in a naming that comes from the poet, as Heidegger points out. 
Equally, Hölderlin, as poet, or the narrative ‘I’ of the poem, has an emotional response 
in that his own heart is moved [und immer bewegen sie | Das Herz mir] as he asks the 
question who does not love them, with the implied answer that everyone does. As 
Heidegger writes, the rivers designate a Here where human beings build. In this 
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building, does not the vanishing and the intimation depend on the standpoint of the 
human being? The rivers can only be said to be vanishing in one direction because der 
Mensch has taken up a position in relation to the river. The same is true of intimation. If 
the river is oriented in two directions, the vanishing and the intimative, then there has to 
be a position from which these two directions diverge and to which they converge 
because otherwise it would not be possible to say that one is vanishing and the other is 
intimative. The place is the human locale, the abode. It is only out of the abode that the 
river can be said to be oriented in two directions. In this sense then, it is the human 
abode that determines the river in its vanishing and its intimation. Equally, however, the 
human abode is possible only on the basis of the river. Here again we seem to have that 
co-originary moment in which the river determines the abode and the human while the 
river in its essence of intimation and vanishing, is determined by the human in its 
abiding. It seems to me that this is a co-originary mutually dependent relation between 
river and abode, between vanishing and intimation, a relation that opens up a place for 
human dwelling. It is similar to that mutual dependency of world and earth, even down 
to the fact that there is still conflict here; the river rips the human out of the familiar.  
 
As we have seen, in naming the rivers as full of intimation and vanishing, Heidegger is 
adopting Hölderlin’s terminology for the specific end of delineating what he claims is 
the essence of a journey. Intimation is an extension and procession into what has been 
and what is coming. Vanishing is a passing away into what is coming at the same time 
as having what has been entrusted to it. This simultaneous doubling is that which the 
river is, what is proper to the river and which Heidegger calls ‘the essential fullness of a 
journey. The river is a journey in a singular and consummate way’.57 Heidegger names 
this consummate essence of a journey a journeying [Wanderschaft] which corresponds 
with the naming of the locality [Ortschaft] of the locale. In this naming by Heidegger, 
we are meant to hear the naming which he ascribes to Hölderlin, a naming which means 
‘to call to its essence that which is named in the word of poetizing, and to ground this 
essence as poetic word’.58 It is questionable whether Hölderlin does name in this 
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fashion, as Allen claims: ‘Although Hölderlin was aware of the linguistic kinship of 
holiness, healing, and making whole, this could not erase the fact for him that the saying 
of these words would always undermine their meaning. Naming seems to have a 
completely different meaning for Heidegger and Hölderlin.’59 It seems to me that 
Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe is saying something similar when he writes of Hölderlin’s 
poetry that it signals the broken or lost possibility of naming, that it is ‘the forever 
withdrawn or truncated secret of the name, an empty nomination,’60 which he contrasts 
with Heidegger’s belief in the possibility of naming. Heidegger believes that he is 
naming the poetic essence here as he begins to explain what he sees as the river’s 
essence, an essence that is distinct from any form of Christian or metaphysical 
perspective: ‘This journeying that the river itself is determines [bestimmt] the way in 
which the human beings come to be at home [heimisch wird] upon this earth.’61 When 
referring to earth neither Heidegger nor, he claims, Hölderlin are referring to any 
Christo-metaphysical notion of an earthly realm as a way station prior to attaining the 
eternal. It is not something that remains to be surpassed or given up and thereby lost, 
says Heidegger. Instead, earth is a grounding of the homely: ‘The journeying that the 
river is prevails, and does so essentially, in its vocation [Bestimmung] of attaining the 
earth as the “ground” of the homely.’62 Heidegger underscores this point by quoting 
from another poem by Hölderlin, ‘Die Wanderung’, ‘The Journey’, where he claims that 
the movement of the river is named in relation to the attaining of the earth, which he 
then links with ‘The Ister’ and its naming of Hertha, another name for Nerthus, the 
Germanic name for mother earth. However, when Hölderlin refers to his mother in ‘The 
Journey’ he is naming Swabia, the region in Germany where he was born, rather than 
specifically mentioning Hertha or mother earth. Be that as it may, Heidegger takes this 
as further evidence to back up the claim that it is journeying that ‘determines [bestimmt] 
our coming to be at home [das Heimischwerden] upon the earth’.63 This coming to be at 
home is also divine [göttlich] but not in any Christian or religious sense: ‘Becoming 
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homely and dwelling upon the earth are of another essence. We may approach it in 
giving thought to the essence of the rivers. The river is the locality for dwelling. The 
river is the journeying of becoming homely. To put it more clearly: the river is that very 
locality that is attained in and through the journeying.’64 The journeying enables human 
beings to come back to that very place which is that journeying.  
 
Journeying is the key to coming to be at home, to the abiding in an abode that is the 
essence of the here and now, and it is in journeying that the unity of vanishing and 
intimation come together: ‘Because vanishing can also be directed into what is to come, 
and intimating into what has been, this naming of the rivers testifies to their rich, yet 
originarily unitary essence [ursprünglich einiges Wesen], which we encapsulate in the 
name “journeying”.’65 In this, there is a certain priority granted to journeying in terms of 
how the rivers are seen, as Heidegger says: ‘[T]he essence of the rivers as rivers is first 
to be perceived from out of the journeying. The river is the journeying of human beings 
as historical in their coming to be at home upon this earth.’66 But becoming homely is 
not easy and at first ‘what emerges is that any determination of the essence of the rivers 
must appear alienating [befremden]. Our claim is this: the river is the locality of the 
dwelling of human beings as historical upon this earth. The river is the journeying of a 
historical coming to be at home at the locale of this locality. The river is locality and 
journeying’.67 It is from out of this that Heidegger gives us the chiasmic essence of the 
river, in a formula which he describes as an enigmatic unity. The formula is this: the 
river is the locality of journeying and the journeying of locality. Jean-François Mattéi 
calls a chiasmus ‘the figure of the reversal of a proposition whose members are 
contained within both the initial proposition and the inverted one and produce a 
distinctive pattern of crossed overlapping’.68 We can see quite clearly that this formula 
complies with this definition, with the river forming the crossing of the here and now 
and the inversion of the terms locality and journeying. Rodolphe Gasché, in his essay 
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‘Reading Chiasms’, writes that a chiasmus ‘allows the drawing apart and bringing 
together of opposite functions or terms and entwines them within an identity of 
movements’.69 In a chiasm, he says, opposites are paired through an underlying unity. 
Again, we can see this pattern here as what would appear to be two separate terms which 
are oppositional – in what sense is place a journey? – are brought together so that each, 
in a certain way, infects the other, so that the locality is only gained through the 
journeying and the journeying can only arise out of the locality. The chiasmus is that 
which brings the opposition into a unity. But if this is a chiasmus, and it is this 
chiasmatic formula that Heidegger claims enable us to know that the river is an enigma, 
that locality and journeying are an enigmatic unity, then the question arises as to whether 
this is a symmetrical or asymmetrical chiasmus. It would appear, from Heidegger’s 
granting of priority to journeying – the essence of the rivers first appears from out of the 
journeying and it is journeying that enables human beings to come to be at home – that 
the relation is asymmetrical. If we think back to how the enigma is structured, the 
structure of the insistent promise and its impossible solution, the way in which the 
solution is withdrawn prior to the promise, then it could be said that by saying the river 
is an enigma, that this formula represents such an enigma, then the formula does become 
asymmetric. However, if at first Heidegger appears to grant a priority to journeying, he 
then seems to modify this by making the locale, and hence the locality of the locale, in 
some way determinative of the river and so determinative of the journeying: ‘The river 
does not merely grant the locale, in the sense of the mere place, that is occupied by 
humans in their dwelling. The locale is intrinsic to the river itself [Der Strom selbst hat 
den Ort inne]. The river itself dwells.’70 The river itself holds the place. The place is 
internal to the river. The locale is an essential aspect of the river and hence of the 
journeying. In fact, the essence of the locale is both where becoming-homely departs 
from and also where it enters and it is in arriving and departing that it journeys. 
 
We should not rush to understand these statements about journeying and locality, says 
Heidegger. It is not a question of solving the enigma: ‘The said statements are always 
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incomprehensible within a certain realm of comprehension, and there is an essential 
reason for this. The incomprehensibility of such statements is not grounded in some 
contingent lack of a knowledge that would be otherwise attainable.’71 As mentioned 
above, there is a certain prohibition about solving the enigma, a prohibition that comes 
from the structure of the enigma. The enigma does not permit a solution precisely 
because, in the terms in which the enigma is set up, a solution has always already been 
prohibited, in spite of the fact that the promise of a solution has to be held open. The 
solution would have been available if access to the solution had not already been closed 
off. But if we should not be seeking a solution to the enigma, we need to become 
mindful of it, to bring it nearer to us as enigma. Part of this mindfulness needs to take 
account of the enigma as it initially and genuinely appears [Scheinen] in that which is 
scarcely available to human thinking, says Heidegger. In this he is referring to those 
lines of ‘The Ister’ where the river appears to go backwards: 
 
 He appears [scheinet], however, almost 
 To go backwards and 
 I presume [Ich mein] he must come 
 From the East. 
 There would be 
 Much to tell of this.72 
 
Heidegger claims that this is not an appearance or illusion, but that in poetic thinking the 
river truthfully goes backwards. This is its provenance [Herkunft]. Instead of actually 
flowing from West to East, a deeper poetic truth is being told, of the necessity with 
which the river comes from the East. But it is also a necessity that we cannot yet know 
this flowing, we just have to be mindful of it. We are not permitted entrance at this stage 
into the poetic knowledge [dichterisch Wissen] of this journeying, a knowledge that is 
set against the knowledge [Erkenntnis] gained through cognition, that ascertains facts. 
Poetic presuming [Meinen] has its own [eigene] truth and this truth has its own measure 
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[Maß]. Later, Heidegger writes that the locale and the journey, a relation of to-ing and 
fro-ing between the foreign [Fremd] and the homely [heimisch], are alien [befremdlich] 
to us and we are not given anything with which we can immediately illuminate them. In 
fact, coming to be at home in what is one’s own is that which is most difficult. ‘Locality 
and journeying…relate to becoming homely in what is one’s own. And this is so in the 
distinctive sense that one’s own [das Eigene], finding one’s own, and appropriating [die 
Aneignung] what one has found as one’s own, is not that which is most self-evident or 
easiest but remains what is most difficult. As what is most difficult, it is taken into 
poetic care.’73 As we know, taking into poetic care is a taking into the enigma. It is in the 
enigma, therefore, that we need to explore this moment of appropriation, of the difficulty 
of finding one’s own. Perhaps it is this difficulty which is being expressed in the river 
flowing backwards, a flowing backwards which is also hinted at by Hölderlin’s 
misnaming of the rivers. Hölderlin names the upper course of the river as ‘Ister’, a name 
which was given to the lower course of the river Donau by the Greeks and then the 
Romans.  It is the lower course that the Greeks knew, according to Heidegger. The upper 
course of the Donau is usually known as Danubius. Heidegger claims that this reversal 
of names is indicative of the possibility that the lower Donau had returned to the upper 
and, in doing so, had therefore returned to its source. But can we not see in this 
misnaming also an estrangement from the source, an estrangement from the Greek that 
can never be appropriated or reappropriated? The upper course is that which is closest to 
the source, but the upper course is given the Greek name for the lower course by 
Hölderlin. The upper course was not known to the Greeks and therefore this naming of 
the upper course is a misappropriation of the Greek name, as if to say that we think we 
know the upper course of the river, we think we know the Greek source and in this 
thinking we give it the Greek name  2Istroj. But the Greeks never knew the upper 
course and therefore could never have given it this name. Hölderlin is perhaps here 
demonstrating that what we think of as our Greek source is not that at all, that we are as 
far from it as we could possibly be. We have named the Greek river but this river was 
never named by the Greeks. Is this not saying that what we think of as being the Greek is 
not the Greek at all and that the Greek remains inaccessible? Lacoue-Labarthe writes, 
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apropos of Hölderlin and the Greeks that ‘Greece, as such, Greece itself, does not exist, 
that it is at least double, divided – even torn. And that what we know about it, which is 
perhaps what it was or what it manifested of itself, is not what it really was – which 
perhaps never appeared’.74 
 
This movement between what is one’s own and what is not one’s own, between being at 
home and the foreign, is what is distinctive about the rivers in Hölderlin’s poetry for 
Heidegger. ‘The river determines the being at home of human beings as historical in 
their coming to be at home. The river is the locality of the locale of the home. The river 
at the same time determines the becoming of human beings as historical in their being at 
home. The river is the journeying of that journey in which the becoming of being at 
home has its essence.’75 It is not, however, a question of the one being added to the other 
in a unity after the fact, but one already inscribed: ‘The river is at once locality and 
journeying in a concealed and originary unity. Such originary unity is different from the 
kind of unity that comes afterwards, merely unifying whatever is already present at hand 
by bringing things together. By contrast, originary unity first lets that which is unitary 
spring forth, yet without it springing free from the ground of this unity.’76 This unity is a 
unity of the homely and the foreign, a unity that is always already a unity, one that 
involves a mutual co-dependence that echoes the unity of world and earth. Clearly, the 
locality cannot be without the journeying and the journeying cannot be without the 
locality. One can only become homely in the locality of the locale through journeying 
into the foreign. That the river has a relation to the Greek is something that Heidegger 
insists upon and it is the Greek that stands in a relation to Germany. But this relation, 
although clearly named, presents an enigma. Both the German and the Greek are named 
in the poem, he says. ‘Hertha’, for instance, is the German name for mother earth and 
the homeliness of this earth is clearly named in the second strophe of the poem. The 
German, therefore, is the homely, situated as it is on the banks of the Ister. That which is 
the foreign is clearly linked with Greece. Hercules, one of the heroes of Greek 
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mythology, is named and it is said in the poem that the Ister has invited him from Mount 
Olympus. The Greek river Alpheus is named, as is the Isthmus of Corinth, a small 
bridge linking the Greek mainland to Corinth. Alpheus is the name of a Greek river god 
and it is also the river that Hercules diverted in the fifth of his labours to clean out the 
Augean stables. The river Indus is named but while this is derived from a Greek name 
the river itself is not Greek; it runs through Pakistan. This Asian river, while named, is 
not considered any further by Heidegger. It is as if the Greek naming of the river has 
covered over this and appropriated the river to itself, as if this other foreign has 
somehow been subsumed by the Greek. Andrzej Warminski has argued that Heidegger 
consistently reduces what is, in Hölderlin’s work, a tripartite structure to a binary one, in 
that he suppresses ‘the radical difference of the nature of the Greeks: that is, to suppress 
the Orient, the East, Egypt’,77 a suppression that has implications for Heidegger’s 
thinking of Heimischwerden and Unheimischsein. This thinking of the law of becoming 
homely in being unhomely is examined in relation to Antigone in the next chapter. 
 
Finding one’s own, appropriating one’s own is, as we have already seen, considered by 
Heidegger the most difficult task, a thought that echoes Hölderlin’s own thinking. It is in 
terms of this difficulty that coming to be at home in one’s own is taken into poetic care, 
that is taken into the enigma. ‘What is one’s own in this case is whatever belongs to the 
fatherland of the Germans. Whatever is of the fatherland is itself at home with mother 
earth. This coming to be at home in one’s own in itself entails that human beings are 
initially, and for a long time, and sometimes forever, not at home. And this in turn 
entails that human beings fail to recognize, that they deny, and perhaps even have to 
deny and flee what belongs to the home. Coming to be at home is thus a passage through 
the foreign. And if the becoming homely of a particular humankind sustains the 
historicality of its history, then the law of the law of the encounter between the foreign 
and one’s own is the fundamental truth of history, a truth from out of which the essence 
of history must unveil itself.’78 Despite its difficulty, for Heidegger there is still the 
possibility of coming to be at home. But it has to include a journey through the foreign 
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and, therefore, any poetic meditation on becoming homely has to include a Zwiesprache, 
a dialogue, with foreign poets; in Hölderlin’s case this is with Sophocles and Pindar. 
Heidegger claims that Hölderlin’s poetry resonates with the poetic thought of these two 
poets and that without knowledge of this resonance Hölderlin’s hymns remain 
incomprehensible. This is not a question of having influences, it is because great poets 
are capable of letting themselves be influenced, he says. Minor poets believe everything 
comes through their own originality [Originalität]. However, what the greats give does 
not come from such originality but from the fact that they are another origin [Ursprung], 
where something is allowed to arise in a founding leap, which enables them to listen to 
whatever is originary [Ursprünglich] in other greats. Hölderlin is in a singular position, 
unlike any of his contemporaries, of being able to be influenced by Pindar and 
Sophocles. This means, for Heidegger, being able ‘to listen in an originary and obedient 
manner to whatever is originary in the foreign from out of his own origin’.79 What this 
means is that each is an origin, the homely through Hölderlin and the foreign through, in 
this case, Pindar and Sophocles. It is only by going through these poets, via a 
journeying, that we can begin to understand the poetizing of the rivers in Hölderlin’s 
river poetry and also come to be at home in the locality of the locale. 
 
This is the tension in Hölderlin’s river poetry. It is the one that he remarks on in his 
letter to Böhlendorff, it is the tension that Heidegger here has foregrounded and which 
he pursues in his own meditation on Sophocles’s Antigone, through the rest of this 
lecture course. And it is a tension that Lacoue-Labarthe has remarked upon, a tension 
that exists between the natural and the cultural and that articulates the difference 
between the ancient and modern worlds. Lacoue-Labarthe believes that this tension is 
palpable and fundamental to Hölderlin: ‘This tension is located with the categories of the 
proper and the non-proper, the “national” (natal or native, which is a most rigorous 
interpretation of the Schillerian Naïve) and the foreign. But a firm law – a destiny – 
governs it: any culture…can appropriate itself as such, return to itself – or rather come to 
itself, attain itself and establish itself – only if it has previously undergone its otherness 
and its foreignness. Only if it has been initially disappropriated. This means that 
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disappropriation (difference) is original, and appropriation, as Hegel will say – and if it 
can take place – is its “result”. Excepting this question (can appropriation, as such, 
occur?), we can see to what extent a logic like this resembles, almost to the point of 
being indistinguishable from, Logic itself – in other words, the speculative logic. This 
exception, however, precludes reducing Hölderlin’s very singular logic simply to the 
dialectical procedure.’80 
 
The exclusionary question that Lacoue-Labarthe raises here – whether appropriation is 
possible at all – is, in turn, fundamental to an understanding of Heidegger’s reading of 
Hölderlin, and it is this question that is posed by the enigma in terms of its structural 
movement whereby the promise of a solution would have already been withdrawn prior 
to the promise having been made. The possibility of appropriation would have already 
been disappropriated if the enigma operates as such. The whole thrust of Heidegger’s 
reading of Hölderlin in these lectures is to bring us to this point where a journey through 
the foreign, through what is not one’s own, can be undertaken and it is through the river 
that such a journey is undertaken. The river determines where human beings belong on 
this earth, determining the abode to where it belongs and making it homely, thereby 
enabling the human being to come into this homeliness by abiding in this abode. This 
becoming homely is determined through the journeying of the river in its doubled 
structure. The river is a vanishing intimating and an intimating vanishing. This, 
according to Heidegger, is the essential fullness of a journey, which is what is proper to 
the river. But what the river does, what the river is, says Heidegger, is an enigma and it 
is precisely this that is named by the chiasmus that the river is the locality of journeying 
and the journeying of locality. This paratactic, antistrophic statement, if indeed 
statement it is, is always incomprehensible in a certain realm of comprehension, 
Heidegger claims. It is not to be seen to be on the same order as a statement that says 
‘today is Tuesday’. The incomprehensibility of such a statement is not due to a lack of 
knowledge, a lack that can be addressed, but rather because we are excluded from such 
comprehension until we have undergone a transformation of our essence, says 
Heidegger. He goes on to say that this statement is not a preparation for this 
                                                 
80
 Lacoue-Labarthe, Typography, p.243. 
 115 
transformation. Rather it enables us to say that the river is an enigma. Knowing that the 
river is an enigma enables us to name it as one. 
 
Heidegger claims that the enigma genuinely appears in the river poem at the point it 
appears to go backwards. However, if this chiasmus of journeying and locality 
effectively names the enigma, and if this statement becomes comprehensible as a result 
of the transformation in our essence, then it follows that after such a transformation the 
enigma itself becomes understandable, that, in effect, it becomes soluble. He has already 
said that the chiasmic statement about the rivers cannot be understood in terms of 
predication but that such statements can be understood in a certain way at a certain time 
and that we are cut off from comprehending them until we have undergone an essential 
transformation. Here, comprehend translates Heidegger’s nominalised verb Begreifen 
which, in its verbal form, means to comprehend, grasp or understand. It is also 
semantically linked to the German term Begriff which normally is translated as concept 
and the verb greifen means to grasp, seize or take hold of, which underlines the level of 
mastering involved in begreifen. Farrell says that begreifen involves effort in 
comprehending something, by bringing it into the understanding and asks the question 
whether it is thinkable and ‘conceivable for the mind of the subject.’81 Although 
Heidegger does not state that such chiasmic statements are comprehensible, it is clearly 
the implication when he writes that we are excluded from such comprehension so long 
as the change in our essence, that of coming into one’s own, has not occurred [ereignet]. 
The effort involved in begreifen is the difficulty of coming into this essence through the 
journey into the foreign. 
 
But if a solution is possible, it is not one that we are permitted to want to solve – ‘Wir 
dürfen es nicht >>lösen<< wollen’82. I have already commented on the prohibition of 
dürfen. Wollen is just as important in terms of a relation to the enigma. Wollen means to 
want, in terms of desire, the desire to see the existence of a thing, as well as to will, 
according to Farrell. There is a sense of the urgent and the demanding about it. In a way, 
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Heidegger is giving us a strong injunction against our demanding a solution. What all 
this seems to suggest, therefore, is that a solution to the enigma is possible but that this 
solution is not available to human agency. It is not something that human beings can 
make happen but it is something that can happen to human beings as a result of the 
transformation of human essence. It is a solution that is arrived at outside of any 
conscious willing or desiring, outside of any subjective stance towards it. We cannot yet 
comprehend such statements, but what we can do, through such statements, is to try to 
bring the enigma as enigma closer to us. The status of a solution to the enigma appears 
to be in flux, between the possibility of a solution and the injunction against seeking one. 
The pronouncement of the chiasmic statement enables us to know that the river is an 
enigma and perhaps it is in this knowledge that the enigma is brought nearer to us. This 
is the implication of Heidegger’s contention that we choose this statement as a means 
towards this nearing. To know, and here Heidegger uses wissen which relates to a 
general knowledge or awareness, that the river is an enigma is not the same as 
comprehending [begreifen] the statement that admits us into the nearness of the enigma. 
Perhaps what we have here is a knowledge of the enigma that operates on two levels, a 
knowledge that at the level of wissen does not gain access to the solution of the enigma, 
only to the fact that it is an enigma. At the second level, the level of begreifen, an 
understanding of the chiasmus is graspable, but it is not an understanding that is freely 
graspable at all times, although it is graspable and capable of being brought into the 
understanding, but only when a transformation of the human essence has occurred. If 
this is the case, then the injunction not to want to solve the enigma could merely be in 
place as an injunction against such an attempt prior to the transformation in our essence. 
Wanting to solve the enigma before this is, perhaps, to fall back into a metaphysico-
aesthetical subjective stance towards the question of the enigma. 
 
The transformation of the human essence can only come about through a journey into 
the foreign. This journey begins at the moment when the river appears to flow 
backwards, at the point in the poem where, Heidegger claims, there is a genuine 
appearance of the enigma; the enigma appears in the work of art. What he says is this: 
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‘Sie muß schon vor dem ersten, aber echten Scheinen des Rätsels haltmachen.’83 That is 
to say that the poet’s vision [die Schau des Dichters] has to pause before this first but 
genuine appearing of the enigma. The ‘watchful and guarded [behutsame und behütete] 
eye of the poet’84 sees the backward movement of the river, takes it up into his care – 
hüten means to look after, keep watch over, guard or keep. He beholds it - in its root 
behold comes from haldan which means to tend, keep or watch over. In this beholding, 
the poet sees in a care-full watching-over the way in which the river goes backwards, but 
this can only be glimpsed [in den Blick nehmen] in a poetic vision. It is only through 
poetry, the poetic, that the river can be seen to go backwards. Instead of flowing to the 
East, the river appears to come from there. But this is not an illusion [Schein], says 
Heidegger. In truth, he claims, the river goes backwards. Its provenance [Herkunft] is of 
such a type. What in fact looks like its origin is its origin only in the sense that it is an 
origin that has come from elsewhere, an origin whose source already contains within 
itself the fact that it has already come from elsewhere. The thinking of the provenance of 
the river is one that can scarcely be ventured [wagen], or risked in human thought, 
according to Heidegger. Instead, we can only be mindful of such thinking. The term 
used here is vermuten, which means to suggest, presume or assume, but is translated as 
be mindful of, because it forms part of a semantic network with Mut and Gemüt which 
mean courage and mind, or cast of mind respectively. Rather than being a faculty of the 
mind it has the sense of disposition or attunement. A thinking that can barely be dared 
becomes a taking-heed of, a kind of taking into care. Poetry has a priority over thinking 
here. The poet’s vision is attuned to the river’s othered origin but thought can hardly 
dare to think it.  
 
But if the river flowing backwards is the appearance of the enigma and if a thinking of 
this flowing backwards can scarcely be thought in human thought, then what is the status 
of this appearance? Perhaps all that really appears is what Lacoue-Labarthe calls the 
wreckage of poetry. Citing these lines of Hölderlin’s - Der scheinet aber fast | Rükwärts 
zu gehen – he writes: ‘To be engulfed in a flood of poetry means that poetry itself sinks, 
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drowns, that its own overflow dries in it its very possibility – a source submerged in the 
flood that it brought forth itself.’85 This seems to argue that instead of an appearing there 
is a disappearing in the very act of bringing forth. Marc Froment-Meurice argues that the 
essential point about this passage is the hesitant beginning in which orientation appears 
as other. It is a ‘return to a beginning necessarily lost in that there is no beginning to the 
quest for meaning/direction [sens], for the Occident, except in the experience of the loss 
of meaning/direction’.86 In order to get to the bottom of this or, at the very least, to 
indicate the direction of travel, there is a need to go back to the Scheinen of the enigma 
that Heidegger claims is operative here. In order to illuminate the meaning of Scheinen, I 
want to examine briefly two works where Heidegger sets out a thinking of Scheinen. The 
first occurs in Being and Time, in a discussion of Phänomen, Erscheinung and Scheinen. 
The second is in Introduction to Metaphysics, in the section ‘Being and Seeming’. 
 
Being and Time presents us with an explicit working out of Scheinen and its cognates 
der Schein and das Scheinbare. These are translated as seeming, semblance and 
semblant respectively in the Macquarrie and Robinson translation. Heidegger outlines 
three forms of appearing. Firstly, Phänomen – translated as phenomenon – is that which 
shows itself in itself, that which is manifest [das Offenbare]. Scheinen is structurally 
related to the Phänomen, says Heidegger. An entity can show itself from itself in many 
ways, he claims, depending upon the kind of access that we have to it. It is possible for 
an entity to show itself as something which it is not and in showing itself in this way it 
looks like something else. This showing itself as that which it is not Heidegger calls 
Scheinen. Only when something claims to be showing itself according to its meaning – 
that is, it is claiming to be a phenomenon – can that something show itself as that which 
it is not. Scheinen shows itself as something it is not by pretending to show itself, by 
pretending to be a phenomenon. Heidegger claims that Scheinen is the privative, 
secondary modification of Phänomen which is the positive and original [ursprunglich] 
meaning of the Greek term fai/nesqai. Scheinen, as privative, is the absence of the in 
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itself, the phenomenon, the manifest. In a sense, Scheinen comes to us in disguise, 
showing itself as something which it is not. If we take Heidegger’s own explanation of 
Scheinen as operative here in the lectures on ‘The Ister’, then it could be said that the 
enigma appears only as that which it is not, that it appears only in disguise but to appear 
in disguise is tantamount to not appearing at all, to being non-phenomenal. 
 
This suggests that the appearance of the enigma in the poem is not straightforward. A 
further complication is added, if Heidegger’s explanation of Scheinen in the Introduction 
to Metaphysics is taken into account. In this lecture course given in 1935, eight years 
after the publication of Being and Time, Heidegger at first outlines what he sees as the 
embedded philosophical distinction between Sein and Scheinen, being and seeming, 
where being is the constant and seeming is that which ‘at times surfaces, and just as 
fleetingly and unsteadily disappears again’.87 It is the opposition between the genuine 
and the non-genuine [Echtes entgegen dem Unechten]. However, according to 
Heidegger, this original disjunction between being and seeming hides a belonging 
together, which is the concealed unity of being and seeming. This concealed unity can 
be glimpsed in a phrase such as die Sonne scheint, which by saying that ‘the sun shines’ 
is saying that the sun makes itself manifest [zum Vorschein kommt]. Heidegger identifies 
three modes of Schein: firstly, it is lustre and glow; secondly, Schein is the appearing 
[Erscheinen] or manifestation of something [Vor-schein]; and finally it is the seeming or 
semblance [Anschein] presented by something. His claim is that the second mode of 
Schein, in its sense of self-showing, is the ground of the possibility of the other two. One 
could argue that, in shining, the sun is. This initial shining determines the appearing. 
Because the sun shines, it appears to go round the earth and this appearance can only 
appear because of the shining, the making manifest. This grounding is not an accidental 
characteristic, according to Heidegger: ‘The essence of seeming lies in appearing. It is 
self-showing, self-setting-forth, standing-by, and lying-at-hand…We say the moon 
shines; this does not just mean that it has a shine, it casts a certain brightness, but that it 
stands in the heavens, it is present, it is. The stars shine: in glowing they are coming to 
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presence. Seeming [Schein] means exactly the same as Being here.’88 Schein is the same 
as sein here. The straightforward opposition between Phänomen and Schein is 
complicated in that Schein can mean the same as Phänomen, as it was defined in Being 
and Time. Schein has been rescued from its derivative, privative meaning, although it 
still does have this meaning as Anschein. Schein and sein are the same, says Heidegger, 
when the sun, the moon and the stars shine. But what is this shine? In a sense, what we 
see in the stars shining is that which is no longer. We are seeing the past of these stars, 
stars which, when we see them, might no longer exist. They are only in their having 
been. But, Heidegger would argue, as he does concerning the sun, this is to see the stars 
in a way which only a few astronomers, physicists and philosophers see them. He says 
that ‘the seeming [Schein] in which sun and Earth stand…is an appearing [Erscheinen]. 
This seeming is not nothing. Neither is it untrue. Neither is it an appearance of relations 
that in nature are really otherwise. This seeming is historical and it is history, uncovered 
and grounded in poetry and saga, and thus an essential domain of our world’.89  
 
The connection between being and seeming can only be grasped fully if being is 
understood in an originary way and this can only come through a consideration of the 
Greek understanding of fu/sij, Heidegger claims: ‘Being opens itself up to the Greeks 
as phusis. The emerging-abiding sway is in itself at the same time the appearing that 
seems [das scheinende Erscheinen].’90 Heidegger’s strategy here is to link the roots of 
fu/sij and fai/nesqai so that that which emerges and reposes in itself [fu/ein] is the 
lighting-up, self-showing, appearing of fai/nesqai. Appearing is not derivative of being 
because being essentially unfolds as appearing, as Erscheinen. Schein and Scheinen, in 
the mode of Erscheinen, indicate whatever appears does so in a genuine appearance, a 
setting-forth, a coming to presence. But this does not mean that Schein cannot mean 
semblance or mere seeming [Anschein]. Schein can mean Anschein because being, 
fu/sij, in appearing, which is essentially the offering of a look or of views, can appear in 
such a way that it covers and conceals what beings are in truth, in unconcealment, says 
Heidegger. Unconcealment always offers the possibility that there will be seeming but 
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where beings do stand in seeming in a prolonged and secure standing then this seeming 
can be penetrated and dispersed. The concealment that seeming is can break apart 
[zerbrechen] or decay [zerfallen], according to Heidegger. Even seeming can, therefore, 
become a genuine appearing. In view of Heidegger’s definition of scheinen and the fact 
that when Heidegger writes of the appearance of the enigma that it is a genuine 
appearance [echten Scheinen des Rätsels], he is saying that the enigma shines and makes 
itself manifest at this point, that it appears as Erscheinen and not as Anschein, that is it is 
not a semblance. But does the enigma genuinely appear or is Heidegger merely asserting 
that it does? Has the enigma been appropriated into the poem, the work of art? These are 
questions that cannot be answered as this point. We have to follow the itinerary of the 
journey into the foreign, a journey that the lecture course makes through the foreign of 
the Greek, in this instance Sophocles. This itinerary will be traced in the next chapter. 
 
Before coming to that, however, I want to say something about the propriety of the 
enigma. Heidegger has already told us that what the river is, and does, is an enigma. As 
the river determines the coming to be at home of human beings on earth, then this 
coming to be at home is bound up with the enigmatic. The relation of the foreign to the 
homely is also named as enigmatic by Heidegger. Now we have already seen that 
Heidegger has his own definition of the enigma, das Rätsel. He claims that he is using it 
in its former [alten] and originary meaning [ursprünglichen Bedeutung], according to 
which the enigma refers to something that is concealed [Verborgene] that we care about. 
He speaks of the pure, originary enigma as care that counsels or counsel that cares but in 
doing so has he delimited the thinking of the enigma? Heidegger claims that his 
definition of the enigma is the eigentliche Rätsel, the proper enigma. If there is a proper 
enigma, then surely there is an improper enigma. As Lacoue-Labarthe points out, prior 
to any appropriation is a disappropriation and Critchley writes of an originary 
inauthenticity in relation to the enigma: ‘Authenticity always slips back into a prior 
inauthenticity from which it cannot escape but which it would like to evade.’91 One has 
to have gone through the foreign to arrive at what is one’s own. What of this improper 
enigma; is it the enigma that retains its meaning as dark saying and that is structurally 
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the promise that is always already effaced prior to its promise? Does the improper erupt 
into the proper? Heidegger has already provided a way back for such a thought of the 
enigma by his statement that a more profound relation lies buried in the everyday 
language use of Rätsel. There is, then, something more profound in the notion of puzzle 
still inherent in the term Rätsel. It might be that Heidegger here is thinking of the 
meaning of care that he ascribes to Rätsel, but that is not what he explicitly says. The 
fact that he writes of a profounder meaning in the context of a puzzle could suggest that 
Rätsel is a more profound puzzle – the injunction not to solve it is, perhaps, indicative of 
this. Giorgio Agamben has written apropos the terms eigentlich and uneigentlich in 
Being and Time that ‘an attentive analysis shows not only that the co-originarity of the 
proper and improper is never disavowed, but even that several passages could be said to 
imply a primacy of the improper’.92 He says that by merely attributing a simple primacy 
of the proper to Heidegger would prevent access to the thought of Ereignis. Could a 
primacy of the improper reign here with Rätsel? After all, even in the rewriting of the 
meaning of Rätsel it could be said that what is happening is a return from the foreign 
into the homely, into its own at the source. The meaning of counsel may have already 
been inscribed in the word but it is an inscription that can only be reached via a prior 
journey into the foreign of the enigma. In coming back, we return to the proper meaning 
in Heidegger’s terms, of Rätsel; but is this proper meaning always already 
disappropriated? 
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Chapter 3 
 
The enigma of Antigone 
 
The journey that the rivers make is the journey into the foreign and, for Heidegger, as far 
as his encounter with Hölderlin is concerned, this is a journey into Greek tragedy, 
specifically Sophocles’s Antigone, in which he follows a path taken by Hölderlin: ‘The 
pure fulfillment of this poetic necessity in the foreign land of the Greeks is a choral song 
in the Antigone tragedy by Sophocles. Hölderlin must have “lived” in a constant 
dialogue with this choral song, such that the word of his hymnal poetizing speaks from 
out of this dialogue and articulates it.’1 Both these claims are open to question, but it is 
true that Hölderlin translated the ode on at least two occasions, once as part of a 
translation of the whole play, and that he engaged in a dialogue with tragedy in general 
and with Sophoclean tragedy in particular. The focus of this chapter is on what 
Heidegger does with the d ei n o/n from this choral song. The enigmatic equivocality 
[rätselhaften Mehrdeutigkeit] of to \ d ei n o/n determines the essence of his journey, he 
says, and it is a word whose impact on Heidegger’s texts is highlighted with an 
appropriate force in an endnote from Derrida’s Of Spirit, which concerns the question of 
the translation of d ei n o/n and its importance to Heidegger: ‘[T]he enigma of the deinon 
leaves its mark on all [Heidegger’s] texts we shall have to approach.’2 To what extent 
the d ei no /n is the enigma as it has been discussed in this thesis, or whether it is just a 
crucial aspect of its operation is a question that this chapter will reflect upon. 
 
The tragedy of Antigone is a well-worn path trodden by a number of philosophers, 
including Hegel and Kierkegaard, as well as Derrida in his commentary on Hegel in 
Glas. From around 1790 to 1905, says George Steiner in his book Antigones, ‘it was 
widely held by European poets, philosophers, scholars that Sophocles’ Antigone was not 
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only the finest of Greek tragedies, but a work of art nearer to perfection than any other 
produced by the human spirit’.3 In his Aesthetics, Hegel pronounced it to be one of the 
most sublime works of art ever created. Heidegger himself addressed the play at length 
twice and this chapter will focus on the reading given in Heidegger’s lectures from 1942 
on ‘The Ister’. It will be mindful, however, of his 1935 reading from the Introduction to 
Metaphysics. The reasons behind this focus are that the question of the enigma 
seemingly plays no part in the earlier discussion, and the question of becoming homely 
in being unhomely does not have the same force and complexity in the 1935 lectures as 
it does in ‘The Ister’ lectures. As Clare Pearson Geiman has convincingly argued4, the 
second reading amounts to a fundamental repudiation of the first and, as such, it bears 
less of a relation to the thinking that will be drawn out in this chapter. It is, she says, a 
move away from the violence of a creative founding to a more meditative thinking of 
letting things be. Veronique Foti also sees the 1935 reading as being preoccupied with 
the ontological relationships of power and the Promethean character of human beings, a 
preoccupation not shared by the later reading: ‘The tragic conflict is no longer played 
out between techne and dike, but rather between two modalities of homelessness and 
homecoming; and, in keeping with this shift, the entire rhetoric has changed from a 
rhetoric of power to a rhetoric of alienation. Homelessness or homecoming characterize 
the human being which is now the locus of contrariety.’5 Dennis J. Schmidt, in On 
Germans and Other Greeks, highlights Heidegger’s key preoccupation in the 1942 
lectures as the estrangement of human beings into their essential homelessness. It is also 
not my intention to investigate a Heideggerian theory of tragedy, if there is such a thing. 
Heidegger provides hints and intimations that a specific understanding of tragedy and 
the tragic inheres in his thought, writes Robert S. Gall, but he ‘nowhere explicitly sets 
about giving us a theory of tragedy or a detailed analysis of the essence of tragedy’.6 
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Schmidt argues that Heidegger addresses ‘the topic of tragedy most of all in the context 
of those concerns which Hegel first articulated, namely, within the context of history’,7 
rather than engaging with tragedy as such. 
 
The play itself appears to be relatively straightforward in terms of its action and 
dramatic trajectory. At the opening of the drama, nearly all the relevant action has taken 
place. Antigone’s brothers, Polynices and Eteocles, are both dead, having killed each 
other in the fight over Thebes. Polynices had led the rebellion against the city while his 
brother remained loyal in its defence. In light of this, Creon, the city’s ruler, has decreed 
that Eteocles be buried with full military honours, while Polynices must be left to rot, 
unburied, on open ground. It is the latter part of the decree that Antigone has decided 
cannot be honoured and she has already determined her course of action to bury 
Polynices before we meet her on stage. We are not presented with her thinking behind 
this decision as part of the dramatic action. There is none of the agonised indecision that 
haunts Hamlet, for example; her justification comes later. It is as if she has already been 
called into the decision and it is merely a question of her taking responsibility for it. It is 
Antigone’s relation to the deed that is vital, according to John Jones: ‘[H]er heroism and 
her solitude rest in her appropriation of the deed: in her exclusion of her sister from any 
share in it…and in her claiming it for herself when she is brought before Creon.’8 This is 
not to say that Sophocles has failed in not giving us the psychological motivations for 
Antigone’s action, merely that these are not presented. It is true to say that Greek 
tragedy is less about individual psychology and more about the individual’s place within 
a wider network, as Schmidt says: ‘Tragedy takes up the riddle that each individual is as 
a singular being, but in Greece it could do this only by asking about the place of the 
individual in the community. Such a situation, an impossible situation, is ultimately the 
root of the crisis that animates Greek tragedy.’9 In the case of Antigone, it is the public 
law of Thebes which comes into conflict with family law and it is the relation of 
Antigone and Creon to these two kinds of law that is dramatised in the play with 
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Antigone’s decision leading to her conflict with Creon and eventually her death. All she 
has to do is to act upon her decision and the play dramatises this act and its 
consequences; the conflict, says Jones, is dramatised in and through the act of burial. 
Heidegger’s main focus is on the choral ode and his purpose is to think towards 
illuminating the essence of the river, that is to illuminate the fundamental law 
[Grundgesetz] of becoming homely [Heimischwerdens]. For Heidegger, the essential 
ground of the tragedy of Antigone is contained in two lines (333-334 in the Greek text), 
and the decisive word within these two lines is t o \ d ei no /n. What is decisive about this 
word hinges entirely on Heidegger’s translation and appropriation of it thereby into his 
thinking of becoming homely in being unhomely. Heidegger translates the enigmatic 
word to \ d ei n o/n as das Unheimliche, which is usually translated into English as the 
uncanny. This latter translation misses a crucial component of the German word heim, 
which means home, although it also has connotations of secrecy and mystery. Heimlich 
can mean secret or furtive and Geheimnis means mystery, so there is a certain 
equivocality in the home. It forms part of a semantic network which is essential to 
Heidegger’s whole illumination of the law of becoming homely, including heimisch and 
unheimisch as well as heimischwerden and heimischsein. Uncanny, through the root 
word canny, is related to knowing, as canny is a kind of practical knowing. This 
translation into English, however, should be kept in reserve and even when it is used the 
German term should always be kept in mind.10 What is of more importance is 
Heidegger’s translation itself, which he admits is at first alien, violent and even 
philologically wrong, although both philologisch and falsch are cordoned off in 
quotation marks, as if to suggest that neither of these terms is particularly apt. This 
translation, he says, can only be justified through an interpretation [Auslegung], that is 
the translation cannot stand alone in and of itself, it is not autonomous. 
 
Before considering Heidegger’s translation of t o \ d ei no /n, it is important to set out his 
thoughts on translation with which he prefaces his explanation of this specific term. For 
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Heidegger, a dictionary is only ever an indication [Hinweise] towards understanding a 
word; it is never the final authority. The information in a dictionary is always based on a 
prior interpretation of the contexts in which a word appears, although Heidegger 
concedes that in most cases it does provide the correct information about the meaning of 
a word – he doesn’t say that it provides the correct meaning – although this correctness 
is not a guarantee of any insight into the truth of this meaning. In effect, what he is 
saying is that in a translation from a dictionary the meaning of a word is related to the 
words that provide the context for its appearance. A dictionary is only one interpretation 
which, in terms of its methods and limits, remains largely opaque, he claims, and once 
language is reduced to the level of communication and exchange then the meanings 
provided by such a word book are ‘binding “without further ado”. Viewed with regard to 
the historical spirit of a language as a whole, on the other hand, every dictionary lacks 
any immediate or binding standards of measure’.11 Translation that sees the dictionary as 
authoritative, he seems to be saying, is not based on what these words meant to the 
Greeks but on what they mean to us now, and that something essential about their 
meaning is lost thereby. 
 
All translation is an interpretation and all interpretation a translation, says Heidegger. 
Translation is not the substitution of one word in one language for another in the other. 
The impossibility of such a substitution is not the failure of translation – indeed 
Heidegger says that translation can bring to light connections that were merely implicit 
in the language being translated.12 Translation goes further, as this quote from his 
lectures on Parmenides makes clear. The translating of the word a 0lh/q ei a ‘occurs only 
when the translating word “unconcealedness [Unverborgenheit]” transports us into the 
domain of experience and the mode of experience out of which the Greeks or, in the case 
at hand, the primordial thinker Parmenides say the word a 0lh /q ei a’.13 Translation is a 
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thinking return into the thought of the language being translated and a means of 
unveiling the truth of a work from out of ‘the blind obstinacy of habitual opinion’.14 
John Sallis writes that the translator’s task involves a certain abandonment so that one is 
‘translated into the domain in which what is to be translated was originarily said’.15 In 
addition, as well as returning to the truth of the translated language, our own language is 
more fully revealed, says Heidegger: ‘[T]ranslation is more an awakening, clarification, 
and unfolding of one’s own language with the help of an encounter with the foreign 
language...Thought in terms of historical reflection, translation is an encounter with a 
foreign language for the sake of appropriating one’s own language [der Aneignung der 
eigenen].’16 This thinking of translation as a journey into the foreign as a way of coming 
back into a more proper relation with one’s own language chimes with a thinking that 
sees a journey into the foreign as essential in terms of becoming homely in what is one’s 
own. The choice for Heidegger is whether language is used as a mere technical 
instrument or whether it is honoured ‘as the concealed shrine that, in belonging to being, 
preserves within it the essence of human beings’.17 This choice must also operate within 
a language itself if, as Heidegger asserts, translation, as interpretation, is operative 
within it. The interpretation of Hölderlin’s hymns is an example of a translation within 
the German language, which is perhaps Heidegger’s way of justifying his own 
interpretation of these hymns. Equally, a study of ancient Greek is not to be undertaken 
for the sake of appearing cultured; it is to be done so that the singular essence of the 
Greek world is acknowledged in its singularity and, in doing so, ‘that the concealed 
essence of our own historical commencement can find its way into the clarity of our 
world’.18  
 
In his terms, therefore, Heidegger’s translation of to \ d ei n o/n as das Unheimliche is a 
thinking into the realm of experience of Greek tragedy as a way of coming into one’s 
own. The key claim is that his translation is a unity of the multiple meanings that 
d ei no /n
 
has, with unity [Einheit] being the experience of ‘the ground of their originary 
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and reciprocally counterturning belonging-together’.19 Structurally, there are three 
doubled meanings which the overarching word das Unheimliche gathers together. First 
of all, the d ei n o/n is the fearful [Furchtbare] and this fearfulness is, on the one hand, the 
fear of that which is frightful, which leads to trembling, attempts to avoid the frightful, 
cowardice and taking flight. On the other hand, fearfulness is also reverence [die 
Ehrfurcht] and awe [die Scheu]. The d ei n o/n in its fearfulness is both that which repels – 
the taking fright and flight – and that which attracts – awe and reverence – and in this 
latter aspect it can ‘become binding and take one into its concealed protection’.20 In the 
counterturning, therefore, there is a dual movement of attraction and repulsion. The 
second meaning of d ei n o/n seems to arise out of the first, suggesting a certain hierarchy, 
even though it is meant to be a gathered unity. Whether it is frightful or awe-inspiring, 
the d ei no /n is always the powerful [das Gewaltige], says Heidegger. As the powerful that 
towers over us, it is again worthy of honour but when the powerful becomes the violent 
[das Gewalttätige] it becomes fearful in terms of the frightful. As with the Furchtbare, 
there is this double movement of attraction and repulsion, a movement that goes away 
but also comes towards, similar perhaps to the rivers in their vanishing and intimation. 
 
This almost passing reference to the violent – it is merely one counterturn in the triptych 
of meanings that make up the dei no /n - is in stark contrast to the priority that is granted to 
violence in the interpretation of this word in the Introduction to Metaphysics. In the 
earlier lectures, the violent is the overwhelming sway [des überwältigenden Waltens], 
which causes fear, panic and anxiety, as well as awe, and which Heidegger identifies 
with beings as a whole. Concomitant to this is the one who uses violence, to whom 
violence is a need, one who has violence as the basic trait of his Dasein, which is the 
human being. Human beings react violently against that which is overwhelming. The 
human being is also d ei no /n in the sense that while he remains exposed to the 
overwhelming sway, he also belongs to being. The necessity of violence is a 
consequence of the fact, says Geiman, that it ‘is only in terms of power that we can 
understand Being, since Being in its difference from beings can never be grasped 
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through any given actuality…but only as the source of potentiality that is prior to and 
exceeds all actuality. It is, similarly, only in terms of power that we can understand 
human Being, since human Being in its temporality is given only in and through 
possibilities or potentialities’.21 As Mark Wigley puts it: ‘On the one hand, man is 
violent, violating both enclosure and structure…and violently domesticating things with 
technology…in defining a home. On the other hand, there is the “overpowering” 
violence of Being, which the familiar space of the home attempts to cover over but 
which compels a certain panic and fear within it, and inevitably forces man out of it. The 
endless conflict between these two forms of violence is constitutional rather than simply 
a historical event.’22 None of this thinking of the violent is, it seems, present in ‘The 
Ister’ lectures and rather than power being the determinant, it is the play of concealment 
and unconcealment which comes to determine ‘the inherent tension and movement that 
belong to the human being as the essentially most unsettling being, who is “un-at-home” 
amidst what is “homely”’23. 
 
In the 1942 lectures, the third meaning of the d ei n o/n arises out of the powerful. The 
powerful, says Heidegger, is always in excess of our usual and habitual powers and 
abilities. In this, therefore, the d ei n o/n is Ungewöhnliche, which is translated as 
inhabitual but corresponds more to unusual or not ordinary. This is both the skilled in 
everything [Allgeschicklichkeit] and Ungeheure, translated as extraordinary, but also 
meaning monstrous. Both of these are then related to a third term, Gewohnheit, which 
means habit or the habitual. That which is out of the ordinary [das Außergewöhnliche] 
does not necessarily lie outside the habitual, says Heidegger, unlike the Ungeheure, 
which immediately and essentially exceeds the habitual. On the other hand, the all-
skilful is both outside and inside the Ungewöhnliche, he says. This is presumably 
because to be skilled in everything is to be unusual, out of the ordinary 
[außergewöhnlich], while the perfection of a skill requires repetition until it becomes 
habitual. That we are to see the Ungeheure and the Allgeschicklichkeit as being outside 
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in different ways is signalled by Heidegger when he puts the word outside in quotation 
marks when referring to being skilled in everything, which suggests that the Ungeheure 
is absolutely outside, unlike the all-skilful. This structure of the Ungewöhnliche, 
however, seems to be different to the structure of das Furchtbare and das Gewaltige. 
Das Furchtbare stands by itself and turns to fear or awe in its counterturning, as does 
das Gewaltige. This third meaning of the d ei n o/n does not have the same dynamic of 
attraction and repulsion, which marks the other two. The fearful and the powerful elicit 
responses to them, presumably from human beings, of cowardice or reverence, giving 
honour or taking fright. In addition, there is no equivalent term to Gewohnheit for the 
fearful or the powerful and neither is prefixed with the privative un-, which seems to 
make it necessary for Heidegger to introduce the positive term. What is more important 
is the relation of Ungeheure to Ungewöhnliche. Because it lies outside the habitual, and 
immediately and essentially exceeds the ordinary, it could be said that Ungeheure does 
not stand in a relation to Ungewöhnliche at all. This double structure of the outside does 
not pertain to the fearful and the powerful. It seems as if the Ungeheure is an 
interruption of the pattern established with the first two definitions, thereby destabilising 
the δεινον itself through the Ungeheure. It exceeds the habitual, the usual, the ordinary 
and the inhabitual and stands absolutely outside them. It inserts the monstrous into the 
Unheimliche, which seemingly cannot contain it. 
 
But if there is an instability introduced into the Unheimliche by the Ungeheure, there is 
also an instability in the word unheimlich and its relation to heimlich, as Freud’s essay 
‘Das Unheimliche’ tells us: ‘In general we are reminded that the word ‘heimlich’ is not 
unambiguous, but belongs to two sets of ideas, which, without being contradictory, are 
yet very different: on the one hand it means what is familiar and agreeable, and on the 
other, what is concealed and kept out of sight.’24 Heimlich means secret or clandestine, 
something furtive, rather than referring to being homely. Farrell underlines its 
fundamental hiddenness: ‘It is more frequently applied to that which happens to be 
hidden or is by its nature hidden. It evokes the atmosphere of secrecy or seclusion both 
                                                 
24
 Sigmund Freud, The Pelican Freud Library Volume 14 Art and Literature, translated from the German 
under the general editorship of James Strachey, the present volume edited by Albert Dickson, 
Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1985, p.345. 
132 
 
 
 
in persons and in things.’25 Perhaps the home is that which loves to hide, or is that which 
remains hidden. As far as Heidegger is concerned, it seems we are meant to think of 
home when we hear the term heim in heimlich and, as is made explicit in the 
Introduction to Metaphysics, the simple distinction of unheimlich and heimlich in terms 
of the homely is what Heidegger is after: ‘We understand the un-canny [Un-heimliche] 
as that which throws one out of the “canny” [Heimlichen], that is, the homely 
[Heimischen], the accustomed [Gewohnten], the usual, the unendangered. The unhomely 
[Unheimische] does not allow us to be at home [einheimisch sein].’26 However, it may 
well be that Heidegger also wants us to think of this meaning even when considering the 
homely or the home. That there is something hidden in the home, or that the home itself 
is hidden, that it hides its true nature, that the home itself can never be grasped, could be 
implied in the formulation of becoming homely in being unhomely. 
 
Putting this question of instability to one side, to summarise Heidegger’s position, these 
three terms, the fearful, the powerful and the unusual are the meanings that go to make 
up the Unheimliche. However, the Unheimliche does not take it in turns to be one of 
them, he says. Rather, it gathers them together into an originary unity [ursprünglichen 
Einheit] so that das Unheimliche ‘grasps the concealed ground of the unity of the 
manifold meanings of dei no /n, thus grasping the d ei n o/n itself in its concealed essence’,27 
an essence that was probably also concealed from the Greeks. Heidegger claims that das 
Unheimliche probably goes beyond the Greek in terms of its explicitness. But if any one 
of these meanings does not have a priority over any of the others, there does seem to be 
an implicit level of valorisation within each of the meanings themselves. The fear that 
calls for reverence, for example, is not one that calls for avoidance or flight ‘but rather a 
turning toward something in heed and respect’.28 Similarly, the powerful as commanding 
respect seems to be valued more highly than the merely violent. With regard to the 
unusual, it is the extraordinary that seems to have priority because it is the extraordinary 
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that leads us to the home, to the heim of the unheimisch and the heimisch, to the 
Unheimliche itself. 
 
The movement, whereby the Ungeheure becomes the Unheimische, or Un-heimische, 
comes during a consideration of Hölderlin’s translations of the choral ode from 
Antigone. Hölderlin produced two versions of this ode, and it is in his full translation of 
Sophocles’s play where d ei no /n is translated as ungeheuer, having previously been 
translated as gewaltige. Heidegger considers the contemporary meaning of Ungeheure to 
be ‘immense’, in which the idea of quantity has priority and which is essentially 
measurelessness. Heidegger equates this measurelessness with ahistoricality and with 
what he calls Americanism and Bolshevism. The Ungeheure becomes vital in 
overcoming this ahistoricality. It requires us, says Heidegger, to recognise, in the 
extraordinary as the immense, the concealed essence of the extraordinary. That essence 
is effectively the not-ordinary, the not-familiar [Nicht-Geheure]. The familiar as the 
ordinary is characterised by Heidegger as der Vertraute, which is a kind of trusting 
intimacy, and which is identified with the homely. To be unhomely, however, is to be 
Ungeheure, extraordinary, monstrous. The Ungeheure is both an eruptive force in the 
uncanny and is the unhomely. In order to see how the Ungeheure works through the 
Unheimliche, we now need to consider unheimlich in relation to becoming homely and 
being unhomely which, for Heidegger, is what Sophocles’s play addresses and is the key 
question of these lectures. It is entirely what Hölderlin’s river poetry is about, says 
Heidegger: ‘Hölderlin, in his telling of the rivers, poetizes the becoming homely yet 
simultaneous being unhomely of human beings as historical.’29 The choral ode from 
Antigone shines out of Hölderlin’s hymnal poetry like a rare and foreign stone in an 
otherwise familiar piece of jewellery, says Heidegger. This implies, although Heidegger 
does not say this, that the ode remains hard and impenetrable within the poetry. Any 
attempt to break into the stone in search of its meaning would be futile, if one follows 
the argument from ‘The Origin’, where Heidegger describes the stone of the temple 
which manifests its impenetrable heaviness. If the stone is smashed, nothing inward is 
ever revealed. The stone merely shows itself as fragments. Nor would the determination 
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of its carat grant us a true picture of its weight. Before we get to the ode itself, a certain 
impenetrability has been marked by Heidegger. The rare and foreign stone shines in the 
familiar but it is a shining in which something essential is undisclosable.  
 
To understand this becoming homely through being unhomely requires that we come to 
understand the enigmatic unity of locality and journeying. This involves an excursion 
into the choral ode, that is an excursion into the foreign, so that the essence of the rivers 
can be illuminated and, in this illumination, there is an enquiry into the fundamental law 
of becoming homely in being unhomely. The unity of locality and journeying can be 
grasped through a thoughtful reflection on the essence of history. The historicality of 
history consists [bestehen] in this being as this becoming. Being unhomely 
[Unheimischsein] is becoming homely, in being unhomely lies the possibility of 
becoming homely, not as an attribute of it but as its essence: ‘Locality and journeying 
bear the essence of becoming homely. Therein lies the historicality of human beings. 
Historicality is the distinctive mark of that humankind whose poets are Sophocles and 
Hölderlin – for something having the character of a commencement [Anfängliches] once 
occurred in the Greek world, and that which has the character of a commencement alone 
grounds history.’30 For Hölderlin, says Heidegger, that essence is concealed in the 
becoming homely [Heimischwerden] of human beings. Therefore, we human beings can 
learn to grasp the enigma that the river is, the enigma that is the unity of locality and 
journeying, only through a becoming homely and human beings can only become 
homely, Heidegger continues, via a passage and encounter [Auseinandersetzung] with 
the foreign [die Fremde]. The foreign, however, is a particular type of foreign: ‘That 
foreign, of course, through which the return home journeys, is not some arbitrary 
“foreign” in the sense of whatever is merely and indeterminately not one’s own. The 
foreign that relates to the return home, that is, is one with it, is the provenance of such 
return and is that which has been at the commencement [Anfängliche] with regard to 
what is one’s own and the homely.’31 The foreign, therefore, is already in an intimate 
relation with the home and what is one’s own. The home and the foreign are 
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complicated by Heidegger through their co-implication. The foreign is there at the 
beginning of the journey and is where the return comes from. In a sense, the foreign 
determines one’s own and becoming homely. For Heidegger, die Fremde is on the way 
to where it can remain in its wandering. In an essay from 1953 on George Trakl, he links 
fremd to the Old High German term fram so that what the term actually means is 
‘forward to somewhere else, underway toward…, onward to the encounter with what is 
kept in store for it. The foreign goes forth, ahead. But it does not roam aimlessly, 
without any kind of determination. The foreign element goes in its search toward the site 
[Ort] where it may stay [bleiben] in its wandering. Almost unknown to itself, the 
“foreign” is already following the call that calls it on the way into its own’.32 What we 
would ordinarily understand by fremd is altered by Heidegger so that it is seen more as a 
movement towards where it can remain as a wandering. But it is a wandering that has 
always already been called towards its own, into becoming homely, and it is a 
wandering that always has a specific end in mind, that is being. To wander, says 
Heidegger, is to be on the way home to being, even if this way home is a wandering. 
Becoming homely is always a possibility for Heidegger even if the achievement of such 
a homeliness is fraught with difficulty and danger. 
 
The homely always stands [bleiben] in a relation to the unhomely in such a way that the 
unhomely is present [anwesen] in the homely. The fact that Heidegger regards the 
human being as the most unhomely is underlined by his contention that the human being 
is the uncanniest of the uncanny. The uncanny is multiple in kind, according to 
Heidegger’s interpretation of the phrase po lla \ t a \ dei n a / which opens the choral ode. 
The po lla \ does not indicate a mere number, rather the uncanny is all sorts of things, 
[das Vielerlei], diverse [das Mannigfaltige] and manifold [das Vielfältige], he says. 
Heidegger italicises the second part of this word to underline the sheer foldedness of the 
uncanny, its layering and leveling, its disclosure and concealment – to fold is always to 
hide - its pleatedness, doubledness and entanglement: ‘Multiply folded, that is, placed 
together and thus individuated and, as thus folded, simultaneously interwoven and 
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hidden, is the uncanny.’33 Out of this folding arises das Unheimlichste des 
Unheimlichen, the human being whose particular kind of uncanniness comes to light in 
the choral ode. An intrinsic relation is established between the becoming homely of 
human beings and the human being who is the most uncanny, to \ d ei n o/t a t on. So 
Heidegger’s claim is that the uncanniest of the uncanny has a relation to becoming 
homely, which is to say being unhomely, and that the uncanny is meant as that which is 
not at home, not homely in that which is homely. For Heidegger, human beings are not 
homely in a singular sense but their care is to become homely. 
 
The journey into the foreign is not an adventure, however. The human being who, in 
Heidegger’s translation of the ode is venturing forth and is always underway 
everywhere, is not an adventurer, who finds fulfillment in the mere fact of travelling. 
The human being belongs in a higher realm of the d ei n o/n, which the adventurer does not 
attain. Here, Heidegger establishes a dual form of venturing forth [ausfahren], an 
improper venturing forth for the adventurer, who remains homeless because of his 
rootlessness, and for whom the fact of his homelessness is not an issue, and a proper one 
for the human being. In the latter form of ausfahren, ‘the sea and the land and the 
wilderness are those realms that human beings transform with all their skillfulness, use 
and make their own [Seinigen macht], so that they may find their own vicinity through 
such realms’.34 Despite this, however, the striving, that is the mark of a human being 
who seeks to establish itself within an environment, a dwelling place, precisely does not 
enable the human being to attain the homely, which remains out of reach. The homely is 
not found in establishing oneself among beings in a specific site. In this, the human 
being remains unhomely but this is not to say that the unhomely human being is the 
same as the adventurer. The unhomely one cannot be a mere adventurer, who could not 
be dei n o /j because he is merely odd and interesting and as such is merely not-homely 
[nicht-heimisch]. According to Heidegger, for the adventurer the distinction between the 
homely and the unhomely is lost. The adventurer is a thrillseeker, one who searches out 
danger but who in fact cannot see that the real danger lies elsewhere. 
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For the dei n o /ta to j, the most uncanny, unhomely and Ungeheure being, there is, 
however, a specific manner of being homely [Heimischsein]. Within the essence of the 
most uncanny being is the inability to find a way into this essence, which is essentially 
closed off to it. This is what constitutes the properly unhomely [eigentlich 
Unheimische], for Heidegger. Even so, the properly unhomely still has a relation to the 
homely but it is one in which the homely is not attained. The relation is one of 
deprivation [entbehren], but a deprivation in which the one possesses the other in a 
mutual possessing, albeit with a certain priority given to the homely possessing the 
unhomely: ‘[D]eprivation is the way in which the unhomely one possesses [besitzen] the 
homely, or to put it more precisely, the way in which whatever is homely possesses the 
unhomely one.’35 The homely possesses the unhomely but only in the sense that the 
unhomely is possessed by what is absent. This is the essence of the uncanny, the 
Unheimlichkeit, presencing in the manner of an absencing, ‘in such a way that whatever 
presences and absences here is itself simultaneously the open realm of all presencing and 
absencing’.36 Even though the homely is unattainable, it still possesses the unhomely – 
therefore the uncanny – as an exclusion, a privation, an impossibility. Essentially, one is 
exiled from one’s own essence, cast out from it without any way back, and one 
experiences one’s essence as its withdrawal.  
 
This experience of the essence, in terms of the counterturning character of the uncanny, 
is announced, says Heidegger, in the p a n to po /ro j a 1po ro j of the choral ode. Putting 
aside the contentiousness of this join – Heidegger elides the colon between the two 
words – I want to focus on what he makes out of it. What this phrase signifies for 
Heidegger is a being that experiences everything and yet remains experienceless, in that 
this being is unable to translate these experiences into an insight into its essence. That 
being is the human being and all human activity, therefore, is a form of displacement, 
because what human beings do can never bring them to a place where their essence can 
become their own. This is because death is unavoidable in fact and all the pursuits that 
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human beings undertake are ways of evading facing up to death – according to 
Heidegger human beings only know of death through its evasion. By evading it, they 
exclude themselves from their own essence. For Heidegger, however, death is the means 
of entry into one’s essence: ‘Human beings, however, mostly know of this essential trait 
of themselves only in the manner of evading it and thereby conceding their exclusion 
from entry into their own essence.’37 Becoming homely is related to death and in order 
to enter into one’s own essence one needs to find a way to evade the evasion of death, a 
double evasion that is a confrontation. In evading death, human beings busy themselves 
with beings and are driven out of being as a result, although they still think of 
themselves as being at home.  
 
It is the uncanniness of human beings which allows them to encounter beings and 
therefore to forget being and through forgetting to stand outside of being, says 
Heidegger. It is this aspect of the uncanny that is identified with unhomeliness which, 
says Heidegger, exceeds all other forms of the uncanny. It occurs because, through their 
uncanniness, human beings encounter other beings and, as a result forget being, although 
the fact that they encounter beings means that they have a relation to being. However, 
because being is only seen in relation to beings, being itself withdraws so that any 
understanding of being proceeds via beings. In being amongst beings, human beings 
believe themselves to be at home but this is the moment when they are precisely not at 
home. It is the distinction of human beings to see the open of being, even though the 
content of this open became lost as a fundamental experience. To understand being and, 
therefore, in a sense, to know it, is to be excluded from it, if this understanding comes 
from beings. The human essence is the extreme uncanny, the uncanniest of the uncanny, 
precisely because in their concern with, and for, beings, the human being forgets being, 
forgets the home, which is being, and mistakes the homely for a futile wandering. This 
is, according to Heidegger, literally a catastrophe in the sense of a turning away or a 
reversal. The human being is the sole catastrophe amongst beings. Heidegger here uses 
the Greek term ka t a s tr o fh / to emphasise that we should not see catastrophe as 
necessarily destructive. In ancient Greek, ka ta st ro fh / referred to an overturning, a 
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subjugation, reduction, or an end. Heidegger wants to signify an overturning or reversal 
[Umkehrung]. The disastrous or pessimistic meaning that catastrophe now has he sees as 
a result of the Christian misunderstanding of the Greek world. This negative moment of 
the uncanny has something of a lesser status within the metaphysics of the West that 
begins with Plato and which forms part of the Christian tradition, according to 
Heidegger. 
 
For him, what is laid open in the Sophoclean moment is the essential Greek experience 
of human beings in the commencement [Anfang]: ‘The history of the Greek world 
attains the pinnacle of its essence at that very point where it preserves and brings to 
appear the counterturning in being itself. For here alone is there the necessity of 
remaining within the grounds of that which is counterturning, instead of taking flight 
into one or the other side. At that historical moment when one side of the counterturning 
character of being is devalued as the lesser and the lower, the Greek world falls out of 
the orbit of its essence and its downfall has been decided.’38 The Greek world falls at 
precisely that moment when it could have turned towards being. Instead, it turns away 
from being towards beings and, in doing so, it forfeits the home, it becomes the 
uncanniest and the most unhomely. This turning away constitutes the entire Western 
philosophical tradition, according to Heidegger, and the greatness of the Greek moment 
is the possibility of a turn towards being and the home, a turn that has yet to be taken. 
According to Heidegger, Sophocles dramatises the moment of the counterturning in the 
pa n t op o/r oj  a 1por o j, the eruption of autonomous power and the rise of the being that 
experiences without experiencing. The human being that forgets being, that pursues the 
homely amongst beings, is the mistaken legacy of this dramatic moment. As unhomely, 
the human being is that homely ‘that seeks yet does not find itself, because it seeks itself 
by way of a distancing [Entfernung] and alienation [Entfremdung] from itself’.39 The 
human being, in whom the counterturning is essentially constituted, always turns away 
from what it is fundamentally seeking. 
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Heidegger deepens this counterturning through another, possibly dubious, conjunction, 
u 9yi /po li j a 1po li j. U 9yi /po li j is to tower high above the site and a 1po li j is to forfeit 
the site, according to Heidegger. This phrase speaks of a specific realm in which human 
action is accomplished, he says. This realm is the political but we are not to see the 
political in terms of how we interpret the city state, or what we think politics is today. 
Rather, the p o/li j is the place where ‘all beings and all relational comportment towards 
beings is gathered’.40 The po /li j is the place where human beings appear and is the site 
of their essence. As u 9yi /p oli j, the human being is always overreaching itself, but as 
a 1po li j, it is always its own downfall. These are not attributes of the human being, they 
are their possibilities. Human beings are placed into the site of their essence, while at the 
same time they are turned away from it. They both govern this place and are lost in it, 
that is any rising high within the po /li j is a plunging into its depths. The veiled ground 
of this unity of rising and falling is the uncanny and because human beings both 
overreach and lose themselves they are the most uncanny beings. The po /li j is the site 
of human being in the midst of being and is essentially bound up with being unhomely. 
The human being does not determine the unhomely, however. Rather, it is the unhomely 
which determines what human beings are and what they might become. This does not 
mean that taking up the d ei n o/n is a passive acceptance, it is an active taking on of 
responsibility. This is the exemplary role for Antigone, as Schmidt says. She is this 
‘because she does not deny the force of human destiny and the impossible situation it 
may unfold’.41 This is what makes her uncanny for Heidegger: ‘The uncanny is nothing 
other than this: the fact that she takes as her all-determinative point of departure that 
against which nothing can avail, because it is that appearing that is destined for her…and 
of which no one knows whence it has arisen.’42 In a sense, she chooses to be chosen by 
her destiny, that is to be the protector of the memory of Polynices through his burial, and 
because this choice comes like a voice from elsewhere no argument can be brooked 
against it. By pursuing this path, Antigone is extracted from all human possibilities and 
comes into ‘direct conflict over the site of all beings and into a sublation of the 
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subsistence of her own life’.43 It is not that her life becomes worthless or not worth 
living. Her life becomes subservient to the task that she has assumed. In this decision, 
she is the unhomeliest of the unhomely. Antigone goes beyond beings, stepping out of 
the site of all beings, and she knows that her action will lead to her death but, says 
Heidegger, her death is a belonging to being, it is her becoming homely within and out 
of being unhomely. As the most unhomely being, Antigone is the most uncanny. As 
such, argues Heidegger, Antigone must be the one referred to at the end of the choral 
ode, where the chorus, the Theban elders, proclaims that the uncanniest of the uncanny 
should be an outcast from the hearth and not be allowed into the knowing of the chorus. 
 
Heidegger fixes on this notion of the hearth, the e9s ti /a. The e9st i /a is the site of being-
homely, says Heidegger, in all its welcoming force. It ‘essentially prevails as lighting, 
illuminating, warming, nourishing, purifying, refining, glowing’.44 E 9st i /a derives its 
meaning from radiate or burn and Heidegger plays upon the welcoming warmth of the 
hearth: ‘Through this fire, the hearth is the enduring ground and determinative middle – 
the site of all sites, as it were, the homestead pure and simple, toward which everything 
presences alongside and together with everything else and thus first is.’45 But is there not 
a hint of danger here, even in the fire itself? And what of the welcome, is it always as it 
seems? As Derrida points out, who or what does the welcoming assumes an authority 
and may not always have the purest of motives : ‘To dare to say welcome is perhaps to 
insinuate that one is at home here, that one knows what it means to be at home, and that 
at home one receives, invites, or offers hospitality, thus appropriating for oneself a place 
to welcome the other, or, worse, welcoming the other in order to appropriate for oneself a 
place and then speak the language of hospitality.’46 Through the hyperbole with which 
Heidegger describes the hearth, he does seem to be suggesting that this is a place of 
welcome and that it is possible to be at home here, a possibility that earlier in the 
lectures he seemed to counsel against. 
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The Theban elders presume to speak for the hearth but, in order to do so, they have to 
‘be able to appeal to a belonging to the hearth. They must be the homely ones’,47 says 
Heidegger. To speak of expelling someone from the hearth they must belong to and have 
a knowledge of it. He questions their right to such a speech but he seems to suspend this 
question in favour of the claim that a knowledge of the homely speaks from out of the 
choral song precisely because a knowledge of the dei n o /n is inscribed there. Heidegger 
goes further; because there is a knowledge of the uncanny in the choral song then this 
knowledge must already go beyond the uncanny even to the extent of a knowledge 
beyond the uncanniest being. Such knowledge knows more than ‘the mere fact that 
human beings are the most uncanny of all beings. And if the most uncanny consists in 
being unhomely, then this knowledge must be closer to the un-homely, indeed closer to 
the homely, and from such nearness have some intimation [ahnen] of the law of being 
unhomely’.48 The Theban elders who expel the uncanniest one from the hearth make 
such an appeal to this knowledge, says Heidegger, when they say at the end of the choral 
ode that the delusions of the uncanniest of the uncanny cannot be shared with the 
knowing of the elders. Heidegger believes these words mean that the uncanniest one is 
excluded from a proper knowledge [das eigentliche Wissen] of the hearth, a proper 
knowledge that seems to belong to the Theban elders. The word that Sophocles uses for 
knowledge is fr o nw =n, from fr on ei =n, which was used to indicate a kind of practical 
wisdom as opposed to the more theoretical knowledge indicated by so fi /a. Heidegger’s 
claim is that, although this knowledge cannot be discerned from the content of the ode, it 
speaks of it through what is unsaid in the ode and that a knowledge of the hearth is that 
which determines what is said therein: ‘The choral song speaks this word concerning the 
“hearth” not merely at the end; rather, everything that it says is first thought and already 
spoken from the perspective of this final word…The closing words first tell of that 
knowledge from out of which every word of the choral song is spoken.’49 It is only 
because there is this knowledge of the hearth that the choral ode can speak of the 
uncanny at all. As the hearth is the place [Ort] of being homely it is also the place of the 
homely itself: ‘All knowledge of the d ei n o/n, of the uncanny, is sustained, guided, 
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illuminated, and articulated by that knowing that knows of the hearth.’50 Because 
knowledge of the uncanny can only come out of a knowledge of the homely, then the 
meaning of the uncanny as the unhomely is the only meaning that can be given to it, 
Heidegger claims. Even more, because knowledge of the dei n o /n can only come out of a 
knowledge of the hearth, then all speaking of this dei n o /n must have already thought well 
beyond it in the direction of the homely. But it is a thinking that does not directly 
pronounce itself. Instead it is, claims Heidegger, picking up on the Greek term fr on ei =n, 
a pondering and meditating [Sinnen und Sichbesinnen] that comes from the absolute 
centre of human essence, but which is fundamentally different from the calculated 
thinking [rechnenden Verstandes] of metaphysical thought.  
 
Heidegger claims that being is the homely, and that however far from being the human 
being appears to roam, the human being always remains in a relation to being. 
Heidegger links the d ei n o/n with pe/lei n, which he translates as looming or stirring, and 
fu /s i j, the Greek term which Heidegger specifically identifies with being [Sein] in this 
passage. Through these linkages, he claims that the choral ode’s opening line says that: 
‘In whatever direction that which is most uncanny ventures as that which is most 
unhomely, insofar as it still is as the most unhomely, it everywhere remains within the 
sphere of being. No matter where that which is most uncanny seeks a way out, no matter 
to where it is thrust back and cast down, it falls back into the sphere of being.’51 
Heidegger then makes the curious claim that although being does not set any limits 
[Grenzen] to human activities, it is being that is constantly restricting [beschränken] and 
knocking them down [niederschlagen] at the same time as opening all doors to them. 
What is a restriction if it is not a limit? If being is continually putting barriers in place 
that deliberately thwart the activities of human beings then how is this different to a 
limit? Is it because human activities that only lead to beings forget being but that even in 
this forgetting the human being remains under the influence of being? This would appear 
to be Heidegger’s meaning: ‘For all its unhomeliness, the unhomely remains within the 
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sphere of being. The unhomely remains related to the homely.’52 What is the status of 
this remaining? What remains of the unhomely if it is always already within the sphere 
of the homely, of being? Perhaps the unhomely has already been subsumed by the 
homely in such a way that it has always already been domesticated, that it is a kind of 
homely unhomeliness and that this unhomeliness is not really a risk at all. As with the 
foreign that is always already infiltrated by that which is one’s own, it could be argued 
that the stakes have already been decided prior to any break out by the uncanniest of the 
uncanny. This is perhaps what Andrzej Warminski means when he argues that 
Heidegger, in his interrogation of Hölderlin, misses the triple structure of the foreign and 
one’s own that the poet formulates, a structure that is named with the terms Greece, 
Egypt (the Orient) and Hesperia (Europe): ‘[T]he Egyptians can never be our other 
because they are somebody else’s (i.e. the Greeks’) other – our other’s other – and 
precisely because they are that, because our other (the Greeks) is divided against itself, it 
(the Greeks) in turn can never be our other. In other words, we invent our other – “our” 
Greeks – by suppressing its otherness (i.e. The Egyptians, the Orient) in it.’53 The 
Greeks are never our other – we are not far here from Lacoue-Labarthe’s contention that 
the proper of the Greeks is inimitable because it never took place - so we have to invent 
them and Heidegger’s version of the Greeks is just another invention. 
 
Perhaps Heidegger here also opens himself up to the charge that Emmanuel Levinas 
makes about the relation to being: ‘The detour of ideality leads to coinciding with 
oneself, that is, to certainty, which remains the guide and guarantee of the whole 
spiritual adventure of being. But this is why the adventure is no adventure. It is never 
dangerous; it is self-possession, sovereignty, a 0r xh /. Anything unknown that can occur to 
it is in advance disclosed, open, manifest and cannot be a complete surprise.’54 Home 
always has the priority, it is always home that determines the not at home. As Robert 
Mugerauer puts it : ‘Only what has been or has the possibility of being at home can lose 
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it; only what has had or might have a home is homeless. While homeless, we are 
connected with the no-longer-at-home and the not-yet-at-home.’55 If Levinas is correct, 
then homelessness is never a surprise, it can be dealt with, indeed has always already 
been dealt with. The loss has already been recuperated. Homelessness always 
presupposes homecoming, as Mugerauer seems to imply here: ‘[H]omelessness would 
be the passing away of belonging and the passing out of the between in which we might 
dwell. Homecoming would be the event of passage back to the belonging together of 
what is yet bound together even when held apart and in opposition.’56 But in that case, 
the priority is with homelessness. One has to be homeless in order to be able to create a 
home. Only those without a home can found and consequently come into the home. This 
reversal, however, gets us nowhere. Home is always already a possibility whether one 
starts from the home or from homelessness. There has to be a home in order to be home-
less and even if one never gets home, the home still remains. Even when one is deprived 
of the home, the home remains in, or is, this deprivation. Is it the case then that there 
always has to be the adventure of the home and homelessness or is it possible to think a 
place or time that is prior to the home and homelessness, a thinking that presupposes 
neither? 
 
Before coming to that, it is necessary to return to the hearth because it is through the 
hearth that we begin to see a proper and an improper unhomeliness. That the home is the 
hearth and that the hearth is being is quite clear from these words of Heidegger’s: ‘The 
hearth is accordingly the middle of beings, to which all beings, because and insofar as 
they are beings, are drawn in the commencement. This hearth of the middle of beings is 
being. Being is the hearth.’57 Within the hearth, we are welcomed and comforted: ‘The 
hearth, the homestead of the homely, is being itself, in whose light and radiance, glow 
and warmth, all beings have in each case already gathered. Pa r e/st i o j is the one who, 
tarrying in the sphere of the hearth, belongs to those who are entrusted with the hearth, 
so that everyone who belongs to the hearth is someone entrusted, whether they are 
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“living” or dead.’58 Because it is in the hearth that everything homely is grounded, there 
is first revealed the ground of the unhomely and the inner essence of being properly 
unhomely [eigentlichen Unheimischseins] is determined. In being expelled from the 
hearth, we in fact become attentive to the homely and the risk pertaining to it, according 
to Heidegger, and in being attentive to the homely the true nature of being unhomely 
emerges as that which is something more than just being merely an addition to the 
human being: ‘Being unhomely shows itself as a not yet awakened, not yet decided, not 
yet assumed potential for being homely and becoming homely. It is precisely this being 
unhomely that Antigone takes upon herself…In becoming homely, being unhomely is 
first accomplished…Antigone’s becoming homely first brings to light the essence of 
being unhomely. Becoming homely makes manifest the essential ambiguity of being 
unhomely.’59 This essential ambiguity leads to the doubled meaning of unhomeliness. 
On the one hand, says Heidegger, one can be unhomely amongst beings, busying 
ourselves with our activities and yet coming to nothing and never approaching the 
homely: ‘The unhomely one shall not be someone homely, so long as they stick merely 
and solely to their being unhomely and thus let themselves be driven about amid beings, 
without any constancy.’60 On the other, Antigone assumes a proper unhomeliness when 
she acts on behalf of her brother, not because of blood ties or her duty to the dead, but 
because of the immutable, unwritten and divine edict that always already prevails. In 
this, Heidegger claims, Antigone names being and the tragedy of Antigone is the 
‘counterplay…between being unhomely in the sense of being driven about amid beings 
without any way out, and being unhomely as becoming homely from out of a belonging 
to being.’61    
 
The improper unhomely stays amidst beings, allows beings to dictate its activities and 
remains alienated from being. The proper unhomely is the path that Antigone takes, 
turning her back on beings to say being. She names becoming homely in the 
introductory dialogue between herself and her sister, Ismene, when she says pa q ei =n  t o\ 
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d ei no \n  t ou =to, according to Heidegger, which in the English translation of his German 
says ‘to take up into my own essence the uncanny’.62 This is Antigone’s essential act for 
Heidegger. In saying this, she passes through being unhomely amidst beings into a 
becoming homely through being unhomely. By doing so, she also escapes the expulsion 
from the hearth that is announced at the end of the choral ode, Heidegger claims. Only 
those who are unhomely in the sense of being amid beings are expelled from the hearth. 
Antigone remains in a relation to the hearth. This is not because she stands outside the 
d ei no /n but because ‘she properly is the most uncanny in the supreme manner [höchsten 
Weise], namely in such a way that she takes it upon her in its full essence, in taking it 
upon herself to become homely within being’.63 Thus, far from being the one that is 
expelled from the hearth, which is what Heidegger intimated earlier in his exposition, 
Antigone belongs to the hearth. She epitomises the properly unhomely and, in so doing, 
brings about the home. Rodolphe Gasché puts it this way: ‘Bringing the essence of 
unhomeliness to light as a way of being in which athomeness has not yet been realized, 
Antigone, in taking unhomeliness upon herself, thus accomplishes and realizes it in the 
first place.’64 Rather than the home being determined by human beings, it is from being 
that the home derives: ‘Homeliness and the home is to be thought from the perspective 
of Being, which determines the essence of the human being. In its most primordial 
sense, the home is not a place where one is common, a stable place where, secluded and 
protected, one can be in and for oneself.’65 To be at home is to be out of the ordinary: 
‘Consequently, the home or abode in which humans dwell – in other words the ethos of 
humanity – is the site in which that which unsettles everything ordinary shines forth – 
the god, for Heraclitus; Being, for Heidegger. In it the human being is at home insofar as 
he or she comports toward this otherness, which in turn unhomes him or her.’66 Gasché 
says that unhomeliness is never overcome because it becomes the true home of the 
human being. But is the home as unwelcoming as this? Is it unsecluded and unprotected? 
After all, the hearth is the home, as we have already seen, and the description of the 
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hearth given by Heidegger suggests that it does seclude and protect. The fire in the 
hearth in its welcoming glow is Nähren, that which feeds, nurtures and nourishes. It is 
also Wärmen, that which brings warmth and restores. The hearth is the bringer of light, 
the absolute homestead [die Heimstaat schlechthin], says Heidegger. 
 
It would seem that Antigone, however, does not find it so welcoming. She says: ‘For 
everywhere shall I experience nothing of the fact | that not to being my dying must 
belong [daß nicht zum Sein gehören muß mein Sterben].’67 According to my reading of 
Heidegger’s translation from the Greek, Antigone is lamenting the fact that her death 
will not belong to being and nor will she be able to experience this death. Her death 
takes place outside of being and outside any experience of it. Is this compatible with 
Heidegger’s contention that Antigone says being? In this saying, Antigone names 
[nennen] being, according to Heidegger. She gives being its proper name and, in doing 
so, Antigone grounds being homely, the hearth. However, in saying that her death does 
not belong to being, Antigone appears to be saying that she will be estranged from 
experience, from death and from being, not that she is coming into proximity with being. 
Rather than becoming homely in being, she seems to be condemning herself to an 
eternal wandering without rest, alienated from both life and death. Perhaps it is possible 
to say of Antigone what Levinas says of Phaedra, that she ‘discovers the impossibility of 
death, the eternal responsibility of her being, in a full universe in which her existence is 
bound by an unbreakable commitment, an existence no longer in any way private’.68 As 
Blanchot remarks, the impossibility of death ‘is what I cannot grasp, what is not linked 
to me by any relation of any sort. It is that which never comes and toward which I do not 
direct myself’.69 In saying what she does here, Antigone seems to be saying that she 
stands outside any possible relation to her death, to the hearth and to being. 
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This notion of her standing outside of any relation to death or to being is given further 
impetus through the way she describes herself as ‘living’. Paul Hammond says that 
‘there is no heimlich world for Antigone, as right from the beginning she is displaced, 
and the world around her rejects her – or she rejects it’.70 When Antigone claims that the 
law against burying Polynices was not proclaimed to her specifically and nor did it come 
from Zeus or Dike, the word that Antigone uses for living is cu /no i koj which, as 
Hammond points out, contains the root word of oi ]ko j which means home or dwelling. 
This implies, according to Hammond, that Antigone is perhaps preparing for herself ‘an 
alternative source of value to the home which is no longer her home’.71 In a later speech, 
as Hammond again reminds us, the word that Antigone uses to describe herself as 
‘living’ in the phrase ‘living…neither with the living or the dead’ is me/to i koj which 
refers to an alien resident in a foreign city who does not have any citizenship rights, 
which suggests that in ‘Antigone’s case it is part of a negative statement: she is not even 
an alien resident among either the living or the dead’.72 The alien resident does not feel 
at home in the foreign city and her alienation would extend even into the possibility of a 
return home. The word itself literally means beyond the home and also refers to being a 
settler or emigrant, a sojourner. It belongs in a semantic network in which meanings of 
changing one’s abode, emigrating and settling elsewhere, of removal and migration, of 
settling in a foreign place, circulate. Antigone uses the same word to describe her 
residence in the underworld with her parents ‘so even here she will be a sojourner in 
another’s house, still not a citizen’.73 When the Chorus describes Antigone as being 
deprived of her residence in the world above ground, the same word - me/to i koj - is 
used. Not only is she already alienated, but even this alien status is to be torn from her. 
Antigone seems to be suspended, neither alive nor dead, neither at home or not at home. 
She seems to be a wanderer without any exit from her wandering. Jacques Lacan says 
that from ‘Antigone’s point of view life can only be approached, can only be lived or 
thought about, from the place of that limit where her life is already lost, where she is 
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already on the other side. But from that place she can see it and live it in the form of 
something already lost’.74 
 
The o i ]koj is not just a simple home. It forms a community and continuity, as John Jones 
points out, in his discussion of Aeschylus’s The Orestia. The o i ]koj, he says, ‘is at once 
house and household, building and family, land and chattels, slaves and domestic 
animals, hearth and ancestral grave: psycho-physical community of the living and the 
dead and the unborn’.75 If, as he later says about Sophocles, that in his plays there is a 
sharpening and a narrowing of ‘the subversion of the oikos into a theme of personal 
usurpation’,76 it is still very clear that Antigone stands in a relation to the oi ]ko j - Creon 
calls insubordination the destroyer of the oi ]ko j - and that as me/to i koj she is excluded 
from everything that pertains to the oi ]ko j. As Valerie Reed argues, Antigone’s relation 
to the home is fundamentally unstable. She does not belong in the place she happens to 
be. As she moves towards her death and a home in the underworld, the kind of residence 
that will be becomes more and more uncertain: ‘[I]t is as if she is always moving 
towards a home which itself is perpetually displaced or receding. And as she approaches 
death, it comes to seem that the problem lies not in her distance from her home, but in 
the possibility that she might never arrive; that even if she does, she will not truly belong 
there; perhaps even more fundamentally, that her home simply cannot be located.’77 In 
fact, as Reed points out, the whole question of the o i ]koj and Antigone’s relation to it, is 
one that is elided by Heidegger. The undecidability of this relation has important 
consequences for Heidegger’s reading of the play, she argues, and, therefore, the whole 
movement of becoming homely in being unhomely: ‘[E]very turn that Antigone makes 
toward her home is also a turn away from it; every act that she performs on behalf of her 
oi ]ko j duty also acts, in some sense, against that duty. And in this way, she embodies a 
different kind of Unheimlichkeit – a radical uncertainty, and not just a perpetual 
becoming homely, that is suggested throughout the play and cemented by the singularity 
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of her death.’78 It is, perhaps, a remarkable elision that, in a discussion in which the 
home, becoming homely and being unhomely play such a crucial role, the Greek term 
for home - o i ]koj - plays no role at all, especially when so many other Greek terms are 
made the subject of extended considerations and especially when Antigone defines 
herself, however negatively, in relation to the oi ]ko j. Having said that, Heidegger does 
focus on the hearth, the e9s ti /a, which is at the centre of the o i ]ko j. 
 
As she goes towards her death, Antigone names the place where she is to die in three 
ways as her tomb, her bridal chamber and her deep dug home, where she will join those 
who are her own, that is her father, mother and brothers. But even these simple terms – 
father, mother, brother – are fraught with their own alienation. After all, Antigone is 
both daughter and sister to Oedipus, her mother is also her grandmother and her brothers 
her uncles. This doubled rupturing of all her familial relationships suggests that there is 
no simple return to what is her own, no untroubled resting place even before her suicide 
in the chamber provided for her death. There is no own, no proper to which to return 
from a sojourn into the foreign for Antigone, nor, it would appear, can the fact of her 
suicide be said to name being. If, in her death, Antigone both names being and grants the 
hearth, then how is it possible for the hearth to be the warming, welcoming, nourishing 
place that Heidegger describes? There is nothing warming or nourishing about this 
death, which is abject in its root sense – Antigone as the one who is cast away – nor does 
it seem possible to say that this is the honourable death that Antigone foresaw in her 
dialogue with Ismene. Her suicide is radically unsettling and Heidegger does not discuss 
it and, as far as I am aware, the question of suicide is not addressed in Heidegger’s 
thinking. Reed argues that, as the play concludes, we are left completely uncertain as to 
Antigone’s fate, that even after her body has been cut down by Haemon, she is still 
‘suspended, hanging between the earth and the world of the dead’.79 As Hammond 
points out, Antigone describes herself as a desolate figure with the repetitive use of the 
privative alpha prefix; she is unwept for and unmarried. In the naming of being, rather 
than the plenitude of the hearth, do we not see the fractured or lost possibility of naming 
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which, Lacoue-Labarthe avers, is what Hölderlin names in his naming, the impossibility 
of naming?  
 
If her familial relations are ruptured, then in a similar way, she seems to stand in a 
rupture of the law. In her dialogue with Creon when she is charged with justifying her 
decision to bury Polynices, she claims that as neither the father of the gods, Zeus, nor 
justice, Dike, was responsible for the proclamation banning burial, then she was under 
no obligation to follow it. Nor did she think that Creon’s law was strong enough to 
overturn the unwritten rules that have always already existed, laws which seem to 
belong to an immemorial past. Froment-Meurice writes that ‘Antigone transgresses the 
written laws, but in the name of other laws, laws without name that she essentially 
cannot cite’.80 According to Heidegger, this is what determines Antigone in her being, it 
is that which attunes human beings as human beings: ‘At no time can what is 
determinative here be encountered anywhere as something first posited on a particular 
occasion, and yet it has already appeared before all else, without anyone being able to 
name a particular being from which it has sprung forth. It is to that which is unconcealed 
in this way that the essence of Antigone belongs.’81 That to which she belongs is, of 
course, being, according to Heidegger. Antigone names being, he says. But if she names 
being and belongs to being, then the statement, that no one knows where it first 
appeared, refers to being, which is surely Heidegger’s implication, and she would then 
know, in terms of the knowing signified by f ro n ei =n, where this edict springs from. 
 
What Antigone says here about the appearance of the law that determines her action is, it 
seems to me, of crucial significance for Heidegger because it is, for him, what 
determines [bestimmen] Antigone in her being – what gives her her voice, in effect – and 
what attunes [durchstimmen] human beings as human beings. In the Loeb edition of the 
play, this is what Antigone says: ‘Yes, for it was not Zeus who made this proclamation, 
nor was it Justice who lives with the gods below that established such laws among men, 
nor did I think your proclamations strong enough to have power to overrule, mortal as 
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they were, the unwritten and unfailing ordinances of the gods. For these have life, not 
simply today and yesterday, but for ever [pot e], and no one knows how long ago they 
were revealed.’82 This law, which Hegel claims is the divine or ethical law, that which is 
pre-given and beyond the individual, was not ordained by Zeus or Dike and yet its 
provenance is still divine. It is a law that is unwritten and unchangeable – wankellosen 
[unshakeable, constant] – according to Antigone. The term that Antigone uses for law is 
n o/mi ma which comes from no /mi mo j which means conformable to custom, usage or law, 
customary, prescriptive, established, lawful, rightful. The law that Antigone refers to is 
something that has arisen through use or tradition, something that has become 
established from out of a kind of practice, a ritual that has grown up around the 
commemoration of the dead. At the beginning of the play, Antigone refers to the fact 
that Eteocles has been buried according to both justice [d i /kh] and custom [n omo /j]. But, 
says Antigone, this is a law that has never belonged to the present, nor has it appeared in 
a past that was ever present, precisely because it is a law whose provenance is unknown, 
where it first appeared or was revealed is not something that can be seen, and which has 
always lived and will always continue to live. Pot e which is translated as ‘for ever’ is a 
word that points both towards the past and the future. It is, therefore, a law outside of 
any event, any deed or proclamation that may have brought it into being. The origin of 
what becomes custom is always inaccessible in that it is impossible to locate the point at 
which what was once a singular event becomes a custom. 
 
The word translated as ‘revealed’ in the Loeb edition and which Heidegger translates as 
erscheinen, and which is given as ‘appeared’ in the English translation of the lectures is 
fa /nh, the infinitive of which is fa i /nw, and which means to bring to light or to make 
appear. It can also mean to come into being. F a i /nes q a i states that something is 
manifestly such and such a thing. The question of f a i /n w and fa i /nes q a i is one which 
Heidegger dwells on extensively – in Being and Time for example in the discussion of 
phenomenology as a method – and in the Introduction to Metaphysics he explicitly links 
these terms to f u/s i j: ‘The roots phu- and pha- name the same thing. Phuein, the 
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emerging that reposes in itself, is phainesthai, lighting-up, self-showing, appearing 
[erscheinen].’83 Heidegger identifies f u/s i j as the way being opens itself up to the 
Greeks and through which beings first show themselves and remain in the light and this 
appearing, as making manifest, he indicates through the word erscheinen. This is what is 
happening here in Antigone’s speech, according to Heidegger, where ‘Being essentially 
unfolds as phusis. The emerging sway is an appearing. As such, it makes manifest. This 
already implies that Being, appearing, is a letting-step-forth from concealment’.84 The 
immutable, unwritten and divine edict has been allowed to step forth from concealment. 
By following this edict, Antigone has become sheltered and homely in unconcealment, 
having gone through being unhomely amongst beings. This is what is happening to her, 
according to Heidegger, when she takes up the uncanny into her essence, thereby 
becoming properly unhomely amid beings and, consequently, becoming homely in 
being. 
 
But the question remains as to whether the law, the edict, the n o /mi ma, is made manifest 
in the way that Heidegger claims. When Antigone says that no one knows where or 
when the law first appeared, she uses the word oi ]d en which comes from the verb ei 1d w, 
which means to know. It also means to see, look at, or perceive. What Antigone is 
claiming here is that the law was not seen in its coming into the light, its appearance was 
not one that was available as a phenomenon. The law that Antigone follows is, then, a 
non-phenomenal phenomenon. As a law which belongs neither to the past or the present 
but has always prevailed and in whose prevailing no one can say that it ever appeared as 
such – the law itself is unwritten – it could be said that it belongs to the interminable, 
that it is both endless and still to come, that it is without beginning, anarchic in a literal 
sense. Perhaps what Antigone describes here is not so much a becoming homely in being 
unhomely, not so much a resting in the glowing warmth and welcome of the hearth, but 
rather what Blanchot calls ‘“the terrifyingly ancient”, there where nothing was ever 
present’.85 He continues: ‘If, in the “terrifyingly ancient”, nothing was ever present, and 
                                                 
83
 Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, p.106/p.77. Transliterations are in the English translation. 
84
 Ibid. p.107/p.77. Transliterations are in the English translation. 
85
 Maurice Blanchot, The Step Not Beyond, translated by Lycette Nelson, Albany, State University of New 
York Press, 1992, p.14. 
155 
 
 
 
if, having barely produced itself, the event, by the absolute fall, fragile, at once falls into 
it, as the mark of irrevocability announces to us, it is because (whence our cold 
presentiment) the event that we thought we had lived was itself never in a relation of 
presence to us nor to anything whatsoever.’86 Perhaps it is a law without relation, an 
interruption of time in time. Time here is the essence of waiting, waiting for a time that 
is still to come. Antigone herself seems to belong to this waiting. Hammond writes that 
‘Antigone seems to exist in a different temporal dimension from other characters. She 
does not live in the same time as Ismene, telling her that her life has long been dead’.87 
Veronique Foti claims that the eccentricity of Antigone’s actions mean that her 
‘difference cannot be subsumed under some aspect of the ontological Differing, or her 
singularity construed in terms of the binary (if ambiguous) opposition between two 
modalities of estrangement and homecoming’,88 and in her book Epochal Discordance 
she explicitly claims that Heidegger’s ‘analysis does not do justice to Antigone’s 
desolation’,89 even if Heidegger may briefly, and in an obscure way, acknowledge this 
desolation. Antigone later claims that she is being taken to Hades while still alive to 
become the bride of Acheron, but without the benefit of any bridal song. She lives, she 
says, neither among mortals nor as a shade among the shades, neither with the living nor 
the dead. Even in her tomb she is still waiting, watching, eternally vigilant over the city 
of Thebes, the ever watchful tomb of Antigone, as Hammond interprets it. Here, then, in 
the law that has not been written, whose provenance is unknown, which is both 
irrevocably past and also still to come, is perhaps the enigma, the enigma of an 
immutable law that has already been erased before it has been written, a law that would 
have been erased prior to the impossibility of its having been written.  
 
The figure of Antigone, therefore, seems to be emblematic of a condition that is neither a 
matter of simply being at home nor being homeless, but who exists in a transitory state, 
just as the poet does. For Heidegger it is the poet who is the privileged site of  becoming 
homely precisely because becoming homely can only happen poetically: ‘[T]he Ister 
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hymn…tells of a becoming homely, of a becoming homely that can properly occur only 
poetically so that it requires the poet above all.’90 The poet, Heidegger reminds us, 
should not be seen in aesthetic terms and that all psychological, historiographical and 
critical responses – what he calls fallende Gerede – to the poet are out of bounds when 
considering the becoming homely of human beings on earth or human dwelling, a 
dwelling that occurs only poetically. But if the poet is the one who authorises becoming 
homely, we are left with the question as to how. Heidegger’s answer, following his 
reading of Hölderlin, is that the poet is a sign. Quoting ‘The Ister’ and ‘Mnemosyne’, 
which both refer to Zeichen or sign, Heidegger claims that the poet is the ‘enigmatic 
“sign”’, that is not ‘something designated by a sign, by the rivers. The poet himself 
would be a sign [Zeichen], yet not for designating [Bezeichnung] something else but in 
such a way that as poet, he is a “sign”.’91 The poet is the sign as sign, the sign itself. Not 
only that, says Heidegger, but the poet is the only one who can decide about poetry, just 
as the thinker is the only one who can decide about thinking. 
 
The poet, therefore, is a sign. That this sign is necessary, and therefore the poet is 
needed, is the injunction that Heidegger takes from these words from ‘The Ister’: 
 
 Namely, they are 
 To be to language. A sign is needed, 
 Nothing else, plain and simple, so that sun 
 And moon may be borne in mind, inseparable, 
 And pass on, day and night too, and 
 The heavenly feel themselves warm by one another.92 
 
Heidegger admits that his equation of sign, first with a demigod and then with the poet, 
could be considered violent. It is a presupposition of his that Hölderlin’s poetic word 
‘remains and should remain in the realm of the enigmatic [Rätselhaften]…After all, 
Hölderlin’s word is not meant to be assimilated to the commonplace realm of everyday 
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opinion’.93 Here Heidegger appeals to the enigma, explicitly claiming that it in some 
way licenses his interpretation of the poet as the sign. Because his thinking, he claims, 
takes Dichtung as its measure, he is able to pursue the line of thinking that moves from 
the sign to the demigod and then the poet: ‘If the sign referred to here bears the “world” 
in its mind and, standing between human beings and the heavenly, is the demigod, and if 
Hölderlin “thinks demigods” in the essence of the rivers and comprehends the demigod 
as the essence of the poet, then the sign can only be the name for the poet.’94 Because a 
sign is needed, this means that a poet and poets have to be, according to Heidegger. 
They are essential for becoming homely.  
 
But if the poet is a sign, then what kind of sign is he? Heidegger has already cautioned 
us against the aestheticisation of the poet and we should be wary therefore of seeing the 
sign as a symbol or symbolic image. The essence of the poet is, according to Heidegger, 
supremely set down in this line from Hölderlin’s poem ‘Andenken’, ‘Remembrance’. It 
is the last line of the poem: ‘Was bleibet aber, stiften die Dichter’. ‘Yet what remains, 
the poets found’. What is left, the remains, is established by the poets. In his essay on 
this poem, Heidegger writes that what remains is that which is lasting, that which abides 
[das Bleibende]. The remains are permanent: ‘Hence, only that remains which does not 
vanish, which does not pass away because it is imperishable.’95 Stiften has the sense of 
creating something that is intended to be permanent, according to Farrell. Remaining is 
the becoming homely in coming back from the journey into the foreign: ‘The remaining 
in what is one’s own is the path to the source. This is the origin from which arises all 
dwelling of the sons of the earth. Remaining means going to the nearness of the origin. 
Whoever dwells in the nearness realizes the essence of remaining.’96 In his lectures on 
‘The Ister’, Heidegger reiterates this valorisation of the remains [bleiben]. Saying ‘all 
that remains’ is not a form of fatalism but is ‘the first historical path into the 
commencements of Western historicality, a path that has not at all been ventured 
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hitherto’.97 But bleiben also has the sense of being left over, of being superfluous or 
excessive, uncontainable, unassimilable, or of being the only alternative left. What then 
is the status of what is left over? One could equally argue that all that remains, what is 
left over is partial, fragmentary, not whole, the detritus. What we are left with may well 
be that which lasts but it may well be just the husk that is left over. The poets then found 
something outside, beyond the pale. Heidegger does not address this line in the lectures 
on ‘The Ister’ – he says that he will not go into their truth. He merely notes that it occurs 
in the poem ‘Remembrance’ and that remembrance means both the journeying into the 
foreign, that is that which has been, and that which is to come, that is a thinking ahead to 
the place of the homely [Ortschaft des Heimischen] and the founding of its ground [zu 
stiftenden Grundes]. In this he ties ‘Remembrance’ to ‘The Ister’ in its vanishing and its 
intimation. 
 
This thoughtful remembrance, says Heidegger, is a pointing [Hinzeigen] and it is the 
poet who points. In pointing, the poet is a sign, but not some thing-like sign, but a sign 
with a soul and a mind. This pointing is not a mere indication but is a showing: ‘The 
showing [Zeigen] is of such a kind as to first let appear [erscheinen] that which is to be 
shown [Zuzeigende]. Yet such a sign can, in saying, let appear that which is to be said 
only because it has already been shone upon by that which thus appears as what is to be 
poetized. This sign must therefore be struck and blinded in the face of the “fire”. This is 
why it is initially unable to find the word, so it seems as though this showing had lost its 
tongue.’98 Here we are back with the ‘Jezt komme, Feuer!’ of the opening of ‘The Ister’ 
with the poets called into their calling by the coming of the morning sun. But we are also 
in another poem of Hölderlin’s, ‘Mnemosyne’, which Heidegger goes on to quote in his 
lecture on ‘The Ister’. The passage is from the second version of this poem, and it 
appears in neither of the other two versions. The poem opens as follows: 
 
Ein Zeichen sind wir, deutungslos 
 Schmerzlos sind wir und haben fast 
                                                 
97
 Heidegger, Hölderlin’s Hymn “The Ister”, pp.53-54./p.66. 
98
 Ibid. p.151/p.189. 
159 
 
 
 
 Die Sprache in der Fremde verloren.99 
 
This could be translated as follows: ‘We are an unreadable sign, we are beyond pain and 
have almost lost our language in foreign parts.’ For Heidegger, the poets are the sign, it 
is they who have almost lost their language, their tongue, in the foreign. Hölderlin 
himself recognised the danger to his own language that an excursion into the foreign 
could entail. In 1794, he wrote to Christian Ludwig Neuffer about Neuffer’s translation 
of Sallust’s Catiline: ‘Our language is the organ of our minds, our hearts, the sign of our 
imaginings, our ideas; it must obey us. If it has lived too long in foreign service there is, 
I think, the danger that it will never again become quite the free and pure expression of 
our minds, shaped entirely from within, thus and not otherwise, that it should be.’100 But 
his conception of the possibility of this free and pure expression was to change. In his 
letter to Böhlendorff, he writes that the most difficult task is the free use of what is one’s 
own. The instability on the part of the poets from ‘Mnemosyne’ has the same resonance, 
Heidegger says, as the line from a draft of ‘Bread and Wine’, where der Beseeler, that is 
the poet on Heidegger’s interpretation, would almost be scorched [verbrandt] by his 
proximity to the source. For Heidegger it is that ‘almost’ which is crucial in that what 
this passage means is that the poet is not yet capable of reading the sign that he is but 
that, having now returned from the foreign and being underway into the homely, it only 
remains for the poet to seek what is his own and to learn to use it freely. The poets are 
‘at the beginning and are still overwhelmed by the foreign fire, “we,” the poets, are as 
yet unread – we are not yet able to read and to show. We are almost as though consumed 
by fire so that “the pain” has yet to stir. Pain, however, is that knowing proper to being 
distinct, in which the belonging to one another of human beings and gods first attains the 
separation of distance, and thereby the possibility of proximity, and thus the fortune of 
appearing.’101 Heidegger goes on to say that pain belongs to the ability to show and that 
it belongs to the poet as the knowledge of his own essence. Heidegger is claiming that 
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here Hölderlin demonstrates that the poets are not yet ready, but that they will be, that 
they are at the beginning of their journey and that in their return to the homely they will 
ground the homely. This is true, says Heidegger, of all Hölderlin’s river poetry: ‘The 
sign, the demigod, the river, the poet: all these name poetically the one and singular 
ground of the becoming homely of human beings as historical and the founding of the 
ground by the poet. Because, in Hölderlin’s poetizing of the rivers, these relations 
constantly stand in a poetic vision from the outset, they return ever anew in the richest 
poetic variations.’102 
 
But is it just the case that the reason the poet is almost speechless and unread is because 
he is merely at the beginning or is the situation graver? The poet is a sign, assuming that 
Heidegger is correct in equating the poet with the sign, but he is a sign that is 
deutungslos which, while translated as ‘unreadable’ also means ‘uninterpretable’. The 
sign is one that cannot be interpreted and one that remains uninterpretable. In the 
Beißner and Schmidt edition of Hölderlin’s poetry, it is claimed that, like the word 
Schmerzlos, deutungslos is negative in the sense of ‘insensibilis’103 that is it involves the 
loss of the faculty of sensation [Empfindungsvermögen]. In fact, the sign, in its loss of 
Deutung, is now a dead hieroglyph [toten Hieroglyphe], a sign that can no longer be 
interpreted, that comes from a dead language. In effect, the poet is a dead Egyptian. 
They go on to claim that the loss of the Sprache belongs to this atrophy of meaning, of 
readability, of interpretation, a complete loss of relation or reference in the face of an 
alienated world. Is this not a description of Antigone as well? If the poet is an 
unreadable sign, then rather than being at the beginning of his journey, the poet is 
already lost, incapable of understanding but still speaking, still summoned to speak but 
unable to explain that summons nor to communicate what is contained in the summons. 
The poet is a voice crying in the wilderness, a wilderness that is indistinguishable from 
the fertile land. As David Michael Kleinberg-Levin puts it: ‘[T]he poet can say only that, 
though we may have once received a sign, or measure, and become thus ourselves a sign 
embodying the divine measure, we have since that immemorial time lost the language 
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that would connect us to what it signifies.’104 It is as if, he says, that we have been given 
an historical task, one that is unrealisable and doomed to failure. The poet stands at the 
threshold of an aposiopesis, a becoming silent, or on the way to becoming silent. 
Aposiopesis is a rhetorical figure in which speech breaks off abruptly and the sentence is 
never finished. It is an abrupt fall into silence. Antigone herself is this silence. Her last 
word is on line 940 in the Greek text with over 400 lines still left in the drama. Perhaps 
it would be more proper to say that the poet is the aposiopesis, a speech that is always 
about to fall silent, an interminable speech awaiting oblivion. Whatever the poet is 
underway to, it is not a destination that can ever be reached, a destination that is always 
on the way, an incessant wandering, but not the wandering that Heidegger characterises 
as inauthentic adventuring. 
 
Heidegger returns to this passage from ‘Mnemosyne’ almost a decade later in the lecture 
series What is Called Thinking where the identification of the ‘we’ is not so much with 
the poet but mankind in general, ‘the men of today, of a “today” that has lasted since 
long ago and will still last for a long time’105 and is a pointing into what withdraws, a 
pointing into the withdrawal in which the human is first human. Man’s essential nature 
is being this sign. Jacques Derrida, reflecting on this passage from Hölderlin as it 
appears in What is Called Thinking, cites the translation from the French edition: 
 
 Nous sommes un monstre [Zeichen] privé de sens 
 Nous sommes hors douleur 
 Et nous avons perdu 
 Presque la lange à l’étranger.106 
 
Monstre means monster but it also means show, as in montrer, as Derrida reminds us, 
hence the decision to translate Zeichen as monstre. We become both a monster deprived 
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of sense or meaning and a meaningless showing. A monstrous, uninterpretable sign, 
monstrous precisely because it is uninterpretable, because to be such a sign is to 
undermine its very meaning; to be an uninterpretable sign is not to be a sign at all. As 
Derrida puts it: ‘[W]e are a sign – showing, informing, warning, pointing as sign toward, 
but in truth toward nothing, a remote sign, at a distance from the sign, a display that 
deviates from the display or monstration, a monster that shows nothing. Isn’t such a gap 
in the sign’s relation to itself and to its so-called normal function already a monstrosity 
of monstrasity, a monstrosity of monstration?’107  
 
The sign, then, is the monstrous, the monstrous becoming sign, a monstrosity that recalls 
Hölderlin’s translation of the choral ode from Antigone where t o\ dei n o /n is translated as 
Ungeheure, one of whose meanings is monstrous. We should also recall that Ungeheure 
appeared as an eruption in the unheimlich and as the unheimisch. Derrida asks whether 
man is the monster and, as Stanley Cavell says, it is only the human that is capable of 
being monstrous: ‘But only what is human can be inhuman. – Can only the human be 
monstrous? If something is monstrous, and we do not believe that there are monsters, 
then only the human is a candidate for the monstrous.’108 George Steiner points out that 
Ungeheure literally means monstrous, ‘whose uncanniness derives from alien 
enormity’.109 For Steiner, Antigone becomes monstrous in her ‘suicidal commerce with 
the divine…when she assumes the role of an Antitheos’.110 If the poet is the sign, and the 
sign is monstrous, then the poet is monstrous, the poet who is called from out of the 
enigma, the enigmatic sign, the one who speaks out of the enigma. Does this make the 
enigma monstrous? Is the poet as sign, which is impossible to read, uninterpretable not 
because he is not yet ready but because the enigma holds him back? The monstrosity of 
the poet is not that he is a sign that is not yet read and which, in its return to the hearth, 
is merely awaiting its becoming homely, but because the poet is a sign that can never be 
read, that remains entirely within the promise of the enigma that is withdrawn prior to 
the promise having been made. 
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If this is the case, the poet, that is the human, in his monstrosity as unreadable sign, is 
homeless or, more precisely, exists prior to the possibility of home in a form of 
nomadism that holds out the promise of a homecoming, but as the enigma of the 
homecoming is the enigma of the promise that has already been withdrawn prior to the 
promise having been made, then homecoming has always already been withdrawn. On 
Heidegger’s reading, Antigone, as the uncanniest, is exiled from beings but, as a 
consequence, becomes homely in being, becomes homely in being unhomely. But if the 
enigma of the dei n o /n is the enigma of homecoming, then the question arises as to what 
kind of homecoming and home these are. This is not just a question of exile, even of the 
exile described by Andrzej Warminski: ‘[W]e are not at home not because we are exiled 
from Greece but, rather, because we are exiled by Greece from ourselves: the Orient, the 
East, Egypt, and so on. Again: it is not just that we are not at home, but rather that we 
are not at home in relation to not being at home; or, better we are not just exiled…but 
rather exiled from exile…as Blanchot puts it in writing on Kafka.’111 In exile, the 
promise of homecoming always remains, it has not been withdrawn, even if the home 
remains unattainable. In exile, the withdrawal of the promise is not constitutive of that 
exile and attaining the home always remains a realisable possibility. Exile can only exist 
in relation to the home, in relation to a promised or potential homecoming, or, at the 
very least, it relates to a fixed place which admits of the possibility of return. Exile is 
never enigmatic. One has to have somewhere to leave in order to be able to leave it. This 
is because exile is a wandering away, it is always a movement away and one has to 
move away from somewhere and, as such, homecoming, or return, always remains a 
possibility of exile. One can always wander back. To be exiled is to have been thrown 
out or to have experienced the necessity of leaving, or the fact of having left, even if this 
having left now only belongs to a tradition.  
 
The nomad always already stands outside or prior to all relations to the home and to 
homecoming. It is not a question of the nomadic being merely opposed to the home; it is 
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a question of how the nomadic arises out of the n omo/j. In her invocation of the law, 
Antigone leads us to the law itself, the n o mo /j, and points to an essential instability in the 
n omo/j, perhaps even to its enigma. The n omo /j forms part of a semantic network, 
including n oma /j, which means both wandering and roaming in search of pasture, ne/mw, 
which means to distribute and to graze, n o ma 8di ko /j, which means of or for a herdsman’s 
life, the nomadic, pastoral. N e/mei n
 
means to distribute, to apportion, to share out. N o mo /j 
itself names pasture land, an allotted dwelling place, custom and law. The word and its 
cognates indicate an inherent instability, an undecidability between custom and law, 
between dwelling and wandering, between place and placelessness. To be in the n omo /j 
is to be always already dwelling and wandering. In contrast, law and Gesetz, in their 
very terminology, are a setting in place, a laying down. The n omo /j has been masked in 
its appropriation by our language where n omo/j becomes law and therefore prescriptive 
and proscriptive. The journey into the Greek language that brings us such terms as 
agronomy, autonomy and economy covers up the enigmatic meaning of the n omo /j, a 
meaning that still remains to be explored, Derrida claims: ‘[T]he Greek tongue would 
doubtless tell us much about the strange relation between law, wandering, and 
nonidentification with the self, the common root – nemein – of division, naming and 
nomadism.’112  
 
Is the law of becoming homely in being unhomely this unstable no mo/j, which Antigone 
appeals to? Tanja Staehler argues that Antigone is pre-eminently a play about the law in 
that it performs the problematic nature of the human in terms of a tension between 
different types of law. What emerges from this tragedy, she says, is an understanding 
that an entanglement in law is constitutive of the human being and that this law is never 
identical to itself: ‘On the one hand, it is the nature of law that it has to be conceived as 
something unchangeable, like the sacred laws which Antigone invokes to justify her 
actions. On the other hand, laws are either created by humans or at least receive their 
specific formulations from humans, and in that sense, they are open to criticism and 
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modification.’113 Law is both mutable and immutable, and necessary and contingent. She 
says that every law, even the most contingent one, has to exhibit a certain necessity. 
There is an irresolvable tension inherent in law between the divine law, which she 
identifies with the ethical realm, and the law that is created and interpreted by human 
beings, this law being identified with the political and legal realms. It is the mutable 
human law that demands its execution without exceptions; a law that can be changed 
demands strict adherence. Judith Butler, in her reading of Antigone, asks whether the 
law that justifies Antigone’s act is beyond conceptualisation, whether it is ‘an epistemic 
scandal…a law that cannot be translated…a breakage in law performed…by a legality 
that remains uncontained by any and all positive and generalizable law?’.114 It is, she 
says, a law without origin, ‘a law whose trace can take no form, whose authority is not 
directly communicable through written language’.115 
 
Heidegger does not consider the law as no mo /j in either of his discussions of Antigone, 
which is curious considering his examination of the choral ode is meant to illuminate the 
fundamental law of becoming homely as the law of being unhomely. He does, however, 
examine the n o mo /j in the ‘Letter on “Humanism”’: ‘Only so far as the human being, ek-
sisting into the truth of being, belongs to being can there come from being itself the 
assignment [Zuweisung] of those directives [Weisung] that must become law and rule for 
human beings. In Greek, to assign [zuweisen] is n e/mei n. N o mo /j is not only law but more 
originally [ursprünglicher] the assignment contained in the dispensation [Schickung] of 
being. Only this assignment is capable of enjoining humans into being. Only such 
enjoining is capable of supporting and obligating. Otherwise all law remains merely 
something fabricated by human reason. More essential than instituting rules is that 
human beings find the way to their abode [Aufenthalt] in the truth of being.’116 For 
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Heidegger, it is not the creation or fabrication of laws that is important, but that human 
beings find their way into a form of dwelling in the truth of being and this comes about 
through the assignment that no mo/j is. Prior to its becoming law, no mo/j names a more 
original apportioning. One of the meanings of n o mo /j is to be assigned an abode or 
dwelling place, so, in a sense, the assignment here is the abode of human beings in 
being. What Heidegger is saying is that the law is contained, or sheltered, in the sending 
of being and that it is only the assignment that n omo /j is that enables human beings to be 
joined with being. Without n o mo /j there is no joining. But in joining beings to being it 
still has to be determined what this abode is. Heidegger uses the term Aufenthalt, which 
does mean residence or abode, but it also has the sense of a stop, delay or wait, where 
the stop is temporary, a resting place before moving on. In literary terms, the Aufenthalt 
is a sojourn, a staying somewhere temporarily. The abode then is provisional, never 
actually fixed. It is not necessarily a place in which a certain rootedness takes place. 
There seems to be an echo here of the journeying of locality and the locality of 
journeying which is where the enigma of the river is said to abide. In addition, 
Aufenthalt, as the dwelling place [Ort des Wohnens], is specifically equated by 
Heidegger with h}q o j, this being the open realm where human beings live, so that for any 
thinking of the h }q oj we have to bear in mind the meanings that have just been 
delineated for Aufenthalt. In one of its meanings, the n omo /j points towards a relation to 
shepherding, pasture and the pastoral. Just as the shepherd guides his flock in search of 
grazing land, a guidance that gathers into itself a caring for both the flock and the land 
itself, so the Schickung des Seins, translated as the dispensation of being, is a guiding of, 
and caring for, being. In its sending - schicken means to send - being assigns beings to 
being, into the providential care that is the Schickung. In literary terms, Schickung means 
act of providence, where providence can be seen as a form of futural care, of foresight. 
In the ‘Letter on “Humanism”’, Heidegger calls the human being ‘the shepherd of 
being’,117 the one who is called to the preservation of the truth of being and who is 
called to live in its neighbourhood, a neighbourhood in which we still remain wanderers 
on the way [auf dem Weg als Wanderer]. The call to live or to dwell in the nearness of 
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being ‘comes as the throw from which the thrownness of Da-sein derives’.118 In 
Heidegger’s thinking of the n omo/j, is it possible then to discern a sense of the instability 
contained in that word, a sense that in his thinking of home and homecoming, there is 
already a thinking of the unstable no mo/j? 
 
In the reading of the ambiguity of the  no mo/j, the law only becomes law through having 
been established as custom. The law has come into the law but, in its taking up into the 
law, it has masked its impossible origin. What is customary is only law through having 
been established in a past, the experience of which can never be experienced as such, a 
law whose trace has never been traced, the unwritten law, the writing of which would 
have already been erased in the impossibility of its writing. It is only when the n omo /j 
becomes law, when it is institutionalised in rules and regulations, that its writing 
becomes possible. That Greek law is essentially unstable is figured in the nomadic 
wandering of the n omo /j as it shuttles its meanings back and forth between wandering 
and grazing, between custom, tradition and the law, into a nomadism that abides only in 
its wandering, a wandering that does not depart from, nor return to, the welcome of the 
hearth, but perhaps only dwells in its nearness, a wandering that is always on the way, 
but is not just a wandering that marks the path of the adventurer. The poet is the 
enigmatic unheimlich, just like Antigone the eternal wanderer between two deaths. The 
poet is the wanderer who is fissured between place and placelessness, dwelling and 
journeying. Here, then, it seems to me, is the enigma of Antigone, the eruption of the 
enigmatic no mo/j. Antigone, subject to an infinite, irrecusable demand, exposed to the 
an-archic, is estranged from the hearth and the home, abject, an alien resident who has 
even lost her status as this me/t oi ko j. The n omo /j never allows her position to be fixed – 
she is both at home and abroad, caught between custom and law and between wandering 
and remaining.  
 
Is it, then, just a question of affirming the nomadic as distinct from the home? Mark C. 
Taylor, commenting on Derrida’s notion of the trace, compares its ceaseless, errant 
wandering, obviously affirmatively, to the temporary roaming of estranged exiles and, 
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implicitly, to the fixed point that is the home. He says: ‘Never able to identify beginning, 
middle or end, the wanderer is not sure where he comes from, where he is, or where he 
is going. The impossibility of locating an unambiguous center leaves the wanderer 
rootless and homeless; he is forever sans terre.’119 Maurice Blanchot affirms ‘nomadic 
truth’,120 as ‘the exigency of uprooting’, a certain Judaism in contrast to paganism. 
Nomadism, he says, ‘answers to a relation that possession cannot satisfy’121 outside any 
fixed place or certainty in the land. In his thinking towards the nomadic, Blanchot 
invests the pagan with the fixed, where one is planted in the earth in a permanence that 
authorises sojourn, whereas being Jewish is a dispersion, ‘a call to a sojourn without 
place, just as it ruins every fixed relation of force with one individual, one group, or one 
state – it is because dispersion, faced with the exigency of the whole, also clears the way 
for a different exigency and finally forbids the temptation of Unity-Identity’.122 He then 
asks a question which, while not mentioning his name, seems to be aimed at Heidegger, 
at claiming that he is entirely bound up with such a fixed relation, that he falls prey to 
the temptation of unity and identity: ‘Doesn’t this nomadic movement (wherein is 
inscribed the idea of division and separation) affirm itself not as the eternal privation of 
a sojourn, but rather as an authentic manner of residing, of a residence that does not bind 
us to the determination of place or to settling close to a reality forever and already 
founded, sure, and permanent? As though the sedentary state were necessarily the aim of 
every action! As though truth itself were necessarily sedentary!’123 If we return to 
Antigone at this point, this would be to say that rather than naming being, Antigone 
fractures the name. Bruns glosses Blanchot’s meaning to be that truth, in not being 
reducible to being, stands outside the alternatives of being and non-being, ‘that is, 
outside the logical determinations of presence and absence. Hence the resonance of the 
metaphors of exile and traversal…So being Jewish opens onto the order of existence 
without being, the il y a; but notice that in this context [the context of Blanchot’s essay] 
there is no experience of horror – or, more exactly, the horror of existence without being 
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is not part of the Jewish experience of being Jewish (why not joy?). Rather the horror, 
one might say, is what is felt by the Greek’.124 The Greek experience of the nomadic is 
one of horror, according to Bruns. Is this what the tragedy of Antigone tells us, of the 
horror of the nomadic? Is the eruptive force of the n omo/j, which I find expressed in 
Sophocles drama, a force from which the Greek recoils in horror but which has to be 
affirmed rather than negated, if Blanchot is right? Is the enigma of Antigone, then, the 
impossibility of a return home to being? Is it the necessity of a taking up of the 
nomadic? 
 
If it is true that Heidegger does fall for the temptation of unity and identity, it is also true 
that, as we have already seen in the discussion of the n omo /j and its relation to 
Aufenthalt, perhaps there is not such a sure fixing into place in Heidegger as Blanchot 
implies and that the rigid dichotomy between affirmation and horror is not really 
sustainable. Perhaps Froment-Meurice is nearer the mark when he writes: ‘Every 
fundamental position is exposed to being but a wandering, all the more since it wishes it 
were solid and certain of itself and of its “truth”.’125 In affirming the nomadic, it could 
be argued that the welcome of the home or the hearth is transposed into a welcoming 
towards the nomadic. And who are we to propose such a welcome? Does not the 
affirmation of the nomadic fall prey to the very thing that Derrida writes of the 
welcome? That one knows what it is to be a nomad, that one is at home in one’s 
nomadism, that one has always already appropriated it into some form of settlement? It 
could also be argued that in settling on this fixed meaning of the nomadic, one is 
betraying the n o mo /j itself in its enigmatic instability. Perhaps it is the case that the 
position that Heidegger takes in relation to Antigone – that throughout ‘The Ister’ 
lectures it is always a case of becoming homely whilst being unhomely, that is, in the 
midst of this becoming, one is always decentred, deracinated and exposed, Ungeheure, 
that it is always a striving rather than a settlement – could be seen as a form of 
nomadism, that is not a mere aimless wandering but is radically unstable, between home 
and homelessness, wandering in its fixity and fixed in its wandering. 
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Heidegger’s definition of fram, referred to above, points towards a sense of always being 
on the way, but always on the way towards a home that, to a certain extent, does not 
offer any kind of easy recognition, as Gasché points out. In a discussion of Heidegger’s 
characterisation of Hölderlin as the poet of homecoming he contends that: 
‘Consequently, the home of a historical people – the Germans, in this case – is not a 
given: it is no existing geographical or cultural entity, and if, therefore, such a home has 
in principle first to be found and won, the home in which a historical people can come to 
be at home cannot be of a territorial order to begin with.’126 In fact, he argues, 
Heidegger’s insight is that, in mistaking home with a geographical, historical, political, 
empirical locality, human beings miss what is essential here precisely because coming to 
be at home is too demanding and unsettling. William McNeill claims that human 
dwelling is not a fixed state or predicament: ‘Dwelling is itself, rather, a task to be 
undertaken and accomplished, a challenge that has to be undergone ever anew – 
accomplished and brought about in and through the temporality of human 
experience.’127 Fred Dallmayr, in thinking through Heidegger’s relation to Hölderlin, 
writes that the ‘home or homecoming for Heidegger is by no means a native possession 
but only the farthest horizon of the soul’s journey abroad. This journey, one should note, 
transgresses not only the limits of chauvinism but also the borders of a self-enclosed 
humanism or anthropocentrism’.128 He says that Hölderlin’s fatherland – and implicitly 
Heidegger’s too - is not a fixed abode ‘but a peculiar “in-between” place of transit – a 
zone located between self and other, between proximity and distance, and also between 
mortals and immortals’,129 which echoes the thinking of the no mo/j which has been laid 
out here. This unsettling nature of the home could also be seen in the welcoming warmth 
of the fire of the hearth, the fire that nourishes, warms and restores. But the flame of the 
fire is also destructive; it too can never be finally settled, as Heidegger writes in an essay 
on Georg Trakl: ‘[F]lame is the ek-stasis which lightens and calls forth radiance, but 
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which may also go on consuming and reduce all to white ashes.’130 It is, perhaps, a 
question of how near and how far one gets to the fire that determines whether it is 
nourishing or destructive. 
 
It might be that the n omo /j, that is prior to an opposition between home and 
homelessness, can be formulated through a consideration of the es gibt as a non-
locatable, unfixable givenness. A brief itinerary will be elucidated here as a preliminary 
to a more detailed consideration of the es gibt in the next chapter, in relation to 
Heidegger’s writings on Parmenides. In Being and Time, Heidegger writes that ‘only as 
long as Dasein is…‘is there’ [gibt es] Being’.131 He later glosses this in the ‘Letter on 
“Humanism”’ to indicate that what he means here is not that ‘being is’ but that the gibt 
is to be understood as ‘gives’ and that ‘the “it” that here “gives” is being itself. The 
“gives” names the essence of being that is giving, granting its truth. The self-giving into 
the open, along with the open region itself’.132 Es gibt is used because to say ‘being is’ 
would be to say that being is a being and to represent it ‘after the fashion of the familiar 
sorts of beings that act as causes and are actualized as effects’.133 Nor does it mean that 
it is human being through which being is fashioned. Rather, being is conveyed to human 
beings through the clearing [Lichtung] of being. This is the dispensation of being 
[Schickung des Seins] itself. For Heidegger, the essential mystery for all thinking is 
contained in Parmenides’s phrase e1s t i  ga \r ei ]na i, ‘for there is being’, a phrase which, 
he says, is still unthought. Whether and how being is has to remain an open question for 
thinking and es gibt is still only a provisional term for how being is. Further light is shed 
on the es gibt in his essay ‘The Way to Language’ where Ereignis is seen as that which 
makes possible the es gibt: ‘The appropriating event [Ereignis] is not the outcome 
[Ergebnis] (result) of something else, but the giving yield [Er-gebnis] whose giving 
reach [reichendes Geben] alone is what gives us such things as a “there is” [es gibt], a 
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“there is” of which even Being itself stands in need to come into its own as presence.’134 
Being needs [bedürfen] the es gibt in order to come into its own as presence [Anwesen] 
as being there. This would seem to suggest that being is no longer the ‘it’ of the ‘it gives 
being’ and this would appear to be confirmed in ‘Time and Being’, where Heidegger 
speaks of the ‘enigmatic It’ of the es gibt, the It that names a presence of absence [ein 
Anwesen von Abwesen], an It that cannot just be equated with being because that again 
would be to identify being with a being. It would be to say that ‘being is’ but, says 
Heidegger, ‘Being “is” just as little as time “is”’.135 Here he seems to speak of an 
anonymous giving – Heidegger acknowledges the danger of arbitrarily positing an 
indeterminate power as the It - and of the enigma of the It being preserved in its 
anonymity. 
 
Before coming to this, however, I would like to review briefly what this chapter has said 
about the enigma. As dei n o \n, the unheimlich, the uncanny, the enigma is always doubled 
but in its doubling it never settles firmly into the priority of one over the other, that is it 
never fixes itself into a determinate opposition, one part of which can be absolutely 
affirmed against the other. Within this doubling, there is a double movement which both 
goes towards and retreats, a kind of attraction and repulsion. Again, this movement is 
never settled, it never becomes fixed. Within the d ei n o \n, there is also the eruption of 
Ungeheure, the monstrous or the extraordinary, which doesn’t seem to fit the pattern 
established by Heidegger in terms of the meaning of unheimlich. The Ungeheure points 
towards an enigma that both erupts and disrupts and which again seems to indicate an 
inherent instability, an instability that can also be discerned in the manifoldness of the 
uncanny enigma, its pleatedness, its multiple doubledness and entanglement. The 
counterturning doubling that Heidegger discerns in the d ei no \n becomes the enigma 
which is always folded or folding in on itself, a folding in which the outside becomes the 
inside and the inside the outside. In its folding, that which was open becomes closed, 
that which appeared becomes hidden. Which side is which is an issue that can never, 
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finally, be decided. It is simultaneously individuated and interwoven and hidden. This 
hiddenness can also be seen in the enigma as immutable law, the law that Antigone 
invokes as justification for her action, the law that has already been erased before it has 
been written, a law that would have been erased prior to the impossibility of its having 
been written. Perhaps it might be better to say that the law unwrites itself before it has 
been written. The enigma as law becomes a palimpsest, wherein that which has been 
erased is irretrievable. In this, the enigma becomes the n o mo /j, the n omo /j that layers its 
meanings and consequently opens up a space that is between dwelling and wandering, 
proximity and distance, custom and law, and that can never finally settle as each is 
folded back onto the other. It is an in-between space, always in transit. It is a no mo/j that 
abides only in its waiting. Here, the poet becomes the exemplary sign of the enigma, a 
sign that is unreadable, uninterpretable and always falling silent. The sign that can never 
be read is the promise of the enigma that is withdrawn prior to the promise having been 
made. 
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Chapter 4 
 
The enigma of Parmenides 
 
In the beginning being was called presencing and presencing, in its turn, was called 
enduring out of concealment. Thus wrote Martin Heidegger at the end of ‘Logos’, his 
essay on Heraclitus, first given as a lecture in 1951. Being, as Sein or “Sein”, as 
Heidegger writes it, was at first, originally [anfänglich] called “Anwesen” and this 
Anwesen is hervor-währen in die Unverborgenheit. Presencing is the lasting 
presencing, that which endures, interminable in the sense that währen expresses ‘the 
mere passing of time, in the sense of ‘go on’’,1 where the going on does not require a 
stated time. It is, perhaps, a kind of whiling and no doubt we are meant to hear in the 
währen an echo of the truth [Wahrheit] and also a sense of something being looked 
after, of solicitude [wahren]. But if Anwesen is a word from the beginning, whose 
meaning has become hidden, it is a word whose thinking is still to come. The word 
that Heidegger uses to mean presencing, as it is translated, no longer has this 
meaning in ordinary German. As a noun, Anwesen now means estate, which is 
suggestive of a certain type of presence, an imposition rather than a dispossession. 
Michael Inwood says: ‘[I]t is the nominalized infinitive of a now defunct verb, 
anwesen, ‘to be there, in, at or involved in something’.’2  It was a being there that 
was bound up with the environment to which it belonged. There are, however, still 
traces of this meaning through the adjective anwesend, meaning present, in the sense 
of someone being present at a meeting, for example, and the verb form anwesend 
sein, to be present, being present, and in the noun for presence, Anwesenheit. The 
meaning of Anwesen has been erased and a new one overlaid, like a palimpsest. In 
the beginning, it meant presencing and in the retrieval of this meaning Heidegger is 
perhaps pointing to the larger strategy of retrieving Parmenides’s meaning through 
his readings. 
 
But if being was originally called presencing, it was also the enigma. In the same 
essay, Heidegger writes: ‘The enigma [Rätsel] has long been [seit langsam] 
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propounded [zugesagt] to us in the word “Being”. In this matter “Being” remains 
only the provisional [vorläufige] word.’3 For a long time, from time immemorial 
perhaps, the enigma has been said to us in the word being, has been promised – 
zusagen means promise – in this word. Being is the promise of the enigma which has 
been promised as being but being itself only has a provisional status, it is only 
temporary, conditional, it is the word that has run ahead, the forerunner, which 
always falls away. The provisional is something that points towards an other, an 
indication or even just a hint. It is never the thing itself. It is the word that stands in 
for something else before this something else can come forward. The provisional is 
never quite adequate for the task at hand but is a making do for the moment, until it 
is replaced. In fact, the possibility of being replaced is constitutive of the provisional. 
The instability of the word being as the promise of the enigma is announced in this 
provisionality. Thinking changes [verändern] the world, says Heidegger, it makes it 
other, but it ‘changes it in the ever darker depths of an enigma, depths which as they 
grow darker offer promise [Versprechen] of a greater brightness’.4 The enigma is the 
promise of an illumination in the movement towards a greater darkness and the 
enigma as promise is named only in an interim fashion as being, which Heidegger 
cordons off with quotation marks and which he immediately qualifies as presencing. 
Our thinking, says Heidegger, should not run [laufen] blindly after the provisional 
[vorläufige] word that being is. Being is already being withdrawn even as it runs 
forward, even as it tells us of the promise. How are we to think being, to think the 
enigma that is promised in the word being? Thinking is surely a peculiar matter 
[eigene Sache], says Heidegger. How to translate this eigene? Thinking is its own, 
proper matter, its own singular matter? Thinkers themselves have no authority, he 
says. Their words have no knowledge of authors [Autoren], they have no writers 
[Schriftsteller]. Thinking is ‘not picturesque’, bildarm, literally picture-poor, nor is it 
charming. It is ohne Reiz, says Heidegger. That we think we know what thinking is, 
but that we have, in fact, stopped thinking, as far as Heidegger is concerned, is clear 
when he says that once at the beginning of Western thinking with Heraclitus, the 
essence of language was illuminated in the light of being. But this moment was lost 
and rather than standing [stellen] in the storm of being, we prefer to drive these 
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storms away. We want calmness [Ruhe] in the face of the storm, just as we want a 
settled place in the violence of the rivers. But instead of this calm, we do not find real 
peace but only anaesthesia [Betäubung]. It is the numbing of Angst in the face of 
thinking. Betäubung is a numbing or a deadening, it is the killing of pain, anaesthetic 
or narcotic. We use thinking as a narcotic, but for Heidegger it is a way of sobering 
up [Ernüchterung], but it is not merely a stimulant [Reiz]. Thinking is 
disillusionment [Ernüchterung], a dis-illusionment which is the putting away of 
illusions, the movement away from mere appearances, disabling illusion so that 
thinking can begin anew, with a clarity unobscured by narcotics or stimulants. 
Standing in the storm obviously demands this clarity, but the storm itself does not go 
away and it is never anything other than unsettling. There is always this question of a 
settling or settlement that is never settled. Thinking for Heidegger ‘does not mean 
here the course of psychologically represented acts of thought but the historical 
process in which a thinker arises, says his word, and so provides to truth a place 
within a historical humanity’.5 The dark promise of the enigma is the relation of 
thinking and being and this enigma comes to us out of a past thinking that has still to 
be thought. But even though it is still to be thought, the relation of thinking to being 
sets on the way [bewegen] all Western reflection [Besinnung], says Heidegger: ‘It 
remains the durable touchstone for determining to what extent and in what way we 
have been granted both the privilege and the capacity to approach that which 
addresses itself to historical man as to-be-thought.’6 It is the relation named by 
Parmenides in saying being and thinking are the same. 
 
Heidegger approaches the relation of being and thinking in his many reflections on 
Parmenides. I will not cover all of these in this chapter. My itinerary will follow a 
number of key terms. In the essay ‘Moira’, first published in 1954 and based on an 
undelivered portion of the lectures that became What is Called Thinking, Heidegger 
explores the enigmatic relation between being and thinking. His claim is that it is not 
just a vague connection but an essential one, which determines the whole of Western 
thinking and philosophy. Heidegger contends that philosophy has subsumed 
Parmenides’s thought into its own thinking and then declared him a primitive 
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forerunner of that thought, one who has been surpassed. What these philosophers, 
especially Hegel, have done is to apply their own thinking onto Parmenides, rather 
than returning to his word. In his essay ‘Hegel and the Greeks’, Heidegger claims 
that Hegel characterises ancient Greek thought purely in terms of its being a 
primitive stage on the way towards the sovereignty of subjectivity: ‘Hegel sees in the 
sentence of Parmenides a first step towards Descartes, with whose philosophy there 
first begins [beginnt] the determination of being on the basis of the explicitly posited 
subject.’7 Philosophers have failed to let the thought of Parmenides think from out of 
its own time: ‘But this historical kinship of the modern proposition and the ancient 
saying at the same time has its proper foundation in a difference between what is said 
and thought in our times and what was said and thought at that time – a difference 
which could hardly be more decisive.’8 According to Heidegger, the thinkers of 
Western philosophy fail to think the Greek saying as an apprehending that gathers 
[versammelnde Vernehmen], that assigns thinking to being understood as Anwesen. 
The philosophical reception of Parmenides is, in effect, a form of wishful thinking 
which enables those philosophers coming after Parmenides to point to themselves as 
having progressed to a higher level of philosophy. In his essay, ‘Anaximander’s 
Saying’, Heidegger contends that what has come to be called Presocratic is judged 
entirely from the standpoint of Plato and Aristotle. It is they who set the standard for 
reading Parmenides, Anaximander and Heraclitus and have effectively foreclosed on 
Anwesen, which he now aims to recuperate in his own thought. 
 
It is not my purpose to assess Heidegger’s interpretation of Parmenides in relation to 
how he has been interpreted by philosophy. Instead, I will be tracing the thought of 
the enigma in relation to presencing and appearing, as it arises in Heidegger’s 
writings on the Greek thinker. To put Heidegger’s discussion in context, however, I 
will give a brief, and necessarily partial, summary of the Parmenidian corpus, which 
could not hope to reflect the complexity of the debate around his work. Parmenides 
has been accepted as the first ontologist, as Charles Kahn says: ‘Parmenides may 
reasonably be regarded as the founder of ontology and metaphysics at once. For he is 
the first to have articulated the concept of Being or Reality as a distinct topic for 
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philosophic discussion.’9 His thought is contained in a fragmentary poem, which is in 
the form of a narrative of a journey by an unnamed youth to the house of an unnamed 
goddess who speaks to him of the various ways of enquiry. The poem has generally 
been split into three parts: the prologue, or proem; the way of, or to, truth [a0lh/qeia], 
although the goddess never refers to it as such; and the way of seeming [do/ca8]. The 
proem has been preserved in its entirety, with a substantial proportion of the way of 
truth extant. The way of seeming is much more fragmentary. The proem has often 
been regarded as mere scene-setting, an allegory and non-philosophical, although 
this might be a projection from our own time rather than being what Parmenides 
thought. Lisa Atwood Wilkinson argues that ‘distinguishing philosophy from poetry 
in the ancient world is complicated by the fact that even as late as the fourth century 
the distinction between logos and muthos, and the one who speaks each, is not 
consistently maintained in…philosophical writing’.10 Philosophy has concentrated on 
the a0lh/qeia section, from where the fragments Heidegger writes on are drawn. For 
Kahn, the problem that Parmenides raises is the problem of the search for knowledge 
and the choice between the ways that knowledge can be acquired. The poem’s 
argument, say Kirk, Raven and Schofield, is that in any investigation there are two 
logically coherent, and mutually exclusive, possibilities, that the subject of the 
investigation exists, or it does not, and that the second alternative is unintelligible. 
They say that Parmenides berates human beings because ‘they never make the choice 
between the two ways ‘is’ and ‘is not’, but follow both without discrimination’.11 In 
a recent study, John Palmer identifies Parmenides as the first philosopher to have 
distinguished with sufficient rigour the modalities of necessity, impossibility and 
contingency, leading to what Palmer calls ‘the unprecedented question: what must 
what must be be like?’.12 
 
Heidegger’s interpretation of Parmenides in the ‘Moira’ essay concerns two specific 
fragments of the poem where Parmenides says that being and thinking are the same. 
The first is Fragment 3 (F3): 
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to\ ga\r au/to\ noei=n e0sti/n te kai\ ei]nai.  
 
This is translated as: ‘Denn dasselbe ist Denken und Sein [For thinking and Being are 
the same].’13 In a lecture from 1957, subsequently published as Identity and 
Difference, it is translated as ‘Das Selbe nämlich ist Vernehmen (Denken) sowohl als 
auch Sein [For the same perceiving (thinking) as well as being].’14 Fragment 8 (F8) 
has it as: tau0to\n d e1sti noei=n te kai\ ou2neken e1sti no/hma; and the German literally 
translates as thinking and the thought, that IS is, are the same. As Krzysztof Ziarek 
remarks, the key word for Heidegger here is the same, that is to\ au0to/, and what it 
names is ‘the way in which thinking belongs to Being, and in which thinking, in the 
sense of primordial Denken, and Being belong “to each other” prior to any 
representational thinking, reflection, consciousness, or knowledge’.15 This is the 
enigmatic word for Heidegger in this essay, the enigma as a belonging together, 
which arises out of the enigma. This emphasis on to\ au0to/, and its figuration as the 
enigma, does not arise in the lecture that formed part of the What is Called Thinking 
series. However, even here, it is named as the ‘as yet unthought essence of A0lh/qeia, 
inasmuch as this essence unfolds into the twofold of the e0o/n’.16 In Identity and 
Difference, Heidegger writes that this sentence or proposition [Satz] accompanies us 
[Geleit geben] into the belonging together, in which it is the belonging that takes 
precedence over the together, and in which both thinking and being belong to an 
identity [Identität], the essence of which arises from the letting-belong-together that 
is the Ereignis. Identity is the Eigentum of Ereignis, he says, that is identity is the 
property of, or belongs to, Ereignis. There seems, therefore, to be a doubled priority. 
Belonging is prior to the together so that, prior to the together of being and thinking, 
there is a belonging. But this would also suggest that belonging is also prior to 
thinking and being because there is already a belonging into which they arise.  
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What these so called, says Heidegger, propositions of Parmenides mean is precisely 
the question which Heidegger will pursue throughout the ‘Moira’ essay. It is not a 
question, however, which can be answered by metaphysics: ‘[E]very interpretation of 
the Greek saying that moves within the context of modern thinking goes awry from 
the start.’17 It has already been noted how Hegel sees Parmenides as part of the 
history of subjectivity, on Heidegger’s reading. He further claims that there are three 
viewpoints from which philosophy as metaphysics attempts to make the thinking of 
Parmenides accessible and bolster its own self image as having progressed to a 
higher level of philosophy. None of these three, whether it is being as the object of a 
subject, Plato’s nonsensible ideas, or seeing thinking as something at hand among 
other beings, get near to the matter in question for Heidegger. Instead, he calls a 
proper enquiry [eigens nachzufragen] one that is ‘a dialogue in which the ways of 
hearing and points of view of ancient thinking are contemplated according to their 
essential origin [Wesensherkunft], so that the call [Geheiß] under which past, present, 
and future thinking – each in its own way – all stand, might begin to announce 
itself’.18 It is a question of advancing a thinking that is alive to the beginning 
[Anfang]. 
 
In the two Fragments that concern us, Heidegger’s initial claim is that, in using the 
terms e0o/n (F8) and ei]nai (F3), Parmenides is not thinking in terms of beings in 
themselves or being for itself - ei]nai is the infinitive ‘to be’, while e0o/n is ‘being’ – 
‘as though it were incumbent upon the thinker to set the nonsensible essential nature 
of Being apart from, and in opposition to, beings which are sensible. Rather e0o/n, 
being, is thought here in its twofold [Zwiefalt] as Being and beings, and is 
participially expressed – although the grammatical concept has not yet come 
explicitly into the grasp of linguistic science’.19 E0o/n is not to be understood as the 
whole to which thinking, as a being among beings, would then belong. The thought 
of Parmenides as it relates to the twofold of being and beings is, however, fated to 
fall by the wayside despite the fact that thinking from its Greek beginnings has 
always moved [bewegen] in the unfolding [Entfalteten] of the twofold [Zwiefalt], 
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says Heidegger, just as the relation between thinking and being has been the 
forgotten movement behind all of Western philosophy: ‘What takes place at the 
beginning [Beginn] of Western thought is the unobserved decline of the twofold. But 
this decline is not nothing. Indeed it imparts to Greek thinking the character of a 
beginning [Beginn], in that the lighting of the Being of beings, as lighting, is 
concealed. The hiddenness of this decline of the twofold reigns in essentially the 
same way as that into which the twofold itself falls.’20 Not only does the twofold fall 
away – into oblivion, says Heidegger, Vergessenheit - but the fact of this decline is 
also hidden. Parmenides’s thought is, essentially, lost but it is a loss that cannot be 
seen or considered by a philosophical tradition which believes it has already 
surpassed this thought. The enduring reign of the oblivion, into which the twofold 
falls, conceals itself as lh/qh, says Heidegger. The twofold is in concealment to 
which a0lh/qeia belongs with such immediacy that lh/qh withdraws in favour of 
a0lh/qeia, leaving pure disclosure to it, as though concealment was unnecessary for 
disclosure, he continues. In the oblivion of the twofold, therefore, we find a 
disclosure that has abandoned concealment – the lh/qh of a0lh/qeia has been forgotten 
– but in this apparently vain disclosure prevails a darkness in which the unfolding of 
the twofold [die Entfaltung der Zwiefalt] is still as hidden as its decline [Wegfall] for 
beginning thought. Western philosophy thinks that it has disclosed the twofold in its 
thinking of fu/sij, lo/goj and e#n, whereas it has, in fact, yet to think it, says 
Heidegger. Michael Lewis captures this well when he writes: ‘[T]he history of the 
West amounts to the unfolding of this withdrawal [of being] as the eradication of all 
traces of the first time it was forgotten, in Greece, in the glories of the systems of 
Plato and Aristotle, so glorious that they disguise the fact that in them an original 
withdrawal conceals itself, a withdrawal upon which their radiance is premised. It is 
this covering over that is forgotten in the later philosophy that unfolds on the basis of 
this Platonico-Aristotelianism.’21 Western philosophy has forgotten its beginning, 
and forgotten this forgetting, and has erected the architecture of its own thought upon 
this doubled forgetting. The claim is that it is only through a thinking return to the 
beginning thought of Greek thinking that this doubled forgetting can be retrieved and 
the twofold and its unfolding can be thought. 
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What is the beginning and what would constitute its rethinking? Heidegger’s lectures 
on Parmenides from around ten years prior to ‘Moira’ are instructive. Here he 
identifies two beginnings. The first, the Beginn, which is translated as outset, refers 
merely to chronology so that on one level Heraclitus and Parmenides belong together 
at the outset of Western thought because they were contemporaries. On another level, 
Parmenides and Heraclitus are linked, not because they were contemporaries but 
because they belong together [Zusammengehörigkeit] in thinking the true [Wahre] 
and, as such, ‘experience the true in its essence and, in such essential experience, to 
know the truth of what is true’.22 Even though these two Greek thinkers are now 
separated from us by over 2,500 years, their thought has remained resistant to its 
being buried by time, not because it is eternal, but because it is what Heidegger calls 
the genuinely historical [eigentlich Geschichtliche]. Genuine history is not the 
narrative of past events but that which precedes and determines all history. 
Heidegger calls this preceding-determining history the beginning, das Anfängliche, 
which does not lie back in the past but in what is to come. It is precisely [eigens], and 
repeatedly, a gift to an age, he says. In a remarkable inversion, Heidegger claims that 
the beginning comes last, that is the beginning is always still to be thought and it 
appears as veiled [Verhüllung] in its own, singular [eigentümlich] way. The 
beginning, then, is not an event, it is not an occurrence in history, nor is it removed 
from history, but that which precedes history and establishes that history as what it 
is. Western thought is not only chronologically distant from the Beginn, it is also 
distant from the Anfang in its thinking. Thus thinkers such as Heraclitus and 
Parmenides have been left behind in the past, superseded by the progressive march of 
philosophical thinking. Equally, the Anfang, in its Heideggerian sense, has yet to be 
thought – indeed cannot be thought – by Western metaphysical thinking and, as such, 
remains hidden in an immemorial past. The beginning, as Anfängliche, is, therefore 
withdrawn at the outset [Beginn] and, in a way, is promised in the yet to come. The 
Anfang is promised in its withdrawal. Is this the promise of the enigma, that is 
withdrawn prior to the act of promising? Or is it a promise that, as John Sallis writes, 
offers ‘something [that] will advance toward us from out of the future, perhaps 
something transfigured and transfiguring, something renewed and renewing, opening 
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up unheard-of possibilities’?23 Does the promise of the Anfang, as Sallis says of the 
promise of art, hold out the possibility of a transfiguring renewal able to engender 
thought, to adapt Sallis’s words, unprecedented in its effect?  
 
I raise the Anfang here because Heidegger, in all of his reflections on the poem of 
Parmenides, seems to return to this beginning, whether it is through a thinking of the 
to\ au0to/, a0lh/qeia or the e1sti, just as the choral ode of Sophocles was a delineation 
of the human being at the beginning. It is also important that anfängliche, translated 
usually as primordial or original in the texts under discussion, resonates with the 
thinking of the beginning that Heidegger gives it in the Parmenides lectures. This 
thinking is also developed in the Beiträge, but I cannot really do justice to the 
thought of the Anfang as it occurs therein, except to note certain things. Here he 
distinguishes between the first beginning and the other beginning and it is the other 
beginning which corresponds to what he describes as anfängliche in the lectures on 
Parmenides. The first beginning is that of the Greeks, a beginning that still needs to 
be won back, writes Heidegger, and which the other beginning needs to encounter in 
order that the other beginning can be unfolded. In other words, the other beginning is 
a return to, and retrieval of, the first beginning to uncover what was unthought in the 
thought of the ancient Greeks. As John Sallis writes: ‘Thus the other beginning, 
beginning beyond the end of metaphysics, is at the same time a return to the first 
beginning, a return that enters into the first beginning so as to grasp it more 
originarily than in the first beginning, so as to grasp somehow that which, though 
essential to the first beginning, remained – in the first beginning – concealed.’24 In 
effect, Western philosophy begins in the first beginning, but fails to think it by 
abandoning being for beings so that it becomes necessary to return to rethink the 
beginning. This is precisely the move that Heidegger is making in his work on 
Parmenides. In this other beginning, Heidegger sees a move away from ontology and 
metaphysics because the question guiding ontology no longer sets the standard for 
thinking, and thinking no longer starts out from beings.  
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The question to which we return first is how to think the belonging together of being 
and thinking, to think the relationality of the ‘and’. What is it that characterises this 
belonging together, Heidegger asks? But in asking this question we have come too 
late, he says. The answer has already been given prior to our asking of the question. 
What is more, the answer itself is not an answer. The answer that arrives prior to the 
question and that does not give an answer is the word that begins Parmenides’s 
saying. That word is to\ au0to/, das Selbe, the same. The answer does not answer 
because by determining [Bestimmung] two things as the same, the possibility of 
belonging together has already been ruled out, because only things that are different 
can belong together, says Heidegger. In addition, the same has nothing to say about 
from which viewpoint [Hinsicht] and out of which ground [Grund] sameness agrees 
with difference, he says. If belonging together is a characteristic of thinking and 
being then they cannot be the same. Equally, merely calling thinking and being the 
same does not enable us to see how sameness came to be equated with difference. It 
is because of this seeming paradox that Heidegger identifies to\ au0to/ as the 
enigmatic word, which governs these two fragments, and, he says, possibly the 
entirety of Parmenides’s thought. 
 
The same, however, is not the identical [Identische] or identity [Identität], says 
Heidegger. To think in this way, to see identity as ‘the most transparent 
presupposition for the thinkability of whatever is thinkable, then by this opinion we 
become progressively more deaf to the key word, assuming that we have ever heard 
its call’.25 The enigma fades into inaudibility if we equate the same with identity. 
When Heidegger refers to identity here he is thinking of it in terms of how it has 
been thought metaphysically, where identity is a trait [Zug] of being. The sameness 
that Parmenides refers to should not be thought in this way: ‘The Sameness of 
thinking and Being that speaks in Parmenides’ fragment [Satz] stems from further 
back than the kind of identity defined by metaphysics in terms of Being as a 
characteristic of Being.’26 To think to\ au0to/ as identity is to misread this word. If the 
same, das Selbe, marks the relation of being to thinking, so the enigma is this same 
mark, if the to\ au0to/ is the enigmatic word. The same, as the enigma, is the relation 
of being and thinking. What, then, is meant by thinking and what is meant by being? 
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And what is the relation if it is an enigma? Heidegger says that Parmenides more 
clearly says in F8 how the being to which noei=n belongs should be thought. In F3 the 
word for being is ei]nai; in F8 it is e0o/n. It is in e0o/n that Parmenides names the 
twofold, according to Heidegger. He translates e0o/n as das Seiend, a being. Ei]nai is 
the infinitive of ei0mi/, i.e. to be or being. Equally, noei=n, thinking, brings to mind 
noh/ma, he says, that which is to be perceived or thought. Noei=n is pure thought, 
noh/ma the matter of that thought. Heidegger gives his own specific gloss on noh/ma 
as that which has been taken heed of [in die Acht Genommene], by a respectful, 
attentive apprehending [achtenden Vernehmen]. But vernehmen also means to hear - 
vernehmbar means audible or perceptible - and perhaps we are meant to hear this 
resonance here, in line with Heidegger’s contention that we need to listen for a 
saying, if we are to think the enigma. Vernehmen is used, rather than hören, so that 
we can hear the resonance between in die Acht nehmen and vernehmen. Acht is a 
form of caring attention to and, although nehmen means to take, we are clearly not 
meant to see this as the grasping of a subject in the violence of apprehension, 
especially when considering that nehmen can be used in constructions such as to take 
something in hand, take care of, or look after. In the lectures on Parmenides, 
Heidegger writes that, for the Greeks, perception as vernehmen is a kind of original 
consent given to being, what he calls a beginning understanding [anfänglichen 
Einvernehmen]. Noei=n is, therefore, thinking that is a taking-heed-of in a heedful 
hearing and it comes to presence on the basis of the e1sti. E0o/n, being, is named as 
that which is for the sake of thought.  
 
But if Parmenides says e0o/n and ei]nai, an experience of the twofold is still some way 
off, according to Heidegger. While thinking comes to presence because of the 
twofold – although this is still unsaid, says Heidegger – this presencing is on the way 
to the twofold of being and beings. What is clear, though, is that it is only the 
twofold that makes thought necessary: ‘[A] “being in itself,” does not make thinking 
mandatory, nor does “Being for itself” necessitate thought. Neither, taken separately, 
will ever let it be known to what extent “Being” calls for thinking. But because of 
their twofold, because of the e0o/n, thinking comes to presence. The taking-heed of 
Being comes to presence on the way to the twofold. In such a presencing [An-wesen] 
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thinking belongs to Being.’27 The twofold presences in taking-heed-of, that is 
thinking, and allows the twofold to come to presence, with presence understood as 
the enduring-here-before. But in order for this thinking to let the twofold come to 
presence there has to be a prior le/gein, says Heidegger. In-die-Acht-nehmen [noei=n] 
is already gathered [versammeln] to the twofold through a prior le/gein, which 
Heidegger translates as Vorliegenlassen which becomes letting-lie-before in English. 
Vorliegen has the sense of being available, to be already out there. Le/gein therefore 
becomes a letting-be available: ‘Noei=n, whose belonging-together with e0o/n we 
should like to contemplate, is grounded [gründen] in and comes to presence from 
le/gein. In le/gein the letting-lie-before of what is present in its presencing occurs. 
Only as thus lying-before can what is present as such admit the noei=n, the taking 
heed of.’28 Thinking arises because it is the twofold where human beings find 
themselves in thinking and which demands such thinking for itself and which enables 
taking-heed-of to be gathered to the twofold. This gathering happens because of a 
prior le/gein, which establishes a prior availability, in which there is a letting-lie-
before. Availability “availables” itself in order for the gathering of the twofold and 
the taking-heed-of. Le/gein is related to the lo/goj and has a range of meanings 
around saying, speaking, discourse and word and it is as saying or speaking that the 
word is generally translated in F6. Thinking, however, does not come to presence on 
account of e0o/nta (beings in themselves) nor for the sake of ei]nai (being for itself). 
Neither of these is sufficient on its own to let it be known the extent to which being 
demands thinking. It is the twofold of the e0o/n that enables thinking to come to 
presence. Being and taking-heed-of presence up to the twofold, says Heidegger, and 
in such presencing, thinking belongs to being. 
 
Heidegger questions how Parmenides characterises this belonging and implies that it 
is in these Parmenidian words - noei=n pefatisme/non e0n tw= e0o/nti - that this 
belonging occurs. In German this translates as ‘das Denken, das als Ausgesprochenes 
im Seienden ist. [Thinking, which as something uttered is in being]’.29 Aussprechen 
means to pronounce, but it can also mean to grant, as in granting a separation, or to 
give a warning or deliver praise. It is a giving voice to something. Thinking, as 
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something that is given a voice, is in being. Heidegger says that we cannot begin to 
understand this Ausgesprochensein, this having been uttered, without coming to 
terms with what is meant here by Gesprochenes, sprechen and Sprache. Equally, as 
long as we take e0o/n to mean a being then the meaning of being will remain 
undetermined. That is, we have to question the relation of the pefatisme/non to 
noei=n as it has been accepted in the philosophical tradition. Thus the belonging 
together of noei=n and e0o/n is grounded in and presences [wesen] out of le/gein, so that 
it is prior to what is present in its presencing, a primordial availability. Only what is 
present as such in its lying-before [Vorliegendes] can admit the noei=n, the taking-
heed-of. Therefore, le/gein becomes crucial for a thinking that seeks to address the 
belonging together of thinking and being. Because the essence of saying rests in 
le/gein, the noei=n is essentially something said: ‘In the Greek experience, the essence 
of saying rests in le/gein. On that account noei=n is essentially – not peripherally or 
accidentally – something said [Gesagtes].’30 But not every said is a Gesprochenes, 
says Heidegger. There are times when it is a silence and when it has to be a silence. 
The said can appear as the spoken or as silence. The question that Heidegger asks is 
why Parmenides marks noou/menon, that which is thought, and noei=n, thinking, as the 
pefatisme/non. This latter word Heidegger says is correctly translated as 
Gesprochenes, but its meaning can only be obtained by turning to the pefatisme/non 
and working out how this word gets its meaning, he claims. He links it to fa/skein 
and fa/nai. Fa/sko means to say, affirm, assert, sometimes with notions of alleging 
or pretending. It can also mean to promise. Fa/nai is the infinitive of fhmi/ – I say – 
and the aorist infinitive, which indicates a past action without determining whether 
the action was momentary or continuous. Fa/ino means to bring to light, to make 
appear. Heidegger here wants to stress that utterance is not the subject vocalising his 
or her thoughts; it is not a question of phonetics and semantics, which would be 
completely remote from Greek thought. Rather, uttering has its essence in letting 
something appear. In responding with language, it is language which allows the 
bringing into view: ‘Fa/skein implies [liegen]:  “to invoke,” [anrufen] “to name with 
praise,” [rühmend nennen] “to call upon,” [heißen] all of which depend upon the fact 
that the verb has its essence in letting something appear. Fa/sma is the shining of the 
stars and the moon...Fa/sij is the saying; to say means to bring forward into view. 
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Fhmi/, “I say,” has the same [selbe] (though not identical [gleich]) essence as le/gw: 
to bring what is present in its presencing forward into shining appearance, into lying 
before.’31 Just as thinking and being are the same, so are fhmi/, I say, and le/gw, 
letting-lie-before. Fa/sij is the saying, says Heidegger and to say is zum Vorschein 
bringen, which means to bring to light or to appear. These words point towards a 
form of prior opening, the originary promise that allows anything to appear at all.  
 
Parmenides, Heidegger says, wishes [liegen daran] to discuss [erörten] where noei=n 
belongs. That the placing of noei=n is important is signalled by erörten which echoes 
Ort, place or position and orten to locate or fix the position of, and which calls to 
mind the Ortschaft of the rivers. It is a question of orienting ourselves because it is 
only by discovering where noei=n belongs and where it is at home [von Hause] that 
we can experience the proximity of thinking’s belonging with being. Thinking, as 
noei=n, is both a possibility and a demand of the twofold of Anwesen and Anwesende. 
That is, thinking is both able to, and has to, come to light [zum Vorschein kommen] to 
an extent in the twofold. It comes to light to the extent that the unfolding of the 
twofold of presencing and present beings invokes [hervorrufen] le/gein, says 
Heidegger. The unfolding is a calling that calls something out. In this case, le/gein is 
called out by the joint unfolding of Anwesen and Anwesende. The unfolding of the 
twofold invokes, calls upon and gives voice to le/gein, which is made available in the 
unfolding of the twofold ‘and with the released letting-lie of what lies before us 
[entlassen Vorliegen des Vorliegenden], grants [gibt] noei=n something it can take 
heed of [in die Acht nehmen] and thus preserve [verwahren]’.32 The unfolding of the 
twofold is a giving through le/gein, a giving of presencing and present beings so that 
these can be brought into the safe keeping of thought as noei=n. However, according 
to Heidegger, Parmenides is not yet thinking the twofold, as such. But what he does 
say in F8, in Heidegger’s translation, is that thinking cannot be found apart from the 
twofold. Heidegger is translating e0o/ntoj here as the twofold whereas it is usually 
translated as ‘what is’. Only on the basis of what is will noei=n be found, and only as 
that which is uttered. This is because thinking belongs with e0o/n in the gathering that 
e0o/n calls for [geheißen], which thinking itself, resting in le/gein, accomplishes. The 
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gathering that is called for is completed by thinking and in this way thinking 
responds to its belonging to e0o/n as a belonging that e0o/n uses: ‘For noei=n takes up 
[vernimmt], not just anything at random, but only the One designated in Fragment 
VI: e0o/n e1mmenai, whatever is present in its presencing.’33 This taking up, this 
vernehmen, is a hearing, perceiving and understanding thinking. The line is: 
 
Xrh\ to\ le/gein te noei=n t0 e0o/n e1mmenai. e1sti ga\r ei]nai. 
 
Heidegger’s translators point out that e1mmenai is a variant of e1menai, both of which 
are from the verb to be, ei]nai. However, although Heidegger does not mention this, a 
shift in the accent of  e1mmenai gives us a word that means to abide in a place, or to 
dwell. It can be used of things to mean to stand fast, hold good, be fixed. Bearing in 
mind previous discussions around abiding and the Aufenthalt, it is possibly not 
accidental that Heidegger uses this variant throughout his quotations from the 
Parmenidian text, even if he makes nothing of it. The second point, which will be 
discussed later in the chapter, relates to the final three words, e1sti ga\r ei]nai, which 
has been translated as ‘for [it] is there to be’,34 and ‘for it is to be’.35 In the ‘Letter on 
“Humanism”’, Heidegger writes that the primal mystery for all thinking is contained 
in this phrase and that it still remains unthought today. In the Letter, Heidegger 
translates it as ‘Es ist nämlich Sein [for there is being]’.36 
 
The essence of language has to be thought out of the saying, says Heidegger, and this 
saying is both lo/goj – as letting-lie-before or making available – and as fa/sij – 
that is a bringing to appearance. This bringing into view remains difficult because the 
illumination almost immediately vanishes into a Verhüllung, a veiling darkness as it 
is translated. Verhüllung means veiling, masking or disguising, while the root word 
hüllen means to wrap or to shroud. For Heidegger, then, this first illumination of the 
essence of language, that is in Parmenides’s text, is almost immediately covered 
over. It is veiled and the essence of language appears as something else, as what 
Heidegger calls vocalisation [Verlautbarung], a system of signs and significations, 
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and finally as data and information. The essence of language covers itself up, it dons 
a disguise which enables metaphysics to come in and claim the essence of language 
for itself. Rather than language being that which brings things into view, it becomes 
the calculative reasoning tool of metaphysics. But what is veiling? Is it 
interchangeable with masking or disguise? In the first chapter, I wrote about disguise 
and the inability of disguise to appear as disguise because to appear as disguise is to 
disclose the disguise and therefore disguise no longer appears. Is the essence of 
language the enigma of Verhüllung? I will mark this for the moment and will discuss 
disguise later in the chapter. Thinking and being, and the way in which they belong 
together, have been more clearly brought to light, says Heidegger, but this light is 
also a darkness. It is the darkness of the Verhüllung. Thinking and being belong 
together in the Gesprochene, which is both lo/goj and fa/sij and, as such, is both 
prior to a language that is a system of signs and meanings but, because it has been 
covered over, is also still to come. In a sense, the saying is a form of exposure in that 
it lays itself bare in the Vorliegen-lassen and the zum Vorschein bringen, that is it 
offers, it gives itself. In another sense, it is exposure as ex-position, in that it is 
outside the metaphysical economy of positing and position.  
 
Despite the fact that the relation of belonging [Zugehörigkeit] of thinking to being 
has been made clearer, says Heidegger, the enigmatic saying to\ au0to/ can still not be 
heard [hören] in all its enigmatic fullness. This is not a search for a solution to the 
enigma, more a case of seeing the enigma in all its, perhaps, impenetrable 
complexity. To perceive the enigma as enigma, is to hear it in its fullness as it 
permeates the thinking of the proximity of thinking and being, of the and of being 
and thinking. Heidegger writes that the twofold of the e0o/n, that is the presencing of 
what is present, gathers thinking to itself and, in so doing, it perhaps gives a hint of 
what is hidden [verbergen] by the word the same, which is ordinarily empty of 
meaning, he says. Heidegger asks the question whether it is from the unfolding of the 
twofold that the twofold calls thinking onto the way [Weg] of Ihretwegen, that is for 
its own sake, and thus makes necessary the belonging together of thinking and the 
presencing of what is present. He does not answer this question immediately but 
implies that it does by then enquiring into the unfolding itself, in terms of what it is 
and how it happens. He concludes that there is nothing that immediately comes to 
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mind in Parmenides’s saying that leads to a proper enquiry into the unfolding of the 
twofold, ‘or for hearing what is essential to the unfolding in what the enigmatic key 
word [i.e. to\ au0to/] of the saying silently conceals [verschweigt]’.37 The enigma, as 
the same, conceals itself through a silencing, keeping its own counsel. The enigma 
silences the essence of the unfolding but, if we follow Heidegger’s thinking on the 
utterance then this silence is already something said. The enigma says something in 
this silence and this silence is a call from out of the unfolding of the twofold. 
 
In terms of the saying that is said in the twofold, Heidegger links this to fa/sij, 
which is discussed above, as that which prevails [walten] in the twofold. This saying 
is the calling [rufende], demanding [verlangende] bringing into view. Rufen literally 
means to produce a sound, and its most frequent implication is that it conveys a 
message, an order or a summons. Thus the saying is a calling-invoking, a 
demanding-insisting-desiring bringing into appearance. Heidegger claims that what 
Heraclitus calls the lo/goj, Parmenides thinks as fa/sij, and he asks the following – 
rhetorical? – questions: ‘What happens in Fa/sij and in Lo/goj? Could the 
gathering-calling [versammelnd-rufende] saying which reigns in them be that 
bringing which brings forth a shining [Scheinen]? Which gives [gewährt] the lighting 
in whose endurance [Währen] presencing is first illuminated, so that in its light what 
is present appears, thus governing the twofold of both? Could the unfolding of the 
twofold consist in this, that a shining which illuminates itself comes to pass?’38 The 
answer to these questions is a clearly unequivocal ‘yes’ because Heidegger 
immediately goes on to claim that the Greeks experience the basic character of what 
has just been described as disclosure [Entbergen] and that the Greek name for 
disclosure is a0lh/qeia. It is disclosure, he says, that reigns in the unfolding of the 
twofold. 
 
Entbergung, disclosure, is a Heideggerian coinage. Bergen has a range of meanings, 
including to save or rescue, shelter, hold or hide, as well as to get or gather, as in 
gathering the harvest. The prefix Ent- can be either a freeing or an intensification. In 
this instance, it is both a freeing from hiddenness and an intensification of the 
gathering-sheltering-saving. The translation as disclosure cannot hope to encompass 
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all these meanings, nor can it reference the terminology Heidegger uses around 
concealment and unconcealment, that is verbergen, Verbergung, Verborgenheit and 
Unverborgenheit. Heidegger equates Entbergung with a0lh/qeia which, as truth, is 
the unfolding of the twofold. Parmenides was thinking within the unfolding in 
relation to a0lh/qeia, says Heidegger, but he leaves unthought where the essence of 
truth might be grounded. This remains unthought in Greek thought in the same way 
that to\ au0to/ as the enigma is unthought, he says. The unfolding of the twofold as 
the disclosure of the presencing of what is present is that which is silent in the same, 
to\ au0to/. What is given to the thinker to think, however, remains veiled with regard 
to its essential provenance, but this veiling is an affirmation that it is disclosure that 
points towards the to-be-thought and this is named in to\ au0to/, in the enigma of the 
same, a naming that is also a silence. But to think the silent unfolding of the twofold 
in the same is not an advance beyond the thought of Parmenides, says Heidegger, but 
a going back into the Anfang, that which has to be thought more originally, or more 
‘beginningly’ [anfänglicher zu-Denkende].  
 
Heidegger claims that to\ au0to/ is the subject of the sentence in F3. In addition, e0sti/n 
does not just mean is, but in fact means presences [wesen] and endures [währen] and 
that which, moreover, bestows or grants that which endures [gewährend aus dem 
Gewährenden]. As such, the same reigns as the unfolding of the twofold as 
Entbergung. The enigma, therefore, is the unfolding of the twofold as disclosure, as 
a0lh/qeia. To\ e0o/n names the twofold and there is no presencing of what is present 
outside of it, because presencing as such rests upon the twofold and shines or appears 
in its unfolded light. Le/gein and noei=n let what is present in the light of Anwesen be 
available [vor-liegen]. As such, le/gein and noei=n lie [liegen] opposite Anwesen but 
not as objects existing independently. It is not as something present in the whole of 
presencing, in terms of everything that is present, that thinking is to be classified: 
‘Thus thinking does not belong together with Being because it is also something 
present and therefore to be counted in the totality of presencing – which means here 
the whole of what is present.’39 Le/gein and noei=n are not objectively available to a 
subjective positioning. Heidegger says that Parmenides seems to support the 
interpretation that thinking is something objectively present, but that this is to 
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misread the e0o/n as beings rather than as the twofold. He claims that what Parmenides 
says in F8 is that outside the twofold there is nothing else in being. The presencing of 
what is present cannot happen outside it, because presencing rests on [beruhen] the 
twofold and comes out it. Parmenides gives this explanation, says Heidegger, 
because the name noei=n appears to be something other [anders lautend] than ei]nai 
and is therefore opposite and outside of being. However, the name as Wortlaut, and 
as what it has named, indicates that thinking holds itself [aufhalten] alongside and 
outside of e0o/n. 
 
This appearance [Anschein] is not mere semblance [Schein] because it points to the 
way in which le/gein and noei=n relate to presencing. Their joining together [das 
Gefüge] liberates [geben frei] the e0o/n e1mmenai for perception [vernehmen]. The 
conjunction of thinking with saying, as le/gein can be translated, is that which freely 
gives presencing in its appearance to perception. It is that which makes available the 
appearance of the presencing. In doing so, says Heidegger, however, it holds itself 
apart [heraushalten] from e0o/n. Thinking is outside the twofold and yet remains on 
the way [unterwegs bleiben] towards it in terms of both being demanded by it and 
corresponding to it. But this outside is also an inside, and is, therefore, non-
placeable. In the very act of remaining on the way to the twofold, thinking is interior 
to the twofold. Thinking is both exterior, and interior, to the twofold through the 
unterwegs zu, and this twofold ‘is never simply an indifferently represented 
distinction between Being and beings, but rather comes to presence from the 
revealing unfolding [entbergenden Entfaltung]’.40 Unfolding as disclosure, therefore 
as a0lh/qeia, is the granting of light to the presencing wherein that which is present 
can appear. But disclosure is dependent on both the vorliegen-Lassen, on the letting-
be-available, and perception [Vernehmen], if that which is present is to appear and, in 
being so, retains thinking in its belonging to the twofold. Therefore, says Heidegger, 
it is not possible for something to be present outside the twofold. But what is this 
interiority that is also an exteriority, that is only interior to the extent that it is 
underway? It is not possible for something to be present outside the twofold, says 
Heidegger, but thinking is outside the twofold, in einer Hinsicht, in a certain way, 
but by being underway, he also says that thinking is interior to the twofold. Thinking 
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therefore exists in this doubled relationship to the twofold. It crosses from the outside 
to the inside via a remaining underway. Or it remains in the chiasmus that is the 
crossing of exterior to interior, that is it remains impossible to situate, lacking a fixed 
settlement. Thinking is only interior to the twofold as a movement towards it. If 
thinking remains underway, it can never be said to have arrived at its destination. It 
is, then, a sojourn, an Aufenthalt, that is always underway, never finally at rest. 
 
This sense of always being underway is further elaborated in the way that Moira is 
described in what Heidegger calls the supreme sentence [Satz] of Parmenides, in F8:  
 
e0pei\ to/ ge Moi=r0 e0pe0dhsen ou]lon a0ki/nhto/n t0 e1mmenai.  
 
The fact that this sentence occurs in a subordinate clause [Nebensatz] is significant 
for Heidegger. There is a suggestion that the marginality of a ‘casually attached 
[angefügten] dependent clause’41 says something about the way the thought of 
Parmenides has not really been attended to. It is, he says, an imperceptible shining 
and the play of the calling, unfolding and growing light is not properly visible, as if, 
in appearing, it has already withdrawn. The subordinate clause withdraws itself 
behind the main clause and is, therefore, missed. Heidegger gives Kranz’s German 
translation and which in English translations of Parmenides has been given as ‘since 
Fate bound it to be whole and unmoved’42 or, similarly, as ‘since it was just this that 
Fate did shackle to be whole and changeless’.43 Moi=ra is generally translated as fate 
but it means part, portion or apportionment and it is as this, as Zuteilung, that 
Heidegger translates it. Here, claims Heidegger, Parmenides speaks not of beings but 
of presencing and the twofold and it is through Moi=ra, through allocation or 
apportionment, in an act of granting or bestowing, that the twofold is unfolded: 
‘Apportionment is the dispensation [Schickung] of presencing, as the presencing of 
what is present, which is gathered in itself and therefore unfolds of itself.’44 
Apportionment sends out presencing as a form of gift [beschenken] and as provision 
[versehen] and thus unfolds the twofold. Apportionment is gathered into itself and is 
the unfolding sending of presencing of what is present: ‘Moi=ra is the destining 
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[Geschick] of “Being”, in the sense of e0o/n. Moi=ra has dispensed [entbunden] the 
destiny of Being, to/ ge, into the twofold, and thus has bound [gebunden] it to totality 
and immobility [Ruhe], from which and in which the presencing of what is present 
comes to pass [ereignet].’45  
 
In the sending of the twofold, both it and its unfolding remain hidden, says 
Heidegger. All that appears is what is present and only presencing reaches 
[gelangen] shining. It is, however, das Geschick, the sending, which conceals the 
twofold and its unfolding. The sending holds onto the twofold and keeps its 
unfolding completely concealed. The unfolding of the twofold is not made manifest 
nor is it made available as an appearance, it remains beyond Schein and Erscheinen. 
Truth withdraws, it remains veiled [verhüllen]. But if it remains veiled then this 
means that truth is already veiled prior to the Geschick and that it remains in this 
veiling. What does come out into visibility [Sichtbarkeit] is the presencing of what is 
present as appearance [Aussehen] and look [Gesicht]. Both terms refer to perception 
as something seen. Aussehen is used when one judges something by its appearance, 
with the implication that the appearance is hiding something. Heidegger equates 
Aussehen with the Platonic term ei1doj, how something looks, and Gesicht with i0de/a, 
which refers to the visual aspect of a thing. Throughout the ‘Moira’ essay, Heidegger 
has used the term vernehmen, which can mean to hear, for perception. The 
terminology sets up a distinction as to the kind of response that is called for, hearing 
and heeding the call, and seeing where truth metamorphoses into the certainty of 
self-consciousness, where the illumination of reason already presupposes the 
disclosure of the twofold. The enlightenment, with other epochs, such as the 
Augustinian and the medieval, share this presupposition, says Heidegger, and 
therefore never inquire into an a0lh/qeia that is in the destining of the twofold. 
 
This contrast between philosophy and Heideggerian thinking in terms of seeing 
[Sehen], ei0de/nai, for the former, and speaking, hearing and listening, for the latter, is 
made more explicit by Heidegger when he writes of the saying of being, daß Sein 
besagt. Being says, and for the history [Geschichte] of being to be spoken, thinking 
must first consider this saying and what it says, which is the presencing of what is 
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present, that is the twofold, he says. But he does not quite say it in this way. Instead 
he announces it paratactically: Anwesen des Anwesenden: Zwiefalt. They are placed 
side by side rather than being joined by the ‘is’. History is the destining [Geschick] 
of the twofold. History is how being appears. It is ‘never a sequence of events which 
Being traverses for itself. It is certainly not an “object” which might offer new 
possibilities of historical representation, willing to put itself in the place of prior 
observations of the history of metaphysics with the presumption of knowing better 
than they.’46 In the earlier lectures on Parmenides, Heidegger links history with 
sending and destiny: ‘But happening [Geschehen] and history [Geschichte] actually 
mean destiny [Geschick], destining [Schickung], assignment. Genuinely formulated 
in German, we may not speak of history, in the sense of coming to pass, but of 
sending [Geschicht], in the sense of the assignment of Being.’47 In his saying about 
Moira, Parmenides reveals to us, or more precisely to the thinker [Denker], says 
Heidegger, the breadth of vision, the Ausblick – the outlook or looking out for – for 
the way (of thought) that has fatefully [geschicklich] been granted, decided or 
summoned [bescheiden]. But the question that has not yet been fully explained is 
what exactly does the destining [schickend] Moira apportion or share out [verteilen]. 
In order to get the measure [ermessen] of this question, and what Parmenides has to 
say about it, it is necessary to return to the unfolding of the twofold in its prevailing 
as fa/sij, as a saying that brings forward into view, says Heidegger. It is in saying, 
and in what saying can be, that there can be seen both the possibility of a thinking 
that has been called by a0lh/qeia and a thinking that turns away from such a call, or a 
thinking that is, in a certain sense, abandoned by this call. 
 
Heidegger identifies two types of saying. Firstly there is the thoughtful saying [das 
denkende Sagen] that corresponds to [entsprechen] the twofold, which is the le/gein, 
the letting-lie-before, and which only occurs on the thoughtway [Denkweg] of the 
thinker [Denker] who has been called by a0lh/qeia. It is this saying that properly 
attends to presencing as such, to being. This is the saying that prevails as disclosing 
destiny [entbergenden Geschick]. But this is also the saying that has been abandoned 
by Western philosophy. Human beings are claimed [beanspruchen] by beings rather 
than being in correspondence [entsprechen] with being and give themselves up to 
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this abandonment. In the unfolding of the twofold, human beings concern themselves 
with beings, what is present in presencing, and not with being. They give themselves 
up [vergeben] to ordinary perceptions [gewohntermaßen Vernommene] rather than to 
a perception [Vernehmen] of the twofold. This abandonment of the Geschick is the 
second form of saying and it is not a le/gein. It is the ordinary [gewöhnliche] saying 
of human beings, a saying that does not consider presencing and, as such, does not 
think, says Heidegger. It is, instead, the speaking of names [Sagen von Namen], in 
which saying becomes terminology and language becomes representational. Saying 
becomes word signs and, in this emaciation of language, the possibility of attending 
to presencing is lost. The gathering taking-heed-of is shattered, says Heidegger. The 
focus shifts to one in which human beings name things, establishing a terminology 
that limits what can be said or thought. Perception is measured by the usual. The 
thinking of the twofold is replaced by the seeds of a propositional, calculative 
thinking that comes to dominate Western philosophy. It is in the following lines from 
Parmenides (F8) that Heidegger sees the beginning of such a philosophy: 
 
to it all things have been given as names, 
all that mortals have established in their conviction that they are genuine, 
both coming to be [gi/gnesqai/] and perishing [o1llusqai], both being and 
not.48  
 
How does this happen? Why should the Geschick abandon [überlassen] the 
unfolding of the twofold to the ordinary perception of human beings, as Heidegger 
states? The perception of what is present only fleetingly knows presencing, as well as 
non-presencing, but it does not know this latter in the way that thinking does, says 
Heidegger, which knows it as that which is withheld [Vorenthalt] from the twofold. 
Ordinary perception perceives what is present in terms of coming to be [gi/gnesqai] 
and passing away [o1llusqai], says Heidegger, but it ‘never perceives place [Ort] , 
to/poj, as an abode [Ortschaft], as what the twofold offers as a home [Heimat] to the 
presencing of what is present. In the “as well as,” the ordinary opinion of mortals 
merely follows the “here and there” (a/lla/ssein, VIII, 41) of particular “places” 
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[Plätze]’.49 Here we seem to be back in the world of the adventurer, who takes his 
pleasure in a mere travelling around and who fails to see the more fundamental 
notion of place that Heidegger expressed as die Ortschaft der Wanderschaft und 
Wanderschaft der Ortschaft. It is not, it seems to me, a question here of highlighting 
the rootlessness of the metaphysical in favour of a more grounded residing in being. 
Rather, it is a question of identifying the types of journeying, one that is a mere 
wandering, the other that is a sojourning, a tarrying in the proximity of thoughtful 
saying, which, if we recall, remains standing in the storm of being. Ordinary 
perception moves within the gaudiness of the present moment and is caught up by 
the immediacy of the kaleidoscope of lived experience, and takes no heed of the light 
that comes from the twofold. 
 
The disclosure of what is present is not really a disclosure at all, says Heidegger, but 
it still arises through Moira, the sending of the disclosure of the twofold. Saying may 
arise as fa/sij but it also comes forward as name-words [nennenden Wörtern] which 
Heidegger says is the speech of human beings. What is present is given up to human 
beings by Moira and this giving up occurs because the twofold and its unfolding 
remain hidden [verborgen bleiben]. In the midst of disclosure [Entbergen], self-
concealment [Sichverbergen] prevails. Parmenides experienced this thought of self-
concealment in relation to a0lh/qeia but only as something unthought, according to 
Heidegger, and, in doing so, he found himself thinking in the spatiality [Weite] of the 
enigma, which is itself hidden or withheld silently [verschweigen] in the enigmatic 
a0uto/. As such, the enigma is ‘the relation of thinking to Being, as the truth of Being 
in the sense of the disclosure of the twofold, and as withholding [Vorenthalt] from 
the twofold (mh\ e0o/n)’.50 In a sense, to think the enigma is to think towards the abode 
[Aufenthalt] of withholding [Vorenthalt]. In order to examine what is at stake in 
a0lh/qeia, I want to turn to Heidegger’s 1942-43 lectures on Parmenides, where the 
discussion centres on its relation to lh/qh and yeu=doj. Heidegger sees it as a 
fundamental word for Parmenides, one ignored by Hegel he claims, and in the 
lectures he names the goddess from Parmenides’s poem as A0lh/qeia, although this is 
just one of a number of names that have been offered in interpretations of the poem. 
As Wilkinson points out, she has been named as Aphrodite, Persephone, Themis and 
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Night, amongst others, but ‘neither the goddess nor the youth name themselves or are 
so named throughout the entire poem’.51 The importance of a0lh/qeia in terms of the 
enigma are reinforced by Heidegger’s later comments on a0lh/qeia in the essay 
‘Hegel and the Greeks’ where he talks of it not as a crude key that unlocks every 
enigma of thinking, but as the enigma itself. This is, he says, the very matter [Sache] 
of thinking, and as that which has not yet been thought. It is prior to the history of 
philosophy, but this priority is manifested in its being withheld from philosophical 
determinability, but which also demands a thinking that arises from it. If the enigma 
is the authority [Befugnis], as Heidegger says, then the enigma of a0lh/qeia is the 
authority for the matter of thought. 
 
In the lectures, Heidegger translates a0lh/qeia as Unverborgenheit, even though he 
also contends Entbergung might be closer to its essence. Throughout his thinking, 
Heidegger consistently translated the Greek term as Unverborgenheit, from Being 
and Time in 1927 to ‘The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking’ in 1964, for 
example. This translation has been challenged, specifically by Paul Friedländer, to 
whom Heidegger responded on a number of occasions, including in the two essays 
just mentioned.52 The two main charges were firstly that the interpretation as 
Unverborgenheit was unsupported by the evidence and that a0lh/qeia53 meant truth as 
correctness. The second charge relates to Heidegger’s essay, ‘Plato’s Doctrine of 
Truth’, and the untenability of Heidegger’s contention that the transformation of the 
meaning of a0lh/qeia from unconcealment to truth as correctness occurred in Plato’s 
allegory of the cave. The first charge was later withdrawn and Friedländer 
acknowledged that, although the meaning of correctness was there, unconcealment 
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was also evident early on in Greek writing and thinking. Heidegger seemed to accept 
the second charge, although, as Bernasconi has shown, this was not to abandon the 
thought of a0lh/qeia. He argues that when Heidegger writes a0-lh/qeia in ‘The End of 
Philosophy and the Task of Thinking’ this is not to do with etymology but to show 
that lh/qh ‘is the oblivion of being which belongs to metaphysics’.54 The word was 
spoken by Parmenides at the beginning but it is only heard at the end of metaphysics 
with the raising of the question of being: ‘To be sure, it is no longer raised as it was 
once raised at the beginning of metaphysics. It is now only raised as itself 
questionable in its inability to speak to us.’55 When Heidegger returns to the issue in 
the late seminars at Le Thor and Zähringen, it is to claim that the Greeks were 
prevented from thinking a0-lh/qeia, unconcealment, because a0lh/qeia had at first, 
and decisively been understood from out of the lo/goj. When Parmenides names 
a0lh/qeia he is not thinking a0-lh/qeia as such, or speaking about lh/qh, but rather 
‘the presencing of presencing, both in respect of the experience and what it grants’.56 
This is the first word, when metaphysics is not yet, Bernasconi continues, which has 
a kinship with the no-longer metaphysical: ‘[T]his kinship arises because the latter 
listens to what is unsaid in what Parmenides says. Parmenides says aletheia and a-
letheia is heard. It is because metaphysics has passed in between that the word now 
speaks differently and the concealment of Being within metaphysics comes to be 
heard from beyond metaphysics.’57 A thinking that comes after metaphysics, that 
hears a0-lh/qeia in the a0lh/qeia, is returning to the Parmenidian word to rehear it 
anew.     
 
The question of unconcealedness remains central to Heidegger’s thought, therefore, 
and in Parmenides the enquiry is directed towards Verborgenheit, concealedness. It 
is a thinking towards the lh/qh, which remains undetermined, Heidegger says, not 
only for us but also for the Greeks, who only genuinely experience and say 
unconcealedness. Concealedness, he continues, is known in multiple ways as veiling 
[Verhüllung], as masking [Verschleierung] and as covering [Verdeckung]. 
Verhüllung is usually translated as veiling; hüllen means to wrap and in constructions 
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such as in Dunkel gehüllt, which means shrouded in darkness, and in Schweigen 
hüllen, meaning to remain silent, there is the sense of being cloaked or shrouded. 
Schleier can also mean veil, as in den Schleier nehmen, to take the veil, as well as 
mist or haze. Decken means to cover while verdecken means to hide or conceal, to 
block a view or cover something up. There are, therefore, various layers of covering 
or hiding, layers which can mask to a certain extent, which can cover entirely, while 
still being open about that covering. The veil, for example, can be seen, even if that 
which is veiled cannot. Alternatively, the veil provides only a misted or frosted 
covering so that what is beneath the veil can be seen in a partial way. Access, while 
not totally denied, is not totally forthcoming either. A mask is different to the veil in 
that the mask cannot be seen through, but the mask itself appears as a mask and that 
which it covers appears as something covered, even if it remains behind the mask. A 
covering may not be a concealment at all, or a concealment that is not intended to 
conceal. When a bed is covered with a duvet, it is not to disguise it. 
 
These three terms, Verhüllung, Verschleierung and Verdeckung, are the main ways in 
which Heidegger conveys the meaning of Verborgenheit. Concealedness denotes an 
inaccessibility, something that cannot be reached or attained. There is a sense of 
reserve, both a keeping back and a setting aside, and a sense of restraint, of reticence 
or silence. With unconcealedness we also get the notion that in the Greek experience 
of what is meant by truth there is a suspension [Aufhebung] or cancellation of 
concealedness. The un- prefix, corresponding to the Greek a 0-, is a privative and this 
gives rise to two possibilities: ‘“Un-concealedness” can mean concealedness is taken 
away, cancelled, evicted, or banned…“Un-concealedness” can also mean 
concealedness is not allowed at all, that, although possible and a constant menace, it 
does not exist and may not arise. From this multiplicity of meanings of the prefix 
“un” it is easy to see that…un-concealedness is difficult to determine.’58 In this 
indeterminacy, however, something significant arises and that is that in truth as 
unconcealedness there is a conflict [Streit] between concealedness and 
unconcealedness. Truth is only ever available through strife, says Heidegger, 
unconcealedness having to be wrested from concealment.  
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To understand what is happening in this strife, it is necessary to look at the fact that 
falsity, to\ yeu=doj, is a form of concealment, says Heidegger. This is because it 
appears as one of the opposites to truth in Greek thinking and to get to concealedness 
from unconcealedness it is not possible to cross out the a0- of a0lh/qeia to get to 
lh/qej. This is because the Greeks do not use this word for the opposite of truth, says 
Heidegger, using to\ yeu=doj instead. This leads us to the enigma at the heart of the 
Greek essence of truth. To\ yeu=doj has its own privative opposition, a0yeu=de/j - the 
unfalse - which leads to the following claim: ‘If for the Greeks the counter-essence to 
unconcealedness is falsity and accordingly truth is unfalsity, then concealedness must 
be determined on the basis of falsity. If, in addition to this, concealedness permeates 
the essence of unconcealedness, then the enigma arises that in the Greek sense the 
essence of truth receives its character from the essence of falsity.’59 A0lh/qeia is the 
experience of this enigma, says Heidegger, that concealedness and the conflict with it 
are decisive for this essence. A0lh/qeia, as the positive, springs from the negative. The 
enigma is identified with the negative and with concealedness and the conflict that is 
involved with it. Because the Greek essence of truth stems from the negative, says 
Heidegger, then there should be an appropriate counterword to unconcealedness. 
Because yeu=doj has a privative formed using the same stem, Heidegger’s argument 
is that a0lh/qeia as the privative must have its non-privative counterpart, that is lh/qh, 
but this appears not to be the case. 
 
This lack is only apparent, however, because the too easy translation of the word 
lanqa/nomai60 as vergessen, forgetting, has covered over the counterword, says 
Heidegger. To get to the counterword of a0lhqe/j, it is necessary, he says, to 
understand the extent to which being concealed [Verborgensein] is an essential 
aspect of the appearance of beings [Erscheinen des Seienden]. Using some passages 
from The Odyssey and The Iliad, Heidegger makes the point that concealing is not 
the action of a subject but a basic feature of the presence of human beings among 
other human beings. Being concealed and being unconcealed are not characteristics 
that the subject brings to bear on a being, but are characteristics of the being itself. 
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Concealing and concealedness are decisive for the Greeks in terms of beings and 
human comportment towards beings. What lanqa/nomai says is that ‘I am concealed 
from myself in relation to something which would otherwise be unconcealed to me. 
This is thereby, for its part, concealed, just as I am in my relation to it’.61 This says 
that I am not aware of something that is happening around me and I am not aware of 
this lack of awareness. Not only is something being concealed but this being 
concealed is also concealed. In one of the Homeric examples Heidegger quotes, 
Hector does not see Athena giving Achilles his lance back. The fact of the giving 
back is concealed from Hector and Hector remains oblivious of this fact. In his 
relation to the concealment by Athena, Hector falls into concealment with regard to 
that relation. In another, Odysseus covers his head to hide his tears, but what the 
Greeks say is that he was concealed to the others as the one crying. What these 
examples show for Heidegger is that there is a concealment around the characters in 
Homer’s epic poems and that the Greeks experienced forgetting as a happening of 
concealment. Michael Naas makes the point that, when words such as a0lh/qeia and 
yeu=doj and their cognates appear in Homer, it is always in relation to narratives of 
revealing and concealing. What this means is that truth and falsity always stand in a 
relation to disclosure and withdrawal: ‘[T]he event of concealment or unconcealment 
is almost always revealed as a concealment or unconcealment and the narrative 
revolves around this difference.’62 It is a case of the staging of the tension between 
concealment and unconcealment, where two different stories are competing in the 
narrative for the attention and trust of human beings: ‘[W]hat is significant is not 
only that one thing is revealed rather than another but that this revelation, this tension 
between concealment and unconcealment, is revealed and staged.’63  
 
What the Homeric examples show for Heidegger is that, for the Greeks, the essence 
of concealment prevails essentially in terms of their standing in the midst of beings 
and that from this we can have a better intimation [ahnen] that they experience and 
think truth in the sense of unconcealedness. It follows, he says, that το yeu=doj can 
also be determined on the basis of concealment because it is the most common 
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opposition to truth, even though it is not related to laq. Therefore, to\ yeu=doj still 
has something to say about the essence of concealment, even if falsity does not cover 
it. Through a consideration of the yeu=doj in pseudonym, Heidegger contends that 
yeu=doj represents a covering [verdecken] which also unveils [enthüllen] something 
recondite [Hintergründiges] in a recondite way, so that what is unveiled remains in 
the background. It is an unveiling that unveils the hidden as hidden but this unveiling 
still lets the unveiled come forward as it truly is, such as the difference between a 
false name and a pseudonym, he says. A pseudonym says something essential while 
a false name covers up, making plain only that which is façade-like and unrecondite 
[Vordergründiges]. It is a question of background or foreground, that which is 
cryptic is revealed as such and that which is merely appearance is also revealed as 
such: ‘Yeu=doj pertains to the essential realm of covering [Verdecken], hence it is a 
kind of concealing [Verbergen]. The covering involved in yeu=doj, however, is 
always at the same moment an unveiling [enthüllen], a showing, and a bringing into 
appearance.’64  
 
To further clarify how yeu=doj relates to concealing and unconcealing, Heidegger 
again reverts to Homer. In a passage from The Iliad, the question arises as to whether 
some signs or portents sent by Zeus are intended to deceive. Fixing on the Greek 
term, u9po/sxesij, Heidegger contends that this ‘means a holding out and holding 
forth, a showing which holds forth and at the same time holds something back, and 
hence does not show. It belongs to the essence of the sh=ma, the sign, that it itself 
shines (shows itself) and in this appearing also indicates something else: the sign, in 
appearing itself, lets something else appear’.65 This showing, which is at the same 
time a not showing [nicht zeigen], is a kind of veiling [verhüllen]. Something appears 
in the sign, says Heidegger, something unconcealed but simultaneously the sign also 
conceals, while appearing as sign, in that it indicates [anzeigen] and points out 
[hinweisen] but never openly displays what it refers to. A sign is a concealing that 
shows, in Zeus’s case, a Verstellen: ‘The guiding basic meaning [Grundbedeutung] 
of Yeu=doj resides [liegen] in dissembling (obstructing or disguising).’66 It is the 
translators who provide the additional gloss in brackets on the meaning of Verstellen, 
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which means to disguise, block or obstruct, or to move out of position, to act or play 
a part or to hide one’s real feelings, like Iago in his relation to Othello, or Hamlet’s 
‘antic disposition’. It can also mean to move or adjust, to shift out of position, 
misplace, or put in the wrong place, a dis-positioning. The question of place, of what 
is the appropriate or proper place, is one that looms large in Verstellen, especially as 
the root word stellen means to put or to place and Stelle means place. What it is not is 
the self-disguise [Sichverstellen] of a person, says Heidegger, it is not the deceptive 
character of an individual, a comportment of the subject. It is, instead, an objective 
happening [Geschehen] that occurs [ereignen] in the realm of beings. There seem to 
be a number of levels to verstellen, from an object obstructing the view of a 
landscape, to hiding a door in the wall by putting a cupboard in front of it, to the 
extent that the cupboard disguises the door and distorts [entstellen] the actual state of 
the wall. The cupboard presents as a cupboard and conceals the door behind it and so 
is said to pretend that there is no door there at all. Where the cupboard is placed 
[stellen] leads to the disguising [verstellen] of that which is concealed by it. Disguise 
is a question of place and displacement. 
 
Having said that, however, the question remains as to how disguise can appear, in 
what place and from what place? If the disguise remains in disguise then surely the 
disguise cannot appear at all. As discussed in the first chapter, disguise only appears 
if it fails and it can only fail if it is seen through. Without the failure of disguise, 
disguise cannot appear and, having failed, it has not then appeared. The door 
disguised by the cupboard can only appear if the cupboard is moved but if the 
cupboard is moved then there is no longer disguise. If the disguise does not fail, that 
is if the cupboard remains in place, then neither the door appears nor does disguise 
because the cupboard appears to be the actual wall. Heidegger says that disguise 
[Verstellung] lets something, which it has both set up [hinstellen] and set out 
[aufstellen], appear as something other than it is in truth. Disguise itself – and what 
would disguise itself be? – lets something appear as other, as other than itself, an 
other that is not itself. In disguise, the other is a masquerade, but it is a masquerade 
that does not appear as a masquerade. The masquerade is a disguise that puts itself in 
the place of something else so that the something else no longer appears as such. It 
appears as the masquerade but without the masquerade itself being an appearance. 
Disguise is impenetrable and unapproachable. At the very moment the disguise is 
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ripped off, disguise itself has already fled the scene because disguise has been 
destroyed. The cupboard is bare. Disguise can only appear as that which it is not and 
once the disguise is revealed it no longer is. While it is true that disguise can let other 
things appear and is therefore a form of disclosure, disguise itself cannot appear 
because to appear as disguise would have already overthrown that disguise. It is 
always something other than it is and to reveal disguise is not to reveal it, because 
what is revealed is that which was in disguise, not the disguise itself. Disguise is 
never a phenomenon. In the structure of concealment – disguise gets its essence from 
concealment – disguise is that which can unveil and let appear but which itself 
always remains beyond this movement of concealing and unconcealing. Disguise is a 
placing that cannot be placed.  
 
The other mode of concealment for Greek thinking, which ranks above yeu=doj in 
priority, says Heidegger, is lanqa/nein. This priority is expressed and understood in 
Greek thought through the phrase lanqa/nw h#xwn, which Heidegger translates as 
ich bleibe im Verborgenen als der Kommende, ‘I remain (I am) in hiddenness as the 
coming (one)’. I am left behind, I stay in hiddenness, I am reserved, held back or 
withdrawn even in my approach. It is not a question, as it is with Verstellen, of 
covering over something and thereby hiding it, as well as covering over the covering 
over, but rather a question of keeping something back. Because this Greek phrase 
determines the appearance of beings in terms of both concealedness and 
unconcealedness, Heidegger claims that disclosure and concealment are a basic 
feature of being. The essence of the prevailing of concealment is expressed, says 
Heidegger, in the word lanqa/nesqai or e0pilanqa/nesqai, whose usual translation as 
Vergessen, forgetting, misconstrues the Greek essence, as discussed briefly above in 
relation to Hector and Odysseus: ‘The forgotten is, in the experience of the Greeks, 
what has sunk away into concealedness, specifically in such a fashion that the 
sinking away, i.e., the concealing, remains concealed to the very one who has 
forgotten…the forgetter is concealed to himself in relation to what is happening here 
to that which we then call, on account of this happening, the forgotten.’67 The thing 
that is forgotten is lost, but equally the relation to this thing is lost so that the fact of 
the forgotten is also forgotten. Rather than using Vergessen, which he believes 
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pertains to the subject, Heidegger uses Vergessenheit, oblivion, or the obsolete word 
Vergessung, translated as obliviation, which Heidegger glosses as the event 
[Ereignis] of oblivion. Obliviation seems to be a combination of oblivion and 
obviate, and suggests a doing away or falling away into the forgotten, and this sense 
of falling away accords with Heidegger’s gloss on Vergessung as a falling into 
oblivion [etwas gerät in die Vergessenheit] where geraten has the sense of being 
accidental rather than intentional. Obliviation, says Heidegger, the event of oblivion, 
is the concealedness that belongs to a singular [eigentümlich] concealment. In this, it 
is the first approach to lh/qh: ‘Lh/qh, obliviation [Vergessung], is a concealment that 
withdraws what is essential and alienates man from himself, i.e., from the possibility 
of dwelling [wohnen] within his own essence.’68 Human beings are in the position of 
being unaware they are no longer in their essence and unaware of this lack of 
awareness: ‘This falling away is a kind of being-away and being-absent. What falls 
away no longer returns to what is present, and yet this “away” [“Weg”] turns, in its 
turning away, against what is present, and specifically in the uncanny [unheimlichen] 
fashion that it takes no notice of it.’69 Obliviation is an absence that absents itself, 
that reserves the absence and any relation to this absence. It ‘is the concealment that 
lets the past, present, and the future fall into the path [Weg] of a self-absenting 
absence. And with that it sets man himself away into concealedness in relation to this 
withdrawal, precisely in such a manner that this concealment for its part does not, on 
the whole, appear’.70  
 
The withdrawal withdraws but conceals this withdrawal so that any relation to the 
withdrawing is withheld. lh/qh is the concealment that conceals its concealment and 
although nothing is allowed to emerge in it, it still, says Heidegger, is the preparation 
for the essential grounding of disclosure and as such prevails in unconcealedness. In 
The Iliad, the unconcealedness of a battle is, he claims, founded unambiguously on a 
memne/wto, which is mistranslated, says Heidegger, as not forgetting. In Greek, it has 
the sense of remember, remind, or recall. For Heidegger, it is the counter-essence to 
e0pilanqa/nesqai, which is determined by lh/qh, and in the original understanding of 
mimnh/sxein, remembrance, there is the sense of keeping, or holding, of the 
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unconcealed. This is not to say that holding is merely noticing but that it is a ‘letting 
oneself be held by unconcealedness, dwelling [Aufenthalt] in it as that which secures 
[verwahrt] the unconcealed against the withdrawal of concealment’.71 It is a kind of 
hanging on to unconcealment in spite of the prevailing of concealment. This 
Aufenthalt, which is never a simple settlement, is the transition from lh/qh, from the 
Aufenthalt that is lh/qh, to another: ‘Lh/qh is pedi/on, field, region, the essence of the 
place [Ortes] and sojourn [Aufenthaltes] from which there is a sudden transition to a 
place and a sojourn that, as the unconcealedness of beings, envelops the mortal 
course of man.’72 In a way equivalent to the falling away of lh/qh, a0lh/qeia as 
unconcealedness is a keeping, holding and retaining. But it is also a saving: ‘The 
unconcealed is originarily [anfänglich] what is saved from withdrawing concealment 
and hence is secured in dis-closure and as such is uneluded [Unentgangene].’73 It is 
not as if a veil had simply been removed, rather the unconcealed is the 
Unabwesende, the unabsent, where the prevailing of concealment has been 
withdrawn. It is pure self-appearance and is an entrance [Eingangene] into the look 
where the emerged and the unconcealed are saved and secured [geborgen] by it. 
Therefore, it is from lh/qh, as withdrawing concealment, that disclosure gets its 
initial impetus. Disclosure is not just an unveiling, it is not purely oppositional, it is 
not the mere removal [Wegnahme] or disposal [Beseitigung] of concealment, says 
Heidegger. It must be thought of in the same way as something like Entzünden, 
discharge, which involves a form of release in which the Ent- triggers the Zündung, 
that is it triggers the ignition that sets off the charge to create the discharge. 
Similarly, with Ent-falten, display, unfold or open, it is a case of a folding [falten] 
that initially lets the manifoldness [Mannigfaltigen] come out in its many facets 
[Vielfalt]. 
 
With this release, there is also an intensification. Thus with Entbergung what we see 
is an intensification of Bergung, here understood in terms of sheltering, gathering 
and saving. The translation gives us Entbergen as both disclosure and enclosure to 
emphasise the sense of protecting, sheltering and gathering in safety. An enclosure is 
a way of keeping safe and bringing into care. It is to protect the unconcealed in 
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unconcealedness: ‘The word “dis-closure” is essentially and advisedly ambiguous in 
that it expresses a two-fold [Zwiefache] with an intrinsic unity: on the one hand, as 
disclosure it is the removal [Aufheben] of concealment and precisely a removal first 
of the withdrawing concealment (lh/qh) and then also of distortion [verstellenden] 
and displacement [entstellenden] (yeu=doj); on the other hand, however, as 
disclosure it is a sheltering en-closure, i.e., an assuming and preserving in 
unconcealedness.’74 The full essence of disclosure therefore is the unveiling, 
sheltering enclosure of the unveiled in unconcealedness. Even so, disclosure itself is 
of a concealed essence and this can be seen through the prevailing of lh/qh which, in 
withdrawing into absence, points to a falling away and a falling out [Weg- und 
Hinausfall], but does not grant access to it. Lh/qh is the self-concealed concealing 
and, as such, falls away. In this movement of lh/qh and a0lh/qeia, we return to the 
Streit, the conflict, from which a0lh/qeia is unified in its essence. A0lh/qeia is against 
concealing closure, says Heidegger, and is for sheltering enclosure. The for can only 
be on the basis of an against and, as such, it is only on the basis of lh/qh that a0lh/qeia 
can determine itself and come to presence in the unconcealed. In the midst of truth as 
presencing lies absenting as obliviation. 
 
But if disclosure is a more essential way of thinking unconcealedness then it is the 
open [Offene] which prevails in unconcealedness, says Heidegger. The open, he says, 
is not conceptualised in Greek thinking or experience but is hinted at. Taking his cue 
from Sophocles’s play, Ajax, Heidegger quotes lines 646-647, which appear in the 
English translation of the lectures as: ‘The broad, incalculable sweep of time lets 
emerge everything that is not open [Unoffenbares] as well as concealing [verbirgt] 
(again) in itself what has appeared.’75 This enables Heidegger to think of time, the 
xro/noj, as the Greeks thought it, not as a series of now-points but as something in 
which every being has its time, a time that can be appropriate [geeignete] or 
inappropriate [ungeeignete]. Time is the place [Stelle], the locale [Ort] ‘to which an 
appearance in its appearing belongs temporally at any “time” [je-“weils”]’.76 Je-
weils indicates that, for Heidegger, time is a kind of whiling, of tarrying, a kind of 
staying that is not permanently fixed – weilen means to stay or tarry, but it can also 
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mean to be, so that tarrying or staying is being. In ‘Time and Being’, Heidegger 
again writes that in naming time, we say ‘every thing has its time. This means: 
everything which actually is, every being comes and goes at the right time and 
remains for a time during the time allotted to it’.77 The distinction made here between 
time as a series of now-points and time as a kind of tarrying-staying-abiding recalls 
the distinction in Being and Time between the ordinary concept of time and originary 
temporality, whose contrast formed the basis of Derrida’s critique in ‘Ousia and 
Gramme’. Here, though, Heidegger understands time in its Greek manifestation as 
corresponding to place, to/poj, which is to understand it as a somewhere to which 
something belongs. To/poj orders the belongingness of the presencing of a being in 
the same way that xro/noj orders the whiling of the appearing and disappearing to a 
then and a when: ‘For primordial [anfänglich] Greek thinking, on the contrary, time, 
always as dispensing and dispensed time, takes man and all beings essentially into its 
ordering and in every case orders the appearance and disappearance of beings. Time 
discloses and conceals.’78 
 
While Sophocles does not use the term a0lh/qeia, and nor does he say that time lets 
the concealed come forth in terms of fu/sij, he does use the term a1dhla, says 
Heidegger, which he translates as Unoffenbare, the un-open – dh=lon means to make 
manifest, disclose or show. His argument is that because the concealed corresponds 
to the unconcealed, the unopen must correspond to the open so what Sophocles is 
saying is that time allows the unconcealed to come out of the concealed into the 
open, into appearance. Effectively, Heidegger grants a kind of lapidary status to these 
words of Sophocles, giving them the standing of a Spruch, a saying or aphorism, the 
same term he uses to describe Parmenides’s saying discussed earlier in this chapter. 
It is as if it is a kind of writ, perhaps not quite holy, that authorises the meaning that 
Heidegger wishes to draw out of it. Whether Sophocles can bear the weight is not the 
issue at stake here. What is, is the question of the open and what openness is. What 
these are is a question that the Greeks remain silent on, says Heidegger, but this is 
not to say that they are unanswerable questions. Disclosure, as a letting-appear in the 
open, he says, can only come about through a prior giving of the open which, 
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therefore, opens itself and is in essence open and, as such, it is the free. The still 
veiled essence of the open is freedom, he says. This is not the freedom of the will, of 
an autonomous subject, however: ‘The free is the guarantee, the sheltering place 
[Stätte], for the Being of beings. The open, as the free, shelters and salvages 
Being.’79 
 
For Heidegger, a0lh/qeia refers to the essence of the open and openness and, although 
the Greeks did not explicitly think the open as a0lh/qeia, it was a constant experience 
for them in one aspect, that of light as brightness, which enables the possibility of the 
look, which can give us either the encountering look or the grasping look. This is not 
simply to say that the Greeks were visual people, says Heidegger. Sight is not the 
result of having eyes. It is because we see that we have eyes, he claims. Without the 
ability, the faculty, of seeing then any light would be superfluous. There has to be an 
already established relation of the human being to visible beings: ‘If man did not 
already have Being in view, then he could not even think the nothing, let alone 
experience beings…But what else is this relation of Being to the essence of man than 
the clearing [Lichtung] and the open which has lighted [gelichtet] itself for the 
unconcealed? If such clearing did not come into play as the open of Being itself, then 
a human eye could never become and be what it is, namely the way man looks at the 
demeanor of the encountering being, the demeanor as a look in which the being is 
revealed.’80 The looking of human beings is a response to being in the light, not a 
way of representing that light to themselves. Michel Haar writes: ‘Man finds himself 
carried to Vernehmen, to apprehending, by this “look” proceeding from being that is 
none other than its very lighting, the Lichtung without which we could not see.’81 By 
looking, human beings open up a way to that which is unconcealed. It is because 
a0lh/qeia, as the open, is the essence of truth and being that the Greeks could use the 
eye as paradigmatic of the relation of human beings to beings. The Greeks could only 
be visual because the relation of their humanity to being is determined by a0lh/qeia. 
Rather than the grasping, mastering look of representation, the Greeks respond to the 
open through the encountering look. As Derrida writes, in ‘Envoi’, ‘for the Greeks, 
according to Heidegger, the world is not essentially Bild, an available image, a 
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spectacular form offered to the gaze or perception of a subject’.82 However, he goes 
on, it was necessary for this world of representation to have already declared itself 
among the Greeks, essentially as Platonism: ‘The determination of the being of what 
is as eidos is not yet its determination as Bild, but the eidos (aspect, look, visible 
figure) would be the distant condition, the presupposition, the secret mediation that 
would one day permit the world to become representation.’83 
 
Heidegger describes this movement in the lectures on Parmenides in terms of the 
look. In Greek, he says, the look [Anblick], that is a looking at or on, is qe/a, the look 
of being as it looks into beings. On the other hand, the grasping look [erfassende 
Blick] has the sense of seeing [Sehen]. This is o9ra/w, says Heidegger. In effect, it is a 
kind of registering of placeness. To see the encountering look is an amalgamation of 
these two terms into what becomes qewri/a, so that what is meant by the word theory 
is the perceptual [vernehmenden] relation of man to being, which is not produced 
[herstellt] by man but is a relation in which being first places [stellt] or posits man. 
As we have seen, time is the Stelle or Offene and it is in this Stelle that man is placed 
by being. But if this is how theory first arises in the beginning, then everything about 
this beginning [Anfängliche] is forgotten, says Heidegger. The theoretical becomes 
an event [Veranstaltung] of human subjectivity, of the representing [vorstellenden] 
subject, wherein a distinction is drawn between the theoretical and the practical, as 
William McNeill describes: ‘[T]heoria in modernity thus becomes world-
representational thinking, a “seeing” that occupies an imagined third-person, 
spectatorial position from which it sees everything and to which it relates everything 
back.’84 The fall of qewri/a from its meaning as seeing the encountering look to its 
representational meaning as that which is need of practical proof to back up its 
claims arises from a series of displacings, in which the Stelle of being becomes the 
Vorstellung of human beings, so that being itself is displaced. The Greek experience 
of qewri/a does not prioritise seeing and looking, says Heidegger, it ‘testifies above 
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all to the primordial holding sway of the essence of a0lh/qeia, in which there dwells 
something like the clearing, the lighted, and the open’.85 
 
The open is the light of the self-lighting, says Heidegger, which is freedom. But this 
is neither the freedom of the human being, nor the metaphysical thought of freedom. 
This form of freedom only arises on the basis of a prior, originary freedom. 
Understanding what this open is, what freedom is, cannot be derived from the 
ordinary understanding of freedom: ‘Strictly speaking, the essence of the open 
reveals itself only to a thinking that attempts to think Being itself in the way that it is 
presaged to our destiny [Geschick] in the history [Geschichte] of the West as what is 
to be thought in the name and essence of a0lh/qeia.’86 Only those willing to use 
a0lh/qeia as their guiding word in thinking of being will approach this understanding. 
What is required is a simple wakefulness in the nearness [Nähe] to any being, an 
awakening that suddenly [Erwachen plötzlich] sees that the being is. In essence, a 
thinking of being is the coup de foudre of the es ist, the it is. Being, as the it is of 
beings shows itself as an eruption into appearance from out of non-appearance. 
Heidegger gives us Greek terms, meaning suddenly, e0cai/fnhj and e0cafanh/j, both 
of which in their etymology refer to fai/nw, from which the term phenomenon 
derives. The Greek term itself means out of non-appearing. This is what the thinking 
of being is: ‘The awakening for this “it is” of a being, and above all the remaining 
awake for the “it is”, and the watching over the clearing of beings – that constitutes 
the essence of essential thinking.’87 The sudden eruption of being into beings, which 
only appear as beings, has an equivalent correspondence on the part of the human 
being who no longer turns to beings but thinks being, says Heidegger. The human 
being has a Verhalten towards being. Verhalten means behaviour or conduct, as a 
verb it means to hold and as an adjective it means restrained, a sort of holding back. 
The human being’s conduct towards being is a kind of holding that holds back, it is 
not a holding that grasps or masters but takes up a place in the Aufenthalt of being. 
To arrive at the open, to come into freedom, it is necessary to think the it is, it is 
necessary to think being. To think being is to think the it is, but this is not the 
thinking of calculation but a proper [eigentliche] thinking that progresses by leaps 
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and bounds, that forswears the supporting structures of explanations [Erklärens], 
says Heidegger, because explanations remain on the ground of facts, because a 
thinking of calculation only ever derives beings out of beings, not being. Every time 
that the focus is on beings, being falls into Vergessung. The thought of beings is the 
event of being’s obliviation. 
 
To think being, to think the it is, is to leap [abspringen] into the groundless, says 
Heidegger and all genuine thinking is always groundless. This ground is the Boden 
rather than the Grund. Boden can mean soil or land, as well as ground, and 
Heidegger’s contemporary audience might well have heard the Blut und Boden of 
National Socialist ideology here, and perhaps Heidegger’s use of such a term marks 
an attempt to repudiate such an ideology. A detailed reading of Heidegger’s use of 
Boden in relation to National Socialism is beyond the scope of what I am pursuing 
here. I merely mark it as a potential instance of Heidegger distancing himself both 
from the regime itself and the position he had taken within it about ten years earlier 
as Rector of Freiburg University. Being, says Heidegger, is not a ground [Boden] but 
is in fact groundless [Boden-lose], because from the beginning [anfänglich], it is 
removed from both Boden and Grund because neither are necessary to it. Implicitly, 
it is Western metaphysics that stays mired in the Boden as a thinking that always 
needs the bridges [Brücken], railings and ladders of explanation to support itself. But 
this ground is not the ground that metaphysics thinks it is; it is brüchig, brittle, he 
says. Its bridges are broken. This groundlessness is only a lack when seen in relation 
to beings and the pursuit of beings, says Heidegger. It is this very pursuit of a ground 
in beings that constitutes the absence of ground. Through this pursuit, human beings 
never make the leap into being or escape the oblivion of being, although being is 
always in close proximity and the possibility of thinking the ‘it is’ as the free in the 
lighting is always open. Being is the unsecured securing. As groundless, it is the 
originary, anfänglich, sheltering, but it is not the equivalent of a sanctuary or a refuge 
where human beings can settle themselves among beings. Instead, it is the 
Wesensstätte, the essential place, of human beings in relation to the self-illumination 
of being. All unconcealedness of beings is secured by being in the open but this 
securing also conceals the originary decision of being’s giving of the 
unconcealedness of human beings, the truth of beings as a whole. History begins in 
this decision, says Heidegger, and the historical human being always belongs in the 
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Zufügung of being, translated as bestowal. But zufügen means to cause or to add or 
enclose. Fügen is a kind of placing, so it could be said that being here places and 
encloses the human being. 
 
Heidegger takes up the question of the it is again in the ‘Letter on “Humanism”’ 
where he claims that Parmenides’s saying e1sti ga\r ei]nai – for there is being – is 
still to be thought and contains the anfänglich mystery for all thinking. The fact that 
being is is approached by Heidegger through the idiomatic phrase es gibt – there is or 
there are – which he uses to avoid saying that ‘being is’. But, as with being in 
relation to Anwesen and the enigma, es gibt is vorläufig, that is, it is a provisional 
word in relation to this avoidance, the implication being that sooner rather than later 
the ‘is’ will have to be addressed. In the meantime, it is necessary to avoid saying 
being is because, by doing so, being is confused with beings and the human being 
busies itself with beings to the exclusion of being which inevitably leads to the 
obliviation of being: ‘Perhaps “is” can be said only of being in an appropriate 
[gemäßen] way, so that no individual being ever properly [eigentlich] “is”. But 
because thinking should be directed only toward saying being in its truth, instead of 
explaining [erklären] it as a particular being in terms of beings, whether and how 
being is must remain an open question for the careful attention of thinking.’88 It is a 
question of getting the measure of being in terms of the ‘is’ but in a way that the 
question always remains open for thinking. Philosophy’s progress can be measured 
by how it stands in relation to this saying of Parmenides. Progress, however, is a 
mistake. Essential thinking, that which attends to Parmenides’s saying, stays in the 
same place [Stelle] thinking the same [dasselbe], says Heidegger. Thinking as 
progress is merely the shadow that follows essential thinking. Philosophy is such a 
thinking, a shadow play. The thinking of essential thinkers revolves around the es 
gibt as the destiny [Geschick] of being and, as such, this thinking into the truth of 
being, is historical, says Heidegger, in the sense that it belongs to the history of being 
and is a remembrance [Andenken] of it. History, as we know, is not the happening of 
past events: ‘The happening of history occurs essentially as the destiny of the truth of 
being and from it…Being comes to its destiny in that It, being, gives itself…this 
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says: It gives itself and refuses itself simultaneously.’89 All other history - Hegelian, 
Marxian, Nietzschean - while neither true nor false, is merely metaphysical. These 
belong to the history of the truth of being, that is they testify to the truth of being, 
without essentially being a thinking of being. The relation of being to beings is of 
homelessness [Heimatlosigkeit] where beings are abandoned by being and this 
homelessness is a sign [Zeichen] of the oblivion of being [Seinsvergessenheit]. Home 
[Heimat] is not thought here along nationalistic lines but as a historical dwelling in 
the nearness of being, says Heidegger, and human beings are the shepherd of being, 
the shepherd that both belongs to being and preserves its truth. 
 
The saying of Parmenides has yet to be thought [noch ungedacht], says Heidegger, 
so any thinking of es gibt is still unthought. Heidegger’s entire thought of being 
seems to rest in this noch, this yet or still. In the essay, ‘The Nature of Language’, we 
return to the ‘is’ [ist] where the question is again of the is of the is. This is is nowhere 
to be found, says Heidegger, it is not a thing attached to a thing. But in this thought 
of the seeming absence of the ‘is’, we are suddenly awoken [plötzlich erwachen] and 
catch sight of something other. This is the coup de foudre of essential thinking 
described above, using the same two words. In this essay, Heidegger is discussing a 
line from a poem by Stefan George, ‘The Word’ – Kein ding sei wo das wort 
gebricht, ‘No thing may be where the word is lacking’. Neither the word, or the is, is, 
neither come into thinghood, being, says Heidegger: ‘What the poetic experience 
with language says of the word implies the relation between the “is” which itself is 
not, and the word which is in the same case of not being a being.’90 We say is but in 
the very moment of its saying the is escapes us. The poetic experience is of what 
there is [es gibt] and yet is not. The es gibt points to the fact that what is is not: ‘If 
our thinking does justice to the matter, then we may never say of the word that it is, 
but rather that it gives – not in the sense that words are given by an “it,” but that the 
word itself gives. The word itself is the giver. What does it give? To go by the poetic 
experience and by the most ancient tradition of thinking, the word gives being [gibt 
das Wort: das Sein].’91 Our thinking has to seek in every es, das gibt the giving that 
is never given, or the giver that is never given. As Gerald Bruns points out, the 
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English translation turns Heidegger’s appositional phrase - gibt das Wort: das Sein – 
into a propositional one, the paratactic into the syntactic: ‘Heidegger inscribes the 
expression paratactically – in imitation, evidently, of the ancients, that is, the Pre-
Socratics, who did not (Heidegger says) organize their thinking into little totalities of 
simultaneous gatherings (syntaxes) but rather were inclined to leave things open, as if 
in a space where there are no words – as if in that place into which we are drawn 
when words fail us or withdraw themselves, leaving us bereft of speech, not knowing 
what to say, as in the region of parataxis.’92 As William Allen says, Heidegger often 
departs from the syntactic into ‘a paratactic suspension of relation between words, 
which are then intercut by colons to indicate the unknown and open nature of their 
relation’.93 The way that es gibt is used here in Heidegger’s reflections is to say not 
that there is the word but that it, the word, gives. The word is the giving that gives: 
‘This simple, ungraspable [ungreifbare] situation which we call up with the phrase 
“it, the word, gives,” reveals [enthüllt] itself as what is properly worthy of thought, 
but for whose definition [Bestimmung] all standards [Maße] are still lacking in every 
way.’94 There are no measures to determine the es gibt. In the unveiling of the es gibt 
as that which is most thought-worthy, it is withdrawn into measurelessness.  
 
Heidegger returns to the es gibt five years later in the lecture ‘Time and Being’, with 
Parmenides’s saying, e1sti ga\r ei]nai, again playing a pivotal role in his reflections 
on this German idiom. The e1sti in Parmenides’s saying, says Heidegger, cannot be 
taken as representing [vorstellen] being as a being because, although everything of 
which we say ‘it is’ [es sei] is taken to be a being, being itself is not a being therefore 
the e1sti has to mean literally ‘it is’. E1sti names being but not as a being. Heidegger, 
however, can hear in this e1sti what the Greeks thought thereby and which he says 
can be paraphrased as Es vermag. Vermögen means to be able, to be capable, so that 
the e1sti becomes a kind of initiating capability because, although the Greeks did not 
think this capability – it remained unthought as the It which is capable of being – 
being capable of being means to yield and give being [Sein vermögen heißt: Sein 
ergeben und geben]. Ergeben is both to produce and to give up, to surrender and to 
                                                 
92
 Gerald L. Bruns, Heidegger’s Estrangements: Language, Truth, and Poetry in the Later Writings, 
New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1989, pp.133-134. 
93
 William S. Allen, Ellipsis: Of Poetry and the Experience of Language after Heidegger, Hölderlin, 
and Blanchot, Albany, State University of New York Press, 2007, p178. 
94
 Heidegger, On the Way to Language, p.88/p.194. 
 218
reveal. As an adjective, it means devoted, humble or submissive. Being is, therefore, 
a giving and a giving up. On the basis of identifying this capability, Heidegger 
claims that the e1sti is the es gibt: ‘In the beginning [Beginn] of Western thinking, 
Being is thought, but not the “It gives” as such. The latter withdraws in favor of the 
gift which It gives. That gift is thought and conceptualized from then on exclusively 
as Being with regard to beings.’95 Being is what is sent in this giving, in this gift, and 
Heidegger defines sending [Geschick], or names sending more precisely, as a giving 
which gives only its gift, but which in the giving holds itself back [zurückhalten] and 
withdraws [entziehen]. What is sent in this sending is being, being is what is given, 
what the It gives, but being on this basis is not the giving, nor is it the It that gives. 
Both the sending and the It that sends hold back from self-showing. 
 
Heidegger defines the idea of an epoch as a kind of holding back, using the Greek 
term e0poxh/, which means halt or cessation but, as derived from e0pe/xw, means to 
hold back or to check. An epoch of being is not a specific period in time but is the 
basic trait of sending in the destiny of being [Seinsgeschickes], in which being is held 
back in favour of the gift’s being perceptible [Vernehmbarkeit] as being’s grounding 
of beings. Thus an epoch of being is one where being itself is not thought, or rather is 
thought as the being of beings, rather than being itself, or the es gibt, being thought. 
Throughout this epochal history, and there have been a number of epochs rather than 
just one, being as Anwesenheit, as presence or presencing, has been covered up 
[verdecken] in many ways, says Heidegger. To think being, it is necessary to forego 
being as the ground of beings and to think of the giving, that is to think the es gibt. 
Giving is concealed in Entbergen, disclosure, and being is the gift of this giving, the 
gift of the es gibt. Being is an allowing to presence. Being, as the gift of the es gibt, 
belongs in the giving and, as a gift, it is not thrown out of the giving. Being, 
presencing is transformed. As an allowing to presence, it belongs in disclosure but as 
the gift of such disclosure, being remains kept back in the giving. As Jean-Luc 
Marion writes: ‘The giving is held back from the gift, from its visibility and its 
availability, precisely because in giving it it undoes itself and withdraws from it, 
therefore turns itself away from the gift and abandons it to itself. By an inescapable 
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consequence, the giving can never appear with, or still less as the gift given by it, 
since to give it not only does it leave it behind; it also differs from it.’96 
 
Being is not, says Heidegger. Being is given as the disclosure of presencing but 
being itself is not this disclosure. Being stays in the als of as disclosure, because 
being never appears as such, it only appears as the disclosure of presencing. Being is 
withdrawn in the allowing to presence, which is: ‘[T]o unconceal [Entbergen], to 
bring to openness. In unconcealing prevails a giving, the giving that gives 
presencing, that is, Being, in letting-presence.’97 Giving is a spielen, a being-at-play, 
in disclosure and from out of disclosure there speaks a giving, an es gibt: ‘[W]hat is 
peculiar [Eigentümliche] to Being, that to which Being belongs and in which it 
remains retained [einbehalten bleibt], shows itself in the It gives and its giving as 
sending.’98 Being belongs to, and is retained in, its own specificity and while this is 
shown in the It and in the giving, being is held back. Being’s specificity, its singular 
property, is, however, not being-like [Seinsartiges]. What is ownmost to being does 
not have the character of being, says Heidegger. To think specifically [eigens] about 
being is in fact to move away from being. To think in such a manner is to be on the 
way [Weg] to the destiny, or sending, of being as the gift. To think being is no longer 
to think being but of the gift [Gabe] of the es gibt. As Marion writes, ‘it is no longer 
a question of thinking Being directly as such (in the fashion of a being), but rather its 
withdrawal as such, since this withdrawal is given as Being’.99 It is the promise that 
would have already been withdrawn prior to the promise having been made. 
 
But if being is not the giving, or the It that gives, is it possible to say what is? Could 
it be that time is ‘the It which gives Being, which determines Being as presencing 
and allowing-to-presence’?100 This is the second strand that Heidegger follows in this 
essay in his attempt to think the giving and the It of es gibt. Time, just as much as 
being, is implicated in presence and coming to presence and, just as being is not a 
being, time is not Zeitlich, temporal or timely. Time, of course, is no mere seriality, 
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nor can time as presence be determined by time as the now or as a series of nows. 
The question that Heidegger asks in relation to time is what matter [Sache] are we 
thinking when we say presencing [Anwesen]? He answers: ‘To presence [Wesen] 
means to last [Währen]. But we are too quickly content to conceive lasting as mere 
duration, and to conceive duration in terms of the customary representation of time 
as a span of time from one now to a subsequent now. To talk of presencing, however, 
requires that we perceive biding [Weilen] and abiding [Verweilen] in lasting as 
lasting [Anwähren] in present being. What is present concerns us, the present, that is: 
what, lasting, comes toward us, us human beings.’101 Presencing is a tarrying-
staying-dwelling-whiling. It is an enduring sojourning, an abiding, that approaches 
the human being, reaches [reichen] him and extends [erreichen] towards him. 
Human beings receive the gift of presencing, that is given in the es gibt, through the 
perception [vernehmen] of that which appears in Anwesenlassen, the allowing of 
presence. 
 
Presencing is not just the presencing of what is present. It is just as intimately 
involved with the presencing of absence, both in terms of what has been and what is 
yet to come so that time is the mutual byplay of past, present and future: ‘But prior to 
all calculation of time and independent of such calculation, what is germane [Eigene] 
to the time-space of true [eigentlichen] time consists in the mutual reaching out and 
opening up of future, past and present. Accordingly, what we call dimension and 
dimensionality in a way easily misconstrued, belongs [eignet] to true time and to it 
alone. Dimensionality consists in a reaching [Reichen] out that opens up, in which 
futural approaching brings about what has been, what has been brings about futural 
approaching, and the reciprocal relation of both brings about the opening up of 
openness.’102 Dimension here is reaching, giving and opening up, and the unity of 
time’s three dimensions consists in a mutual, tripartite interplay [Zuspiel]. This 
Zuspiel proves to be true time, what Heidegger calls die eigentliche Zeit, time that is 
its own, proper time and it is the interplay that plays in time’s ownness [im Eigenen 
der Zeit], that is the playing and reaching that constitutes time and is the fourth 
dimension of time: ‘But the dimension which we call the fourth in our count is…the 
first, that is, the giving that determines all. In future, in past, in the present, that 
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giving brings about to each its own presencing, holds them apart thus opened and so 
holds them toward one another in the nearness by which the three dimensions remain 
near one another.’103  
 
The fourth dimension is the first dimension, says Heidegger, the dimension that gives 
forward into mutual play the not yet, the having been and the present. This fourth 
dimension which, as anfängliche, that which belongs to the beginning as beginning, 
is the inceptive [an-fangende] reaching or extension [Reichen] wherein is founded 
[beruhen], the unity of eigentlich time. Heidegger calls this original inception 
‘nearing nearness’ [nähernde Nähe] or nearhood [Näheit] which involves a nearness 
that is also a distance, in which the past, present and future are brought together but 
only by keeping them apart. What has been is held open by nearhood while it refuses 
its future as present, or refuses its arrival as the present: ‘This nearing of nearness 
keeps open the approach [Ankommen] coming from the future [Zukunft] by 
withholding the present in the approach [Kommen]. Nearing nearness has the 
character of denial and withholding. It unifies in advance the ways in which what 
has-been, what is about to be, and the present reach out toward each other.’104 Time, 
therefore does not have the character of the ‘is’, rather there is a giving of time, es 
gibt time. Time is given by nearness, but this nearness is both a withholding 
[Vorenthalt] and a refusal: ‘It grants the openness of time-space and preserves what 
remains denied in what has-been, what is held in approach. We call the giving which 
gives true time an extending which opens and conceals. As extending is itself a 
giving, the giving of a giving is concealed in true time.’105 True time, proper time, 
time in its singularity, is the unitary threefold lighting nearness of the present, having 
been and the to-come. Human beings stand within [innestehen] this threefold 
Reichen, and endure [ausstehen] the nearness which determines the Reichen in its 
denying and withholding. As Ziarek points out, Reichen is ‘the radical temporality 
beyond the division into present, past, and future, and therefore time understood as 
reaching must be discerned from the three-dimensional time that makes it possible 
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for presence and absence to be “reached”…Only in the context of this originary 
reaching does time disclose its four-dimensional character’.106 
 
Have we now reached the point that we can say with confidence what the It is? No, 
because with both being and time what has been elucidated is the giving of time and  
being. The giving of es gibt Sein is a sending and destining of presence in its epochal 
transformations, while the giving of time is a lighting-clearing-extending [lichtendes] 
reaching of the four-dimensional realm. The It here still remains enigmatic, says 
Heidegger. The enigma here is the It and while it may appear that time is the It that 
gives being, because being lies in time’s extension, time itself is also given by an it 
and therefore cannot be the It. The It remains as the enigma and, as yet, has not been 
determined. Nor has the relation – effectively the ‘and’ - between time and being 
been determined either. It is in naming the It and determining the ‘and’ that 
Heidegger makes his move to Ereignis. Firstly, for Heidegger, the It names the 
presence of absence, the Anwesen of Abwesen, so that whatever the It names is 
naming the presence of absence. The It is a gathering in belongingness in that what is 
singular to being and time, in coming into their own, comes into their belonging 
together. The It is named in a passage that is almost untranslatable, because of the 
way the words echo back and forth: ‘In the sending [Schicken] of the destiny 
[Geschickes] of Being, in the extending [Reichen] of time, there becomes manifest 
[sich zeigt] a dedication [Zueignen], a delivering [Übereignen] over into what is their 
own [Eigenes], namely of Being as presence and of time as the realm [Bereich] of 
the open. What determines both, time and Being, in their own, that is in their 
belonging together, we shall call [nennen]: Ereignis.’107 In its first appearance in the 
translation, Ereignis is not translated but it is then translated as ‘event’, its standard 
German meaning, or as ‘event of appropriation’, a commonly accepted term in 
Heidegger translations. But it is never a happening or occurrence, says Heidegger. It 
is not an event, as such. It is that which gives but is not the given. But to say what it 
is and what it is not is already, in a way, to betray it. To say the It of es gibt is 
Ereignis is to represent it as a being, which is to cover up the matter at hand. The 
statement that the It is Ereignis is both correct [richtig] and untrue [unwahr], he says. 
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What can be said about it then? Firstly, Ereignis appears to be a kind of gathering, 
and intensification, around the Eigen, around what is one’s own, or what is singular 
or proper to one. We can see this in the Zueignen and the Übereignen, both of which 
are nominalised verbs where Heidegger eschews the use of the nouns associated with 
these terms, and which suggests an essential movement within Ereignis, a movement 
within and around giving. Secondly, to come into one’s own, that which is 
determined by Ereignis, is to come into a co-belonging. At the very moment of 
singularity, the moment of the Eigen, there is a togetherness, brought about through a 
prior belonging. Being and time are determined in their relation, in the and that 
points to this relation, at the precise moment that they come into their own, so that 
coming into one’s own is always already a relation to the other, to that which is not 
one’s own. In coming into one’s own, being and time come into a prior belonging, in 
the same way that to\ a0uto/ names the prior belonging of thinking and being. Time 
and being are related in terms of the Eigen that each of them comes into. Ereignis 
names this relation of Eigen and maintains being and time in their belonging 
together: ‘What lets the two matters belong together, what brings the two into their 
own and, even more, maintains and holds them in their belonging together – the way 
the two matters stand, the matter at stake – is Appropriation [Ereignis].’108 The 
attempt to say what Ereignis is is, however, seemingly impossible because the 
propositional statement poses the question of Ereignis in a way that obscures it. If 
being is not a being and time is nothing timely, then it would follow that the event is 
not an event. Nor is it a question of erecting Ereignis as ‘the encompassing general 
concept under which Being and time could be subsumed’.109 It is not a question of 
logic: ‘For as we think Being itself and follow what is its own, Being proves to be 
destiny’s gift of presence, the gift granted by the giving of time. The gift of presence 
is the property of Appropriating [Eigentum des Ereignens]. Being vanishes in 
Appropriation. In the phrase “Being as Appropriation,” the word “as” now means: 
Being, letting-presence sent in Appropriating, time extended in Appropriating. Time 
and Being appropriated in Appropriation.’110 As Ziarek writes, by writing being and 
time into Ereignis, Heidegger moves away from prioritising being to a position 
where both being and time are the necessary givens for any disclosure. His thought 
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becomes located within the proximity of time and being. It shows, he says, an 
impossible naming, ‘the impossibility of finding or writing the one, the correct, word 
that could name “what has been called ‘Being’ up to now”’.111 
 
Ereignis is the marking of the own of time and being, that gathers together what is 
proper to being and time, that brings their singularity into relationality and holds 
them within that relation. Being and time are brought into their own in the bringing 
that is Ereignis, which itself is concealed in destiny and the lighting, that is the 
opening, extending. But this coming into one’s own is just as much a withdrawal, 
just as much a keeping back. Giving as sending always involves a keeping back, says 
Heidegger, in which the denial and withholding of the present are at play within the 
having-been and the to-come. It is because withdrawal determines Schicken and 
Reichen, which rest in Ereignis, that withdrawal itself is a singular property 
[Eigentümlich] of Ereignis: ‘Appropriating makes manifest its peculiar property 
[Eigentümliche], that Appropriation withdraws what is most fully its own from 
boundless unconcealment. Thought in terms of Appropriating, this means: in that 
sense it expropriates [enteignet] itself of itself. Expropriation [Enteignis] belongs to 
Appropriation as such. By this expropriation, Appropriation does not abandon itself 
[aufgeben] – rather, it preserves [bewahrt] what is its own [Eigentum].’112 So within 
appropriation is expropriation, within the coming into one’s own lies a kind of 
disabling or dislocating of what is one’s own. Thus, where time and being come into 
their own, there is already a relation, a belonging, that dispossesses them, that 
displaces the ownership of the own such that this belonging together can only be a 
belonging of difference, a belonging of difference in the same, to\ a0uto/. A shifting 
takes place or place becomes a certain shifting. Ereignis does not give itself up, it 
does not surrender itself, it neither offers itself nor does it abandon itself. It keeps 
itself to itself. Its own remains concealed. Does it keep its own counsel? In the giving 
of being and time, neither of which is, the It that gives does not give itself.  
 
In naming the It the enigmatic It, and then naming this It as Ereignis, has Heidegger 
then solved the enigma? Or has he reinscribed the enigma into the heart of the es gibt 
and essentially rendered the enigma insoluble and the es gibt as enigmatic? Has he, 
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as Marion argues, done precisely what he warned against, that is posited the 
enigmatic It arbitrarily as ‘an indeterminate power which is supposed to bring about 
all giving of Being and of time’?113 Marion’s argument, in a broader one which 
claims that Heidegger draws back from givenness as phenomenological principle, 
even though he reverts to givenness and espouses its function as principle, is that by 
naming the It as Ereignis Heidegger violates its anonymity and obscures the enigma. 
Heidegger uses the properties of givenness ‘but without admitting that they arise 
from givenness’.114 The enigmatic It must remain anonymous and indeterminate, 
says Marion, because otherwise it would turn into a being, if not the supreme being. 
In essence, Heidegger is making two moves, says Marion, the first wherein presence, 
as being, is reduced to a gift appropriate to givenness, and the second, which 
completes and annuls the first, wherein givenness is abolished in the Ereignis. But is 
this what is happening here? Heidegger himself is at pains to point out that Ereignis 
is not an all-encompassing concept [umgreifende Oberbegriff] which swallows up 
being and time, nor should we understand it as an event as such, as Vorkommnis and 
Geschehnis, that is an incident, occurrence or happening, a point he made in Identity 
and Difference, where he also describes it as a pure singularity, a singulare tantum, 
and as untranslatable as the lo/goj or the Tao. Bruns says Ereignis is as unspeakable 
and uncontainable as a pun which cannot be caught in a term or a statement. It is no 
longer simply what it names. It has become rifted or dif-ferent. Marion translates the 
term as avènement which means accession, such as a king acceding to the throne, or 
advent where the advent is of something significant, even Messianic; événement is 
usually translated as event and has more mundane connotations. Avènement is 
cognate with avenir, the future, so that there is always a sense of something still to 
come with avènement. To translate Ereignis, which, despite Heidegger’s use, still 
refers to an ordinary event, as avènement, is to have already interpreted it in a certain 
way, as something portentous or ominous, values which the German word may not 
have. Nor does Marion question the term itself, he does not venture into ‘the 
polysemy of eigen and eignen’, as Ziarek puts it,115 or, indeed, of the äugen,116 of 
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being called into the Blick, the look, as Heidegger says in Identity and Difference. 
Here, Ereignis is linked with er-äugen which is linked to the Blick, via the ‘as’ of  er-
äugen as erblicken.  
 
It is true that an exhortation by Heidegger not to read Ereignis in a certain way is not 
a guarantee that it cannot be read in that way and if this was all there was to it then 
the matter should end there. Equally, the terminology Heidegger uses can lead to 
charges, such as those of Marion’s. As Blanchot writes, granting that eigen does not 
have to mean ‘property or ‘appropriation’: ‘But why eigen, why “proper” (how else 
can this word be translated?), and not “improper”? Why this word? Why “presence” 
in its stubborn (patient) affirmation, which makes us repudiate “absence”?’117 
Certainly Heidegger’s remarks would seem to indicate that he was fully aware of the 
danger that Marion describes, especially when considering his comments at the end 
of ‘Time and Being’ when he says that the very form of a lecture hinders the saying 
of Ereignis and that the lecture itself spoke merely in propositional statements 
[Aussagesätzen]. As Michael Lewis points out, the very idea of a thesis on being is 
one that Heidegger moves away from: ‘The immediate presentation of a thesis on 
being is exactly what Heidegger realized to be impossible as he came to think being 
as always already having withdrawn from the totality and therefore from man, as a 
pre-original withdrawal in whose wake the entire metaphysical tradition must exist in 
a constantly frustrated attempt to understand its own loss.’118 What is more, Ereignis 
is also Enteignis, that is power or possession is also powerlessness or dispossession, 
appropriation is also expropriation, position: dis-position. As Dastur remarks, it is 
because Ereignis is not structured as a self and can only be thought as Schicken - a 
giving of givenness as a holding back and withdrawal – ‘that it is in itself Enteignis, 
that is, the groundless ground of Being, its abyss’.119 In so far as the sending of being 
rests in the reach, or extension, of time, and in so far as time and being rest in 
Ereignis, the singularness [Eigentümliche] of Ereignis manifests itself, announces 
itself, as that which withdraws from unbounded unconcealment, that is it withdraws 
into concealment. Ereignis is the play of withdrawal in manifestation, of 
dispossession in possession, of holding in withholding, of concealment in 
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unconcealment. Does not this doubled movement trouble the identification of 
Ereignis with an indeterminate power? Does it not question the very idea of power 
where power is a keeping to itself, a kind of refusal that preserves itself in itself? It 
should be recalled that Heidegger identified Ereignis with the Now of ‘The Ister’, 
which I claimed marked the erased trace of a prior time that could never be figured 
into the poem. In so far as Ereignis names the It, therefore, the naming is more of a 
gathering, a drawing together of the eigen and the eignen, in which it names the 
coming into one’s own by gathering what is ownmost into itself. This gathering, says 
Dastur, is not a subject taking possession of something other but an allowing of 
something to be what it is. If the givenness of being and time rests in their coming 
into their own, then the naming of the It as Ereignis is perhaps just a way of showing 
this movement rather than it being the ultimate prime mover.  
 
In his thinking in and around the poem of Parmenides, Heidegger has resorted more 
and more to the figure of the enigma, referring to it far more than he had done with 
the origin of the work of art, the enigma of the rivers or the uncanny. The enigma 
marks to\ a0uto/, a0lh/qeia, and e1sti ga\r ei]nai. It marks the es gibt and Ereignis. His 
thought seems to be constantly moving in the place of the enigma and Heidegger has 
inscribed it at the very heart of the possibility of appearing, at the very heart of being 
and truth, being and thinking, time and being. More than anywhere else there is a 
sense of the provisional, the temporary, at work here, that the name that Heidegger 
uses, whether it is being or presencing, unconcealment or disclosure, are only ever 
interim names, measures for which there is no measure. It is perhaps not accidental 
that the poem of Parmenides is used as the context for the provisionality of the name. 
As Wilkinson notes, the speech of the goddess in the poem is completely lacking in 
names: ‘Just as the goddess does not name or describe herself or the “House” in 
which she abides, neither does the goddess name the subject of her speech. Perhaps 
this is the quest for all who hear the goddess’ speech: for hers is a muthos without 
names.’120 The enigma, as the withdrawn promise, is the mark of this provisionality, 
the settlement that is never settled, the position that is always dis-position, the place 
that is always displaced. It is not a question of saying ‘the enigma is being’ or ‘the 
enigma is truth’. This would be to make the enigma another being and to make the 
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enigma another metaphysical concept. The enigma is a promise that a name can be 
found, but this name is always already withdrawn in the prior withdrawal of the 
promise. Being was only ever a provisional word for the enigma, the one that runs 
ahead, announcing it in its non-announcing. Perhaps Ereignis is just another 
provisional name for the enigma, something that will do for the time being. Rather 
than being the naming of an absolute advent, it is a non-locatable, unfixable 
givenness that can only be said paratactically. Or perhaps it can only be said 
tautologically. In the 1973 Zähringen seminar, Heidegger describes Parmenides’s 
e1sti ga\r ei]nai as a genuine tautology and the domain of the inapparent, das 
Unscheinbare. This tautology, as a le/gein of to\ a0uto/, is a speaking of the same: 
Sein: Anwesen: Es gibt: Ereignis: Rätsel.  
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Epilogue 
 
A time and place for us 
 
I want to start this epilogue by looking at two short stories; one, by Franz Kafka, 
published posthumously as one of a number of Betrachtungen, reflections or 
observations, is merely a single sentence; the other, ‘In the Fertile Land’, by Gabriel 
Josipovici, barely covers two pages. Despite their brevity, both of them, however, 
seem to say something about the enigma, in terms of its timing and placing, as it 
arises in this thesis in relation to the work of Martin Heidegger. The story by Kafka 
is short enough to be given in full: 
 
‘Leopards break into the temple and drink the sacrificial vessels dry; this is 
repeated [wiederholt] over and over again [immer wieder]; finally 
[schießlich] it can be calculated in advance [vorausberechnen] and it 
becomes a part [Teil] of the ceremony.’1 
 
What begins as a savage interruption, as a sacrilegious eruption and disturbance, in 
that the sacrificial cups are emptied of their liquid, is incorporated into the ritual and 
closed off, in a sense. After the invasion by the leopards has happened enough times 
– and the question of this enough has to be reckoned - their entrance and activity can 
be predicted so that what was once disturbance can become performance. In essence, 
the ritual absorbs this strange intrusion and makes it its own, without ever actually 
possessing it because, while their entrance can be formalised ritually, the ceremony 
does not control it; it only marks their time. The ritual takes account of the intrusion 
without necessarily being able to give an account of it, because no narrative can be 
given which makes sense of it. In a sense, the leopards remain outside the ceremony 
while taking part within it. Their part [Teil] in the ritual never becomes a judgement 
[Urteil]. The leopards share in the ceremony, without being shared, and the 
                                                 
1
 Franz Kafka, The Great Wall of China and Other Short Works, translated by Malcolm Pasley, 
Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1973, p.82. Gesammelte Werke: Hochzeitsvorbereitungen auf dem 
Lande und andere Prosa aus dem Nachlass, herausgegeben von Max Brod, Frankfurt am Main, S 
Fischer Verlag Lizenzausgabe von Schocken Books, New York, 1953, p.41. 
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acknowledgement, the reckoning, of the leopards that is contained within the 
vorausberechnen stops short of being knowledge.  
 
What remains enigmatic, it seems to me, is precisely the point at which the entrance 
of the leopards moves from being disturbing to being foreseen, from being a rupture 
in the ceremony to being ceremonialised. The now when the leopards become part of 
the ceremony is never a now that it is possible to experience precisely because in 
saying now, the now has already gone. It has already been decided prior to this now 
and they are already part of the ceremony by the time that part has been formalised. 
As I argued, in relation to the ‘Jezt komme, Feuer’, which marks the beginning of 
Hölderlin’s ‘The Ister’, and which Heidegger related to the time of the poets, this 
now marks a time that has already passed. The poets have already been called prior 
to the now of the calling. By the time it has been decided that the leopards will form 
part of the ceremony they have always already been part of the ceremony. The 
repetition [wiederholen] of the action cannot be retrieved [wiederholen] as an origin 
of the action. Equally, one can see the movement of the no/moj here, in the way that 
the laws that Antigone was acting in the name of were never an appearance. They 
became law beyond or outside this non-appearance. The unwritten and unfailing laws 
came out of a time that was never a phenomenon. The experience of the now when 
the leopards are incorporated into the ceremony can only be experienced as, and in, 
its recollection. It is a past that is never present to itself. 
 
If Kafka’s story says something about the time of the enigma, then Josipovici’s story 
says something about the place. A nameless narrator begins this story, and even in 
this non-naming, we can perhaps begin to glimpse the enigma as enigma: ‘We live in 
a fertile land. Here we have all we want. Beyond the borders, far away, lies the 
desert, where nothing grows.’2 The fertile land is full of everything the narrator 
needs, everything grows there, human beings are free to live up to and exceed their 
potential. Everything is plenitude and bountiful. The narrator’s place here is certain, 
fixed and grounded. People are settled in the settlement that is the fertile land. The 
inhabitants of this land are always talking in an endless round of chatter and there is 
always an abundance of things to talk about. As a counterpoint to the fertile land, 
                                                 
2
 Gabriel Josipovici, ‘In the Fertile Land’, In the Fertile Land, Manchester, Carcanet, 1987, p.61. 
 231
however, there is the desert, which is barren and harsh, where nothing grows, where 
the possibility of life is impossible to imagine, and where everything is silent apart 
from the wind that whistles across the sand. On the one hand, it can be said of the 
fertile land that its centre is everywhere and circumference nowhere, but, on the other 
hand, the reverse can be said, that the circumference is everywhere and the centre 
nowhere. In this reversal, there is the desert. This desert exerts a fascination on the 
inhabitants of the fertile land to such a disturbing effect, that a law has been passed 
forbidding the mention of the desert. But this law cannot stop the narrator dreaming 
about the desert, a desert whose limits he or she finds it impossible to imagine, where 
near and far have different meanings to those they have in the fertile land, a desert 
whose silence contrasts with the continuous talk of the fertile land. But in the endless 
talk, talk that cannot mention the very subject it wants to talk about, because of the 
fear of contravening the law, talk that begins to become disturbing, oppressive, the 
thought comes to the narrator ‘that perhaps I am actually in the desert already, that I 
have crossed over and not returned, and that what the desert is really like is this, a 
place where everyone talks but where no one speaks of what concerns him most’.3 
These thoughts are typical of the fertility of the land, the narrator concludes. 
 
A story that begins certain of its place, that knows where it is, that is secure in its 
dwelling, ends in insecurity, uncertain of its place, not knowing whether it is in the 
fertile land or in the desert, whether the desert is always already the fertile land and 
the fertile land the desert. The narrator has been displaced, but it is not a question of 
merely reversing the places, saying that rather than being in the fertile land the 
narrator is in the desert. The narrator dwells in the impossibility of saying where he 
or she might possibly be dwelling, in a place that is neither the fertile land nor the 
desert and yet, at the same time, it is both the desert and the fertile land. What was 
thought to be a safe and secure home, far away from the troubling and disturbing 
desert, is no longer so safe or secure. The desert’s farness has become a nearness or, 
rather, its nearness is its farness and its farness its nearness. The borders that used to 
guarantee a safe distance from the desert have become porous. The desert and the 
fertile land bleed into each other. Rather than being grounded in a place that is 
known intimately, the narrator is staring into the abyss, into the possibility of an 
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 Josipovici, p.62. 
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absence of ground, a ground that can never be secured. What was once a putting into 
place is a being displaced. The story enacts the thought of a placing that is also a 
displacing. This, it seems to me, says something about the operation of the enigma, 
an enigma that refuses placement in its placing, that can never be finally settled into 
a here, just as it can never finally be timed into a now. It is never secure in time and 
place. The enigma is an anachronism and an anatopism, or anachorism, where the 
xro/noj is out of time and the to/poj and xw=roj name the place that is out of place, 
just as the here and now of ‘The Ister’ marked the time and place of the poem. The 
enigma is that which is out of its proper place and time, because it is always already 
improper.  
 
What both these stories suggest, for me, is a sense of insecurity, of an insecurity in 
security where this insecurity and in-security are never settled. But if the question of 
insecurity is at the heart of the enigma, the question is what this insecurity does to a 
thought that thinks the enigma in its very core. The question of the Rätsel is one that 
looms large in the thought of Martin Heidegger, but it is a question that is seemingly 
endlessly deferred, in that he never asks the question of the meaning of the enigma, 
or the truth of the enigma, and yet it always seems to accompany him along his path 
of thought. It seems to be both central to his thought and, at the same time, marginal. 
For such a term to be referenced so many times, and yet barely examined as such, 
appears to be an oversight, a lacuna. All the other terms that seem to relate to the 
enigma – art, being, presencing, unconcealment and so on – become the focus of an 
exegesis, but such an exegesis is lacking for the enigma. In this lack is its marginality 
but it is a margin that always seems to exceed its margin. A margin always frames 
the text, provides the space for the text to be, but never actually appears in the text 
itself. The text, however, could not appear without it, so that the margin’s appearance 
in the text is, precisely, its non-appearance. The appearance of the text rests precisely 
on this non-appearance. In a similar fashion, the enigma does not appear and, in view 
of its non-appearance, perhaps one can only approach the enigma in the way that 
Heidegger does, that is by not approaching it by way of an Überlegung, such as the 
consideration that he gave art in ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’. In the first dialogue 
in Country Path Conversations, the enigma appeared at the point in the dialogue 
where thinking was wandering away from the discussants or they were wandering 
away from thinking. It was by not thinking about it that the thought of it arose. The 
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way to approach the enigma, therefore, would seem to be to approach it obliquely. 
Heidegger’s approach would seem to be through the examination of other words, of 
other names, so that the question of the truth of being, the origin of the work of art, 
the question of concealment and unconcealment, of a0lh/qeia, become ways in which 
to see the enigma as enigma. Perhaps one can only approach the enigma through the 
provisionality of other names and then only in this perhaps which, as Levinas writes, 
is the modality of the enigma, its mode or manner, which can never be reduced to 
either being or certainty – these two terms being synonymous for Levinas.  
 
A thinking of the enigma, therefore, is both marginal and central to the thought of 
Heidegger. In his essay, ‘Hegel and the Greeks’, Heidegger marks the Befugnis, the 
authority, of the enigma by way of a footnote. The authority of Befugnis is the 
authority that is conferred on somebody or something, by virtue of the office that he 
or she holds, or by specific circumstances. Its authority is somehow fitting for it. In 
this authoritative thinking, the enigma is somehow given its authority as enigma by 
the enigma. It is an entitlement and is itself its own authority, but whose 
authorisation does not belong in an experience that can be specifically placed. It is an 
authority that unauthorises itself. Perhaps its authority is such that the enigma itself 
and its authority are unthinkable. It is, perhaps, the unthinkable that gives the 
measure for a thought that is a more thoughtful thought, as a Denken that is 
denkender, as Heidegger writes: ‘[T]he more thoughtful a thinking is, that is, the 
more that it is claimed by its language, the more authoritative [maßgebender] what is 
unthought becomes for it, and even what is unthinkable for it.’4 The more thinking 
thinks about the enigma, the more that thinking is given the measure by the enigma. 
But if it is the measure then, in a sense, it is also the measureless, as unthinkable. It is 
both this measurelessness and this measure, in the same way that it is both a 
centrality and marginality. It is both circumference and centre and centre and 
circumference, and the impossibility of deciding which is which.  
 
It is clear that, from the very beginning of his thought, Heidegger was making an 
appeal to the enigma, or was being called by the enigma. As Simon Critchley has 
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 Martin Heidegger, Pathmarks, edited by William McNeill, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
1998, p.333. Wegmarken, Frankfurt am Main, Vittorio Klostermann, 1976, p.440. 
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pointed out,5 the Rätsel had already figured in Being and Time; he counted at least 
ten occurrences of the word therein as it related to Dasein’s being-in-the-world. As 
this thesis has shown, the enigma was a constant reference point from the 1930s to 
the 1960s, whether it appeared merely as an afterthought to a work or whether it was 
more intimately interlaced within a work. In the thinking from the 1930s onwards, 
the enigma moves away from being Dasein-centric to being more of a question about 
the appearance of being itself, rather than Dasein’s thrown projection. Throughout 
this time, however, Heidegger only once, as far as I am aware, gave a description of 
his understanding of the enigma and, only then, as an etymological interpretation of 
the term Rätsel, which he related to care. Coupled with this explanation was an 
injunction, an injunction that was repeated at various stages in his thinking. This was 
the injunction that we should not seek to solve the enigma, we should only seek to 
see the enigma as enigma. We were, in some way, prohibited from solving the 
enigma. The solution was forbidden territory, a place and a time where it is not 
permissible to go. Where the prohibition came from is not disclosed, but perhaps the 
unthinkableness of the enigma is this prohibition. 
 
But, if the enigma was forbidden territory, it was still necessary to engage with it and 
this engagement is, clearly, not incidental to Heidegger’s thought, or it is incidental 
but in a significant way. It is inscribed at the very heart of his thinking and is related 
to key terms within that thought. What the term a0lh/qeia names, he says, is not an 
answer to what is enigmatic in thinking, it is not a crude key that unlocks the 
enigmas of thought, but is the enigma itself, what he calls the matter of thinking, die 
Sache des Denkens, the principle or cause of thinking. With regard to art, it is art 
itself which is labelled as enigmatic, art wherein world and earth strive to allow truth 
to arise. What this means is that the truth of the work of art, the truth that arises in the 
work of art is an enigma. It is here, where art is conceived as an origin, that the 
enigma operates. Art, as an allowing of truth to arise, is an origin and, therefore, the 
origin is an enigma. Whether art is at this point is still open to question, says 
Heidegger at the end of ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’, but the reflections that are 
contained in his essay are necessary for this question to be answered. Despite what 
he has written in this essay, the question of the possibility of art is still open, whether 
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 Simon Critchley, ‘Enigma Variations: an Interpretation of Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit’, Ratio (new 
series), Oxford, Blackwell, XV 2 June 2002, pp.154-175. 
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it is an origin or merely culture is undecided. Reflections of the sort contained in 
‘The Origin’ are vorläufig, that is they are only interim and provisional reflections, 
the forerunner of what is still to come.  
 
The necessity of engaging with the enigma arises again in relation to Hölderin’s river 
poems. The rivers are said to be vanishing and full of intimation, that is they stretch 
out into the past and into the future. They are where human beings dwell, but, in 
building their home there, they are building in the most difficult terrain. The now is 
proclaimed by the poet where the river is as this intimation and vanishing. What the 
rivers do is an enigma, says Heidegger, but this activity illustrates a fundamental law, 
that of the law of becoming homely in being unhomely. It is the fundamental law for 
human beings. This law, that pertains to the possibility of being at home, is an 
enigma and the enigma of this law is taken further in relation to Antigone as the most 
uncanny being, the being who, as me/toikoj and nomo/j, is ungeheuer and unheimlich, 
and seems to be beyond the possibility of a fixed and stable home and beyond the 
possibility of a fixed and stable law that can be decided once and for all. In this, 
Antigone, as the most uncanny, is the enigma. 
 
Then there is the question of the promise of being. In his writings on the ancient 
Greek thinkers, Heidegger describes how being is the provisional [vorläufig] word 
that has been put forward as the forerunner for the enigma of Anwesen, the enigma of 
presencing. In this word being, the enigma has been promised to us and this promise 
can be seen in all the words that Heidegger uses in his attempts to name presencing, 
whether it is the e1sti ga\r ei]nai of Parmenides, the a0lh/qeia of Greek thought, or 
whether it is the es gibt or Ereignis of his own thought. The enigma is the promise of 
this naming, a naming that marks the emergence of what is named, that allows it to 
take its place in a complex of relations with other names. Naming brings into being, 
it situates and fixes, and makes intelligible. Heidegger writes in ‘Logos’ that the 
enigma has long been promised to us in the word being. This promise is the zusagen 
and the question of what is promised by the enigma, or of what kind of promise the 
enigma is, has been a theme running throughout this thesis. It is in this promise that I 
want to conclude because it is in the enigma as promise that tells us how the enigma 
is to be read in Heidegger’s thought and how, in the light of this promise, this 
thought is to be read. A promise is a giving towards the future, it is an openness 
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towards the future, and is a form of assurance and an undertaking. The promisor 
assures the promisee that something will be done at a future date, or that something 
will happen. It is a question of creating expectations, of guaranteeing, at least 
implicitly if not explicitly, that a forthcoming event will take place. It is to say that 
the potential will become actual. In a way, the promise is a giving, but it is a giving 
that, as promise, always covers a lack. The promise seeks to make present an absence 
so that what is not there yet will come about. A future state of affairs will resolve 
whatever is at issue in the current state of affairs. In its very terminology, a promise 
is a sending forth, a sending forth that always expects to be met and fulfilled. Even 
so, however, there is still a certain provisionality about the promise, it can never be 
definitively pinned down. After all, a promise can be broken but, usually, the 
expectation is that the promise will be kept.  
 
The promise of the enigma, however, unsettles this movement, and perhaps unsettles 
it in this very keeping. To keep a promise is to ensure that the promise is fulfilled, 
but to keep also means to hold something back, to not let it go. In this sense, the 
promise keeps itself to itself and refuses to send itself forth. An enigma is a promise, 
the promise that a solution can be found to the enigma, that would have been 
withdrawn prior to the promise having been made. Its withdrawal exists in a future 
that has already happened even before the making of the promise, but the promise 
can only have been made in a past that is not available to any kind of experience. The 
promise is only experienced as the recollection of this experience. It is never an 
experience as such, only its memory or memorial. In the term being, the enigma has 
been promised to us, but it is a promise that can never be fulfilled. Being, as the 
promise, has been sent forth but, in this sending forth, it has already been withdrawn. 
The withdrawal occurs in a past that has not yet been but this past is still prior to the 
promise having been made. The enigma is this impossible promise, precisely because 
it is constituted as insoluble, but it is still a promise that retains its status as promise, 
even though the promise of a solution has been withdrawn. But if the enigma has 
been promised in the origin of the work of art, in the name being, it has also been 
promised as a0lh/qeia, es gibt and Ereignis. Each name attempts to name the enigma 
but in the promise of this naming lies the withdrawal of the name. In the tensions and 
torsions of the enigma rests the settlement that can never be settled. 
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